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BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NORTH AMERICA
1864-1871¹

C. P. STACEY

ONE of the most familiar vices of historians is their inveterate tendency to compart history. We partition it off chronologically, chopping it into neat periods. Thus the student who is being taught about the fifteenth century is only too likely to get the impression that at some date during that century a new heaven and a new earth suddenly came into being. The date varies according to the particular course to which the student is being subjected at the moment: it may be 1453, or 1485, or 1492, or 1494. That sort of thing is probably in some degree inevitable. More serious is our tendency to compart by topics. A person who writes a textbook—or even a book—on a period of modern British history is almost certain to divide it into topical chapters or groups of chapters. Thus a long chapter on "Domestic Problems" is usually followed by a rather shorter one on "The Ebb and Flow of Foreign Policy." Next comes a still shorter chapter entitled "Colonial Policies and Problems." Finally, the book almost invariably ends with a chapter called "Intellectual Currents."

The weakness of this kind of approach is most evident in co-operative works where the chapters are written by different hands, but even where the book is the work of one author there is a tendency for the division between the chapters to become absolute. The reader forgets that the men sitting around the table in Downing Street and controlling events (or trying to) were dealing simultaneously with all departments of policy, domestic, colonial and foreign; to say nothing of the fact that they were doubtless swayed by intellectual currents.

The same tendency to compart appears in more specialized fields, and here I come to my theme. Students of British foreign policy in the mid-Victorian era are familiar with the difficulties which resulted from Bismarck's wars; they are also acquainted

¹This paper was read before Section II of the Royal Society of Canada at the June meeting of 1955. In a book called *Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871*, published in 1936, the present writer ventured the remark, with respect to the Danish War, "The fashion in which, at this period, the uncertainty of the situation in America hampered Britain's action in Europe, and *vice versa*, has been too little studied" (p. 154, n. 5). In this paper he attempts to expand that suggestion.

with the fact that the same period witnessed a prolonged and severe crisis in Anglo-American relations (though it must be said that scholars in the United Kingdom have usually been less interested in this than in the continental developments). It is rather extraordinary, however, that so few students on either side of the Atlantic should have noted the extent to which these two aspects of British policy were practically interconnected. The same statesmen who dealt with Prince Bismarck and Napoleon III had to deal with President Lincoln and President Grant; and it was this fact that was basically responsible for the ineffectiveness of British policy in both hemispheres. Historians have rightly recognized that it was military weakness that paralysed the action of the United Kingdom in Europe;² they have failed to point out that that weakness was the more serious in that British statesmen had to face the fact that if compelled to fight in Europe they would quite probably find themselves fighting the United States in North America at the same time. The British Army in the years dealt with in this paper was an inadequate instrument to deal with either of these emergencies singly; it was monstrosly inadequate to deal with a war on two fronts, one on each side of the Atlantic. British policy has rarely if ever been faced with a more unpleasant dilemma. It was painfully evident to contemporaries, and it is really surprising how completely it has escaped the authors of such valuable and scholarly works as the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*. Comparing that history published soon after the First World War with earlier British writings in the same field, one applauds the increased (though still inadequate) attention given to relations with the United States; but one remains impressed by the failure to observe the effects in Whitehall of the interaction of events in America and events in Europe.³

Such interaction was not, of course, entirely a new thing in the 1860's. It had appeared half a century before, during the Congress of Vienna, when British statesmen confronting Prussia and Russia found it embarrassing that their best troops should be fighting in America, and hastened to make peace with the United States so Britain's hands might be freed for more important matters.⁴ In

²See, e.g., Arthur Hassall, *The History of British Foreign Policy, from the Earliest Times to 1912* (Edinburgh and London, 1912), 281.

³A. J. P. Taylor shows some awareness of the matter in *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954); see pages 129 and 199. But he does not mention the *Alabama* question, indicate how serious was the problem confronting Gladstone's ministry in 1868-71, or describe the means adopted to deal with it.

⁴A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols., London, 1905), II, 423-34.

those days the United States was weak. Britain had in fact fought the French and the Americans simultaneously for three years without incurring fatal results. But half a century worked great changes. It is true that as late as 1861, when the *Trent* affair brought war between Britain and the United States very close, some Englishmen were still able to view the prospect with comparative equanimity. Lord Palmerston's Secretary of State for War, in the midst of hurrying off reinforcements to Canada, observed "We shall soon *iron the smile* out of their face."⁵ The United States had just been disrupted by civil war; the breathless withdrawal of the Northern army from the field of Bull Run was fresh in the public mind; and for the moment Europe was comparatively quiet.

During the next three years the whole scene was transformed. The Southern Confederacy's early hopes of victory and independence were not realized. The Northern States became the greatest military power on earth, and their hostility to Britain was as evident as their strength. At the same time new and terrible forces were on the march in Europe. Bismarck had become Minister-President of Prussia in 1862 and had set about strengthening the army, in defiance of Parliament, and preparing for those trials of strength with Austria and France that were necessary preliminaries to unifying Germany under Prussian leadership. Britain's first real embarrassment came early in 1864, when Prussia and Austria attacked Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. Palmerston had made the mistake of saying loudly that aggressors would find that "it will not be Denmark alone with whom they will have to contend." But the German monarchies were quite unmoved by such threats.⁶

At the same time the British Government discovered that nearly 15,000 of its regular troops were in British North America and that this would add greatly to the difficulty of collecting any kind of expeditionary force for Denmark. Orders were accordingly issued to reduce the force in Canada. What alarmed Canadians most was a proposal that the troops remaining in their country should be concentrated entirely at Quebec and Montreal, leaving

⁵Lewis to Twisleton, Dec. 5, 1861: Sir G. F. Lewis, ed., *Letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis* (London, 1870), 406.

⁶*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, chap. XIII. Schleswig-Holstein ("Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office," no. 35, London, 1920), 75 ff. Palmerston and Russell, in spite of the country's weakness, showed a tendency to persist in a warlike policy, but were restrained by their colleagues and by the Queen. It was at this time that the Queen described her two senior ministers as "those two dreadful old men" (to King Leopold, Feb. 25, 1864, G. E. Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria, Second Series*, I, 168).

Upper Canada without a British soldier.⁷ This clearly reflected the British Government's new and solid respect for American military power; and in the course of the next few months editorials in *The Times* and debates in Parliament testified to the extent to which the scorn and bluster with which so many Englishmen had regarded the Northern forces and the Northern cause had now changed to apprehension and dismay.⁸ The British governing class never appeared to worse advantage than in its attitude to the Civil War in the United States; and there is a certain poetic justice in the fact that that war did so much to advance the cause of political democracy in Britain and the transfer of power to other hands.

The Cabinet's position with respect to North America at this period was extremely difficult. No administration headed by Palmerston was likely to adopt a policy of scuttle, even when so many voices were raised in favour of it. The Government in fact steered a middle course. It refused to have anything to do with the ideas of Little Englanders like Robert Lowe, who urged that every Imperial soldier should be withdrawn from Canada at once; and on the other hand it argued that Canada's defence must rest "mainly and principally upon Canada herself."⁹ The determination to maintain the Imperial military connection with Canada was strikingly symbolized by the decision taken at the beginning of 1865 to set about strengthening the fortress of Quebec at British expense. It was significant, however, that this decision was fiercely contested at the Cabinet table by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, W. E. Gladstone.¹⁰

The other aspect of the Government's policy was expressed mainly by the Colonial Secretary, Edward Cardwell. It appears very strikingly in the ministry's attitude towards the Canadian political developments of 1864. Back in 1858 the Colonial Office had been more hostile than friendly when dispatches arrived from Canada suggesting the possible desirability of a federal union of British North America.¹¹ Things were different now. When the Quebec Conference's resolutions reached London Cardwell was almost comically eager to embrace the scheme. On November 26, 1864, he wrote the Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick that the resolutions had been circulated to the Cabinet only the night

⁷*Canada and the British Army*, 154-60.

⁸*Ibid.*, 171-3.

⁹*Ibid.*, 173. The words quoted are Cardwell's. See Palmerston's report to the Queen, March 13, 1865, *Letters of Queen Victoria*, Second Series, I, 262-3.

¹⁰*Canada and the British Army*, 171-2.

¹¹D. G. G. Kerr, *Sir Edmund Head: A Scholarly Governor* (Toronto, 1954), 194-200.

before, and it "would, of course, be premature for me to anticipate their decision." Then he proceeded:

... But I think I may safely assure you that they are one and all most anxious to promote the end in view, that they will allow no obstacles to prevent it, if those obstacles can be surmounted: and that if there are provisions which they do not entirely approve, they will be very slow to consider those provisions as rising to the magnitude of insurmountable obstacles.

I fully expect that I shall soon have to instruct you in their name to promote the scheme of the Delegates to the utmost of your power.¹²

This forecast proved accurate. One week later Cardwell wrote officially, warmly approving the Quebec scheme.¹³

From this moment the Imperial Government steadily supported the federation plan. And there is little doubt that the chief reason for this was the scheme's obvious military importance. In the spring of 1865 a Canadian delegation went to London to discuss the defence of the country with the British Government. One result was a formal exchange of assurances of the two governments' determination to devote all their resources, if need be, to maintain the connection between Britain and Canada. Another was the mobilization of the fullest degree of Imperial influence to ensure the victory of the confederate cause in the Maritime Provinces. In a dispatch sent to the Maritime governors in June, 1865, Cardwell instructed them to inform their legislatures that it was "the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government" that it was desirable that all the British North American colonies should "unite in one Government." The paramount argument employed was that of defence. Cardwell wrote:

Looking to the determination which this country has ever exhibited to regard the defence of the Colonies as a matter of Imperial concern, the Colonies must recognize a right and even acknowledge an obligation incumbent upon the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just authority the measures which they consider to be most expedient on the part of the Colonies with a view to their own defence. Nor can it be doubtful that the Provinces of British North America are incapable, when separated and divided from each other, of making those just and sufficient preparations for national defence, which would be easily undertaken by a Province uniting in itself all the population and all the resources of the whole.¹⁴

¹²Public Record Office, London, 30/48, Cardwell Papers, Box 6/39 (Microfilms in Public Archives of Canada), Cardwell to Gordon, Nov. 28, 1864. The recent acquisition of these microfilms is due to the laudable initiative of the Dominion Archivist, Dr. W. Kaye Lamb.

¹³Cardwell to Monck, Dec. 3, 1864, P.A.C., G 21, vol. 28.

¹⁴*Papers relating to the Conferences which have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and a Deputation from the Executive Council of Canada . . . (Quebec, 1865), Cardwell to Lieut.-Governor of New Brunswick, June 24, 1865.*

In October, 1865, Palmerston died. Lord Russell carried on the government until the following summer, when a Conservative ministry headed by Lord Derby came into office. During these months the British ministers watched with alarm as Bismarck manipulated the Schleswig-Holstein question to produce the war he wanted with Austria. But they had learned their humiliating lesson, and there was no more loose talk of intervention. Russell's Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, wrote to the Queen: "We have spoken in defence of right; we cannot actively interfere with those who are quarrelling over the spoils; and in the present state of Ireland, and the menacing aspect of our relations with the United States, the military and pecuniary resources of England must be husbanded with the utmost care."¹⁵ Three days after the formation of Derby's Government the Prussian Army humbled Austria at Sadowa, displaying in the process an efficiency which Englishmen found both unfamiliar and alarming. As a result, Army reform suddenly became an important political issue.

The Government could draw some comfort, it is true, from the fact that in America the Civil War had ended, the Union Army had been largely disbanded, and the wanton attack on Canada which had been feared when fighting ended in the South had not eventuated. But on the other hand the Fenians were enjoying their heyday; they mounted a large-scale operation in 1866. The Canadian Government begged for help from England, and England sent a very considerable regular reinforcement. It was the last time such a thing was to happen. The action taken was not popular with Derby's chief lieutenant, Disraeli; it was at this moment that he wrote to the Prime Minister, "what is the use of these colonial deadweights which *we do not govern*?"¹⁶

In 1867 the Dominion of Canada duly came into being. The London *Times*' comment on the event was severely practical: "We look to Confederation as the means of relieving this country from much expense and much embarrassment. . . . We appreciate the goodwill of the Canadians and their desire to maintain their relations with the British Crown. But a people of four millions ought to be able to keep up their own defences."¹⁷ Nevertheless, in the first instance Confederation brought no relief to Britain's strained "military and pecuniary resources." In all the circumstances of the time, it is perhaps not surprising that some Englishmen found

¹⁵March 31, 1866, *Letters of Queen Victoria, Second Series*, I, 314-15.

¹⁶*Canada and the British Army*, 191-4.

¹⁷March 1, 1867.

themselves regretting that the British Empire had a North American frontier. Early in 1867 Derby's son and Foreign Secretary, Lord Stanley, wrote to the British Minister in Washington, who had suggested the possibility of giving British North America representation in the House of Commons at Westminster, that he had once held the idea himself: "But I have never found it take in this Country. Many people would dislike the long boundary line with the United States (they look now to an early separation of Canada). . . ."¹⁸ A few weeks later Stanley, fresh from putting a stop to the dangerous idea of calling the new political entity the Kingdom of Canada, wrote to Sir Frederick Bruce again: "There is no idea of a new monarchy, and that may as well be explained. The Colonies will remain Colonies, only confederated for the sake of convenience. If they choose to separate, we on this side shall not object: it is they who protest against the idea. In England separation would be generally popular."¹⁹

Late in 1868, a general election put the Conservatives out and brought in a Liberal ministry, headed by Gladstone, with a large majority behind it. The Continental situation remained uncertain. The Army remained unreformed; a proper Reserve could not be organized without an increased supply of recruits, and recruiting would not improve as long as British soldiers spent most of their lives abroad. For some twenty years successive British governments had been striving to reduce the colonial garrisons; but not much had been accomplished. Above all, the *Alabama* question remained unsettled, the Fenians were still active, and therefore Anglo-American relations were in a constant state of crisis.

Almost the first act of the new ministry was an attempt at settlement with the United States. Following a line already charted by the Conservatives, they signed the Johnson-Clarendon Convention in January, 1869. It was a disastrous failure. The Convention was thrown out by the United States Senate by a vote of 54 to 1 after a speech by Charles Sumner which seemed to estimate the amount of the *Alabama* claims at half the total cost of the Civil War. When this news reached London, Lord Clarendon wrote grimly, "I believe that Grant and Sumner mean war; or rather that amount of insult and humiliation that must lead to it."²⁰

¹⁸P.A.C., Transcripts of Derby Papers from Knowsley Hall, Stanley to Bruce, Jan. 25, 1867.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, March 23, 1867.

²⁰Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration* (New York, 1936), 147-52. Sir Herbert Maxwell, *The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon* (2 vols., London, 1913), II, 358, Clarendon to Lady Salisbury, May 9, 1869.

For the Gladstone Cabinet's appreciation of the situation that now confronted it there is considerable evidence. The essence of it was the fact that as long as things in North America did not improve British policy in Europe would be hamstrung. In the spring of 1869 the Foreign Secretary was writing to the Queen of the dangers latent in the treaties concerning Belgium and Portugal to which Britain was a party. "It seems to be the duty of your Majesty's Government to bear in mind how widely different are the circumstances of this country now to when those Treaties were concluded, and that, if their execution were to lead us into war in Europe, we should find ourselves immediately called upon to defend Canada from American invasion and our commerce from American privateers."²¹ This was before the news of Sumner's speech arrived. When it came, Clarendon wrote to the Queen again: "It is the unfriendly state of our relations with America that to a great extent paralyses our action in Europe. There is not the smallest doubt that if we were engaged in a Continental quarrel we should immediately find ourselves at war with the United States."²² These views were not confined to Clarendon. His successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Granville, wrote to John Bright when Bright resigned from the government:

. . . Your guidance would have been invaluable as regards the United States.

I can conceive no greater object than to put our relations on a satisfactory footing with them. Our present position cripples us in every way. Not only would it do so if we wished for war, but it impedes our pacific efforts, making people attribute to fear that which is prompted by a sense of duty.²³

The First Lord of the Admiralty had already suggested to Granville, when there seemed to be danger of a war with Russia over the Black Sea, that it was "very important" to get the differences with the United States out of the way: "Otherwise there can be little doubt that, however unprepared they may be just now, sooner or later we shall have them on our hands."²⁴

What remedy could the Government provide? One obvious procedure was to liquidate the quarrel with the States at any cost which the British taxpayer could be made to swallow. In point of fact this was ultimately done, and historians would be well advised not to forget the European situation in interpreting British

²¹April 16, 1869, *Letters of Queen Victoria, Second Series*, I, 589-91.

²²May 1, 1869, *ibid.*, 594-5.

²³Nov. 21, 1870, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville* . . . (2 vols., London, 1906), II, 28-9.

²⁴Spencer Childers, *The Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers, 1827-1896* (2 vols., London, 1901), I, 173-4, Childers to Granville, Nov. 19, 1870.

policy in connection with the Treaty of Washington and the Geneva Arbitration. But in 1869 the Americans had struck aside the hand that Britain offered, and it would be two years before real negotiation would again be practicable.

There was however another possibility. That was to get out of North America. At the beginning of 1869 Great Britain was still deeply involved in this continent, and the symbol of this investment was the 12,000 British regular troops stationed in Canada and Newfoundland.²⁵ There is ample evidence that many influential Englishmen considered these troops "hostages . . . for British good behaviour"²⁶ and an incitement to the Americans to make war. It was obvious that merely to get them home would be an advantage to the security of the United Kingdom; it would be doubly so if their removal from Canada made conflict with the United States less likely. And the fact that, with the mother country's encouragement, a new political unit capable of assuming national responsibilities had now been created in British North America, gave such a policy more than a colour of justification.

There is no doubt that some members of Gladstone's Government would have welcomed a complete severance of the ties with Canada. However, they found themselves faced with an obstacle—that rather inconvenient Canadian loyalty which Lord Stanley had noted. In a crisis, this loyalty would probably have found considerable support in the British House of Commons. But the separatists were influential, and the high point of their activity was reached in the gloomy days after the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention. For many years British public men had been in the habit of referring to the relation between Britain and the colonies in terms which suggested that it was a temporary arrangement. Now this idea appeared in an official Colonial Office dispatch. On June 16, 1869, Lord Granville wrote confidentially to the Governor General of Canada, saying that the Imperial Government had no desire to maintain the connection "a single year" after it became "injurious or distasteful" to Canada, and concluding with an order: "You will . . . be good enough to bring to my notice any line of policy or any measures which without implying on the part of Her Majesty's Government any wish to change abruptly our relations, would gradually prepare both Countries for a friendly relaxation of them."²⁷

²⁵Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, United Kingdom, 1870, no. 254, vol. XLII (12,014 all ranks on March 31, 1869).

²⁶*The Times*, March 29, 1867.

²⁷*Canada and the British Army*, 216.

On their own side Granville and his colleagues were slackening off the painter. Cardwell, now Secretary of State for War, was actively setting about the reform of the Army; and he had explained to Gladstone on undertaking the task, "The with-drawal of Troops from distant Stations is at the bottom of the whole question of Army Reform. . . ."²⁸ In the spring of 1869 Canada was told that her garrison, apart from the troops at Halifax, was to be reduced to about 4,000 men, and it was indicated that even this force was not to remain long.²⁹

At this moment the British Cabinet was faced with a fundamental decision, summed up by Granville in a private letter to Cardwell thus: ". . . the practical question is whether Quebec is to be considered an Imperial or a Colonial Fortress."³⁰ Although the British Government had been striving for years to reduce its force in Canada, it had never before been seriously suggested that Imperial troops would cease to garrison Quebec. In 1863 the Defence Committee had reported on the strategic importance of the fortress in these terms: "Since Quebec is the place through which all succours from Great Britain to Canada must pass, it is obviously necessary that this fortress should be maintained in the most efficient and secure condition. If it fell into the hands of an enemy, the military communication between the province and the mother country would be cut off. The Committee are therefore of opinion that Quebec should be kept up as a first class fortress. . . ."³¹ This was the thinking that led Palmerston and his Cabinet to override their colleague Gladstone and undertake improvements in the fortress in 1865. By 1869 a great new fortified bridge-head had appeared on the south shore of the St. Lawrence opposite Quebec; but now Gladstone was Prime Minister and a different spirit ruled in Whitehall. It is evident that in April, 1869, Granville and Cardwell brought the question of the status of Quebec before the Cabinet.³² I have been unable to find any definite record of the discussion or the decision; but it seems likely that the Cabinet decided at this time that Quebec was no longer to be an Imperial fortress, though it would appear that no final moment for with-drawal was fixed.

The Government's determination not to be turned from its course was demonstrated after the news of Sumner's speech arrived.

²⁸Jan. 9, 1869, Cardwell Papers, Box 2/6.

²⁹*Canada and the British Army*, 214.

³⁰April 14, 1869, Cardwell Papers, Box 5/28.

³¹Report of Jan. 8, 1863, *ibid.*, Box 6/40 (confidential print).

³²Correspondence in *ibid.*, Box 5/28.

Although, as we have seen, members of the Cabinet felt that it might be a sign of coming war, it caused no change in the plans for withdrawing troops from Canada. In the Cardwell papers there is what is evidently a note passed by Cardwell to Gladstone in the House of Commons in connection with a question on this point. It remarks that he proposes to reply simply that the orders were being executed, and it was not intended to countermand them. Gladstone's minute on the paper reads, "By all means."³³ However, events in North America did complicate the later stages of the withdrawal. There was a Fenian raid in the spring of 1870, and at the same time the need arose for sending an expedition to Red River. The Imperial Government consented to allow its troops to take part in the Red River operation; but it did so only on very strict conditions, and particularly emphasized that the regulars should be absolutely certain of getting back to the East before the winter. It is worth recalling that the *London Times*, in commenting on the Imperial share in the Red River expedition, remarked, "The British Parliament is now called upon to intervene for the last time in the affairs of the American Continent."³⁴

These events in Canada were overshadowed by contemporary happenings in Europe. In July, 1870, war broke out between France and Prussia. In London there was great anxiety over an apparent threat to Belgium, and at the very outset of the struggle Gladstone asked Cardwell "to study the means of sending 20,000 men to Antwerp with as much promptitude as at the Trent affair we sent 10,000 to Canada."³⁵ The withdrawals from the colonies had allowed the Government to cut the cost of the British Army and reduce its over-all size while at the same time increasing the force in the United Kingdom. This happy situation now ended; 20,000 additional men were hastily voted for the Army, and the estimates leaped up in proportion.³⁶ In the minds of Englishmen the mistrust of France, which was so marked at the beginning of the war, changed, as the war progressed, to fear of Prussia. Lord Kimberley, the new Colonial Secretary, wrote to one of his colleagues in September, 1870, "We are only at the end of the first act of the tragedy, & we shall be fortunate if the next acts are not more gloomy & horrible still."³⁷ With the safety of Britain herself

³³March 13, 1869, Cardwell Papers, Box 2/6. Cf. *Canada and the British Army*, 213.

³⁴*Canada and the British Army*, 243.

³⁵Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II, 339.

³⁶*Canada and the British Army*, 247-8. See Cardwell's speech in the House of Commons in introducing the Army Estimates, Feb. 16, 1871.

³⁷Kimberley to Cardwell, Sept. 7, 1870, Cardwell Papers, Box 5/31.

apparently in question, the urge to liquidate the country's responsibilities in North America was even stronger than before.

The day before the Battle of Sedan, Cardwell asked Kimberley whether the time had come to offer officially the transfer to Canada of the Citadel of Quebec. Although the Dominion had already been given an indication that the Imperial force would be withdrawn in 1871, Kimberley preferred not to pursue the question at that moment and it was shelved for a few months.³⁸ But it came up again in December, 1870, by which time the British force in central Canada was down to a small remnant. Kimberley inclined to the view that it would do no harm to leave this force at Quebec, for the moment, as a concession to Canadian feeling; but Cardwell remarked, "A single Regiment & two Batteries at Quebec may be considered by the Cabinet a very awkward committal for the British Flag in case of rupture with the U. States."³⁹ It was agreed that the matter should go to the Cabinet for decision. Kimberley laid it before the Prime Minister in a letter and said he would "bring the matter forward at the next Cabinet."⁴⁰ No doubt he did, and it is evident that the decision was in favour of withdrawal. The Canadian Government tried hard to get the men in Whitehall to change their minds, but it was no use. In the autumn of 1871 the last British troops left Quebec, and thereafter the only British garrison in Canada was that of Halifax.⁴¹ By this time the Treaty of Washington had made provision for settlement of the various issues between Britain and the United States. There was another period of serious anxiety early in 1872, and then the award of the Geneva Tribunal finally laid the *Alabama* claims to rest.

The departure of the 60th Rifles from the Citadel of Quebec on November 11, 1871, was a landmark in the foreign as well as the colonial policy of Britain. Eight years before, the highest military authorities in the Empire had declared that it was essential to maintain Quebec as an Imperial fortress. Six years before, the British Government had decided to renovate the defences at great expense. Now about a quarter of a million British pounds had been spent, the new forts were still not quite complete, and yet the Imperial troops departed. This somewhat peculiar train of events reflects the course of British policy in this troubled era.

³⁸Cardwell to Kimberley, Aug. 31, 1870, Kimberley to Cardwell, Sept. 1, 1870, *ibid.* *Canada and the British Army*, 226-7.

³⁹Cardwell to Kimberley, Dec. 6, 1870, Cardwell Papers, Box 5/31, and other letters in same box.

⁴⁰Kimberley to Gladstone, Dec. 9, 1870, *ibid.*

⁴¹*Canada and the British Army*, 252-3.

Confronted simultaneously with menaces in both Europe and North America, a situation whose potentialities their military resources were quite unequal to coping with, Gladstone and his colleagues came, in effect if not in form, to a decision to abandon Britain's political and military responsibilities in America, to withdraw from this continent to the utmost possible extent, and to concentrate their country's power at home, where it would be available to deal with European foes. The adoption of this policy was facilitated by the fact that earlier British administrations had encouraged the federation of British North America. Palmerston seems to have thought in terms of the new Dominion sharing Britain's North American responsibilities. Gladstone's Cabinet thought in terms of *transferring* those responsibilities to Canada, so far as she was able and willing to assume them—but, whether Canada assumed them or not, Britain clearly intended to get rid of them.

It seems evident that there was never a specific or formal decision in favour of this policy of abdication and withdrawal. It was never quite fully avowed by those who seem to have been most devoted to it. In 1869 Granville wrote to Cardwell on the necessity of making an early decision on what to do about the troops remaining in Canada. "I do not think this will be difficult," he wrote, "What will be more so is the language to be held in debate about our future relations with the Dominion. I do not think it would be wise to be abrupt on the subject."⁴² There was always some opposition, in Parliament and in the country, to Gladstonian colonial policies, and it is even possible that too forthright a declaration of the view which Granville represented might have produced opposition within the Cabinet.

Finally, it must be added that the policy of withdrawal was never complete. In 1870–71 Britain got out of the interior of North America, but she did not get out of Nova Scotia. The Halifax base was evidently considered on balance a military asset rather than a liability, and there the British troops remained until well into the twentieth century. Also, the British Government never went so far as to declare that it would not defend Canada in case of war. On the contrary, the dispatch which early in 1870 announced the impending withdrawal of the troops took care to specify that the proposed arrangements "are contingent upon a time of peace, and are in no way intended to alter or diminish the obligations

⁴²Granville to Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1869, Cardwell Papers, Box 5/28.

which exist on both sides in case of foreign war."⁴³ Those obligations could scarcely have been escaped without a formal separation; and however much some people might have welcomed this, Britain never got to the point of declaring herself independent of Canada. She did however effect, in the course of a few years, a complete revolution in her relations with North America. On one side, she settled, at heavy cost to herself and also to Canada, the issues outstanding between her and the United States, and thereby put an end to any immediate threat of an Anglo-American war. On the other, she suddenly withdrew from her traditional military responsibilities in the interior of this continent, thereby saving roughly a million pounds a year, facilitating the reform of her army, and materially strengthening her military position with respect to Europe. By 1872 it could almost be said that Great Britain had ceased to be a North American power; and it would seem that there were comparatively few Englishmen who regarded the change with any feeling except the deepest satisfaction.

⁴³*Canada and the British Army*, 226-7. Britain also retained the small naval station at Esquimalt in British Columbia, but there was no army garrison there at this period.

THE RIEL REBELLION AND CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR.

THE Riel Rebellion presents an interesting case in Canadian-American history.¹ For relations between the two nations, already strained by the Civil War, Fenian movements within the United States, and the American rejection of reciprocity, took a turn for the worse in 1869-70 when Canada was suddenly confronted with the insurrection in Rupert's Land. Beguiled by the evasive dream of becoming a continental republic, Americans had long coveted the lands of their northern neighbour. That the new Dominion of Canada could survive—indeed, could dare to envision its own transcontinental glory—was inconceivable to many Americans. In their own self-interest, they exaggerated the signs of disaffection within the Dominion. And when the métis of Rupert's Land forcibly rejected political union with Canada, and certain citizens of British Columbia petitioned President Grant for admission into the United States, it seemed that all British North America was breaking up and that its separate members would soon become a part of the American family to which they "naturally" belonged.²

Rupert's Land, with its attendant uprising, was regarded as the most vulnerable of British North America's "vanishing" provinces. Expansionists of the Middle West sought to direct the insurgents into the American orbit, and urged President Grant's administration to adopt a forceful policy of annexation. Both Grant and his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, were receptive to these pleadings; but the "short-of-war" policy which they followed failed to gain the prize. Louis Riel, leader of the rebellious métis, with all his apparent leanings towards the United States, employed American expansionism only to achieve provincial status within the Dominion for his beloved Red River. Moreover, the Canadian Premier, Sir John A.

¹See the excellent article by Donald F. Warner, "Drang Nach Norden: The United States and the Riel Rebellion," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIV (March, 1953), 693-712. Professor Warner's work and that of the author differ in one essential respect. He states that President Grant's administration was "cool" (p. 705) towards the scheme of annexing all or part of British North America. Had he been able to examine the diaries and papers of Hamilton Fish and J. C. Bancroft Davis, I am sure that he would have agreed that the State Department worked diligently and ardently to effect a policy designed to annex whatever could be annexed of British North America.

²*Boston Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 30, 1869.

Macdonald, was too skilful an opponent for his American adversaries. He knew full well the inadequacies of their policy and he conciliated the métis with an adroit blending of diplomacy and force. But despite the talents of Macdonald, the fate of the British Northwest remained uncertain until Imperial troops had reached and overawed the Red River Settlement in July, 1870.

I

The Hudson's Bay territories had long attracted the interest of both Canada and the United States. But in the post-Civil War era, the American Northwest, benefiting from the natural highways uniting the Northern Great Plains, enjoyed a socio-economic relationship with the British Northwest that was probably more intimate than Canada's own relationship with the region. Mankind moved freely within the greater Northwest. Religious bodies on both sides of the international line co-operated with each other in the furtherance of God's work.³ In St. Paul, a Rupert's Land Institute flourished, attracting the interest of Minnesota's Senator Ramsey;⁴ while Donald Gunn of the Red River Settlement in Rupert's Land paddled a skiff around the shores of Lake Winnipeg collecting specimens for the Smithsonian Institution.⁵ Stage and railroad lines, working in tandem, had bridged the grassy seas between St. Paul and the Red River Settlement. In 1870, the total dollar value of the regional trade, including bonded and smuggled goods, probably exceeded \$1,000,000.⁶

³The Anglican Bishop of Rupert's Land frequently visited Minnesota and in 1868, he attended the Triennial Convention of the Anglican Church in New York City. J. J. Hargrave, *Red River* (Montreal, 1871), 461.

Roman Catholics of both lands realized an even greater intimacy characterized in social, fiscal, and clerical ways. Indeed, they co-operated in meeting the religious needs of the border country; and in 1861, Bishop Taché of Rupert's Land was made Vicar General of Pembina and St. Joseph, American communities lying below the 49th parallel. Bishop Grace to Bishop Taché, St. Paul, Oct. 6, 1860; Grace to the Archbishop, July 3, 1861, Archiepiscopal Archives, St. Boniface, Manitoba; photostatic copies in the Minnesota Historical Society.

⁴Alexander Ramsey's Diary, April 8, 1862, typewritten copy, Minnesota Historical Society.

⁵The *Nor'-Wester*, June 25, 1862. Gunn's association with the Smithsonian was of long duration. See several letters from S. F. Baird (of the Institution) to Gunn, 1856-61, in the James W. Taylor Papers, Minnesota Historical Society. Gunn's portrait, together with those of many Hudson's Bay men, was to be seen on the walls of the Institution. St. Paul Press, March 30, 1869.

⁶Enos Stutsman to the Treasury Department, Pembina, Aug. 10, 1866, and Oct. 23, 1868. Reports and Correspondence from Special Agent Stutsman, 1866-1869, National Archives, Washington. Cf. Joseph Lemay to the Deputy Commissioner in charge of the Bureau of Statistics, Pembina, May 10, 1869, Letters from Collectors, 1869, National Archives.

The British Northwest presented Canada with visions of rich agricultural land, commercial wealth, and a glorious sea-to-sea nationhood. Restricted in the East by the Pre-cambrian Shield, Canada had to expand into the Northwest or face the future as a petty state, overshadowed and, perhaps, overpowered by the United States. Moreover, Toronto had its eyes fixed upon the trade of the Northwest, hoping that its wealth might be snatched away from the merchants of St. Paul. Providence, too, had fashioned a transcontinental destiny for the Dominion that was quite as manifest as the American model. And in the post-Civil War era, this expansionist spirit burgeoned as the dynamic American frontier approached Rupert's Land.

In 1869, the Hudson's Bay Company agreed to sell its lands to Canada; but it proved to be easier to buy the Northwest than to get possession of it. The métis—the overwhelming majority of the settlers—had long distrusted Canada, her immigrants to the Northwest, and her governmental representatives there.⁷ And when Canada sought to bring Rupert's Land into the Dominion, they revolted against a government that had been created without their consent and imposed without their knowledge.

When William McDougall, the prospective Lieutenant-Governor of Rupert's Land, reached the 49th parallel, he discovered that both he and Canada were locked out of the Northwest. The métis had barricaded the road to the Red River Settlement; and McDougall was forced to remain at Pembina, while Riel assumed the government of Rupert's Land. McDougall was neither a wise nor a patient man. He refused to conciliate the métis, sided instead with the hated Canadian party, and attempted a "counter-revolution." But the "coup" failed for want of support. Indeed, its only results were to establish the supremacy of Riel and to drive the English-speaking citizens into his arms. The Canadian party was either jailed or scattered over the countryside. And on December 16, McDougall himself withdrew from Pembina, "having no force at . . . [his] command to re-establish the supremacy of the law. . . ."⁸

With McDougall and the Canadian party driven from the field, it seemed to many Americans that the long-awaited moment had arrived for the acquisition of the British Northwest. Minnesota was probably the most acquisitive state in the union, for at stake lay the commercial empire of the greater Northwest. When her efforts to

⁷There are many examples in the files of the Hudson's Bay Company to demonstrate this point.

⁸McDougall to Mactavish, Pembina, Dec. 16, 1869, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1870, vol. V, no. 12, 97-9.

revive reciprocity had failed in 1865 and when Canada moved forward to acquire the Hudson's Bay territories, the spirit of neighbourliness vanished in Minnesota and was replaced by outspoken expansionism. For now it appeared that only annexation could insure an empire that nature had given to Minnesota.⁹

James W. Taylor, St. Paul's oracle of expansionism and a Special Agent of the Treasury, presented to Congress in 1866 the outlines of a bill to annex all British North America.¹⁰ A year later, Senator Alexander Ramsey—with Taylor's co-operation—introduced a bill to buy the Hudson's Bay territories.¹¹ In Congress and out, Minnesota's expansionist junto strove to arouse the nation in regard to their state's northern destiny. When Canada completed negotiations for the Northwest, Minnesota's bitterness could not be masked; but when McDougall and Ottawa were rejected, her elation was unbounded: "The Red River revolution is a trump card in the hands of American diplomacy, if there is statesmanship equal to the opportunity, by which, if rightly played, every vestige of British power may be swept from the Western half of the continent."¹²

The first cards were played in the Red River Settlement. And the dealer there was General Oscar Malmros, the American consul and the undisputed leader of a small but vigorous American party within the settlement.¹³ The general had arrived on the scene only two months before the outbreak in October; but within less than a month, he had not only communicated to his superiors details of the coming insurrection but also suggested ways in which his country might assure its success. For it was his belief that "the entire French and over one half of the other inhabitants are strongly opposed to annexation to Canada; the rest, with the exception of perhaps a couple of dozen of Canadian partisans, are politically in-

⁹Girart Hewitt, *Minnesota: Its Advantages to Settlers* (St. Paul, 1867), 4. Cf. St. Paul Press, Jan. 26, 1867; Enos Stutsman to the Treasury Department, Pembina, July 31, 1867, Reports and Correspondence from Special Agent Stutsman, 1866-9, National Archives.

¹⁰"Commercial Relations with British America," June 12, 1866, *House Executive Document No. 128*, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 1263. Cf. T. C. Blegen, "A Plan for the Union of British North America and the United States," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, IV, (1917-18), 470-83.

¹¹*Senate Miscellaneous Documents No. 4 and 22*, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 1319.

¹²St. Paul Press, Feb. 8, 1870.

¹³Indeed, the consulate had been created by Senator Ramsey, and without reference to the State Department. *Congressional Globe* (Feb. 3, 1869), 40th Cong., 3rd Sess., 821.

Malmros had been officially named to his post by the State Department in April, 1869; but in actuality he was the appointee of Ramsey, to whom he reported with the regularity and completeness that he accorded to the State Department—but with far greater candour.

different."¹⁴ Moreover, the Hudson's Bay Company and the Catholic hierarchy, the foremost powers of the settlement, were "decided in their expression . . . of dislike to Canadian rule." While he recognized that the Company's servants might be "conciliated" by Canada, yet he believed that the hierarchy could "be relied on in any feasible scheme to sever the connection of this country with Canada." Hostility to Canada might well be changed to friendship towards the United States, leading to the eventual annexation of Rupert's Land and making a "great confederation north of the United States an impossibility."

Malmros piously denied to Washington that he ever departed from his proper role as a disinterested observer. Quite the contrary—he had merely "on proper occasions, by conversing on the causes or successes of revolutions in other countries . . . indirectly endeavoured to prevent mistakes and ill-considered measures . . ."¹⁵ But to Ramsey, his real "State Department," the consul fully confessed his part in the insurrection: "... instructions or no instructions I feel it my duty to act and to have the satisfaction of knowing that I without committing the Administration in the least degree & without having by outsiders my real position suspected materially assisted in producing the present situation & of having prevented many mistakes on the part of the popular leaders. . . ."¹⁶

After McDougall's inglorious defeat, the victorious métis declared their "independence" and exultantly raised the flag of the provisional government. To celebrate the occasion, the cathedral band of St. Boniface serenaded the vicar general and then moved on to play before the American consulate.¹⁷ The mystery that had attended Malmros' activities was gone. The moment had arrived when he could openly make his bid for Riel's support. Until Canada made amends and acceptable proposals to the half-breeds, the consul had a relatively free hand in shaping policy. And it was only good sense for Riel tentatively to accept Malmros as an advisor. For the United States was his ace-in-the-hole if Canada refused to bargain with his provincial government.¹⁸

¹⁴Malmros to J. C. B. Davis, Assistant Secretary of State, Winnipeg, British North America, Sept. 11, 1869. Consular Dispatches from Winnipeg, 1869-71, National Archives.

¹⁵Malmros to Ramsey, Winnipeg, Jan. 6, 1870, Ramsey Papers, Minnesota Historical Society.

¹⁶Alexander Begg's Journal, Dec. 10, 1869, I, 88, Public Archives of Canada.

¹⁷When a conservative member of the English-speaking party agreed to be the postmaster for Riel's provisional government, he did so "on condition that the object of the provisional government was to treat if possible with Canada for a just union with that country or England failing these to look elsewhere. . . . It to be under-

As winter set in, it became increasingly apparent to observers within the settlement that the American party was associating itself and its political schemes with Louis Riel.¹⁹ "The American residents in the Town of Winnipeg and those at Pembina [Dakota Territory] have of late greatly interested themselves in the movements of the French and are evidently trying to mislead Riel in favor of annexation to the States—H. S. Donaldson—Major Robinson—Oscar Malmros [*sic*—] and Stutsman at Pembina are all admitted to the secret councils of Riel."²⁰ Led by Malmros, these adventurers and filibusters strove to guide Riel into the American fold. They attempted to discredit the people and government of Canada and preached to the half-breeds from the gospel according to annexation.²¹ But their greatest organ of propaganda was the *New Nation*, which, during the course of the rebellion, usurped the monopoly once held by the scurrilous *Nor'-Wester*.

The ownership of the *New Nation* was mysterious but its policy was unmistakable.²² Its first issue (January 7, 1870) was blatantly annexationist, containing an unsigned article, "Annexation Our Manifest Destiny," which had been secretly dictated by Malmros.²³ In it, he argued that the Northwest was isolated from Canada by a "dismal waste of rocks and water." "In fact," said he, "we form a separate colony and people, distinct habits, and different interests and necessities; we have nothing in common with that country [Canada] or its government." But on the other hand, nature had wedded Minnesota and the Northwest in a union that was at once

stood that Annexation to the United States is not the direct policy of the Provisional Government." *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1870, I, 127-8.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 16, 23, 26, 1869, I, 94, 96, 105, and 106.

²⁰*Ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1869, I, 110-11.

²¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 22, Dec. 25, 28, 1869, I, 29, 111, 113-14. Cf. Malmros to Ramsey, Winnipeg, Jan. 6, 1870, Ramsey Papers.

²²The sheet was published by H. M. Robinson & Co., but Begg stated that it was purchased jointly by Robinson and Stutsman. The underwriter is unknown, but Riel undoubtedly had an interest in it; and he certainly controlled it. When Robinson "resigned," Thomas Spence assumed the editorial duties, and at an allegedly high salary. Who paid his salary? Perhaps the question can be best answered by stating that Spence followed Riel's policy, both in the spirit and in the letter. Cf. Alexander Begg, *History of the North-West* (3 vols., Toronto, 1894), I, 427-8, who called the *New Nation*, "Riel's organ." James W. Taylor asserted that "the first installment of a loan forced from the Hudson [*sic*] Bay Company by Riel—about £600—was applied to the purchase. . . ." Taylor to Fish, Washington, Jan. 27, 1870, Consular Dispatches, Winnipeg, Special Agent, Red River Affairs, National Archives.

²³Malmros to Ramsey, Winnipeg, Jan. 6, 1870, Ramsey Papers. Malmros added that the second edition would contain another of his articles.

geographic and economic. Subsequent issues of the *New Nation* carried out the tone of the first with exacting fidelity.

The American party endeavoured to arouse the spirit of annexationism within the United States as well as within the British Northwest. Anonymous letters to the *St. Paul Press*—many of them undoubtedly from the hand of Enos Stutsman—proclaimed the righteousness of Riel's cause and vigorously denounced the Canadians.²⁴ Moreover, Malmros was quick to suggest policy to the State Department. With obvious pleasure, he reported in early November that "the prospect now is that in a short time the country will be a unit in favour of independence, i.e., annexation to the United States although some favor the formation of a separate British Crown Colony. . . . Should this revolution be successful it may, I think be safely predicted that in less than two years time all the British Colonies on this Continent will apply for admission into the Union."²⁵ Two months later, he urged the State Department to underwrite Riel with \$25,000, "to secure the success of the independence movement."²⁶ And later, when he had begun to doubt the success of his own political machinations,²⁷ he sought permission to give *de facto* recognition to Riel's provisional government.²⁸

But Malmros charted his course by delusive stars. He believed—in ignorance of Bishop Taché's true position—that the Catholic hierarchy in the British Northwest was irreconcilably opposed to union with Canada. He contended that Canada and the Northwest were so disparate in nature as to defy a political marriage—"their historical life is unconnected with that of Canada and all intercourse, social or commercial between the respective communities has been prevented through natural obstacles."²⁹ And he believed that Canada would fail to work its way out of McDougall's morass. Finally, he reasoned that, if his premises were true, the Northwest would ally itself with the United States.

But the subversive propaganda and political intrigue of the American party not only created an atmosphere of hostility towards the party itself but also discredited the United States. For the Yankees overplayed their hand. Their philosophy of materialism, their chauvinism, and their seeming social crudities had never ap-

²⁴Cf. *Press*, Nov. 14, 1869. And the *Press* reprinted these letters with enthusiasm and great frequency.

²⁵Malmros to Davis, Winnipeg, Nov. 6, 1869, Consular Dispatches, Winnipeg, National Archives.

²⁶Malmros to Davis, Jan. 15, 1870, *ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1870.

²⁸*Ibid.*, March 12, 1870.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1870.

pealed to many men of Red River.³⁰ And now, when the annexation of the Northwest seemed almost within reach, the American party failed. It had been too acquisitive, too eager for political union.

The high-water mark of American influence upon Riel's government was reached in December; by mid-January, the tide was visibly ebbing. When Donald A. Smith, Special Commissioner of the Canadian Government, presented Ottawa's "olive branch" to the people of the Red River Settlement on January 20, there were "only one or two" Americans in the crowd that so cordially received Smith's words. On the following day, the third edition of the *New Nation* came out; but despite the fact that free copies were distributed, the editor's office was showered with rejected copies—"and many of the returned papers . . . [had] some pretty hard writings on them such as 'the New Damnation'—etc., etc."³¹ The fourth edition plainly showed the restraining hand of Louis Riel. And in March, the paper was "entrusted" to a new editor. Of this first edition—as one might well have surmised—an observer laconically commented: "Annexation is knocked on the head."³²

The prestige and power of the American party vanished. On January 12, Bob O'Lone's saloon had resounded with the toasts of Americans, drinking to annexation;³³ but on Washington's birthday, a scheduled ball was cancelled "for want of funds."³⁴ Without being recalled, Malmros hurriedly left for the United States on March 18. When the State Department published certain of his dispatches without adequate pruning, his position in the Red River Settlement, already uncertain, became "entirely untenable, impracticable and in fact intolerable."³⁵ Before leaving, he selected the *New Nation's* first editor, H. H. Robinson, as the American vice-consul. But within a fortnight, Robinson himself was arrested by Riel and forced to give up his keys to the *New Nation*.³⁶ The American party had been silenced.

Canada was now the more favoured suitor. Perhaps Riel had always intended to unite with Canada, if the grievances of the métis

³⁰Alexander Ross, *The Red River Settlement* (London, 1856), 338-9; *the Nor'-Wester*, Sept. 28, 1860 and July 29, 1862; Begg's Journal, Jan. 12, 13, 29, 1870, I, 136, 137, 177.

³¹Begg's Journal, Jan. 21, and 27, 1870, I, 160, 172.

³²*Ibid.*, April 2, 1870, II, 61.

³³*Ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1870, I, 137.

³⁴*Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1870, II, 20.

³⁵Malmros to Ramsey, Winnipeg, March 15, 1870, Ramsey Papers.

³⁶Robinson to Davis, Winnipeg, April 2, 1870, Consular Dispatches, Winnipeg, National Archives. Cf. Begg's Journal, March 31, 1870, II, 59.

were redressed and their security could be assured. If so, when he flirted with the American party, he had done so either to offset his bet upon Canada or to induce Ottawa to accept his terms.³⁸ The tactics succeeded. By the middle of March, Canada had given positive assurances of meeting the ends of Riel's rebellion. Donald A. Smith, Canadian Commissioner, and Bishop Taché, with their promises and persuasions, had turned the Red River Settlement towards Ottawa, and unalterably away from the United States.

II

In their efforts to detach the British Northwest, American expansionists spun a complicated web of intrigue that stretched from the Red River Settlement to Washington, D.C. At the centre was the Minnesota junto, composed of a small but forceful group of men, the "Yankee wire pullers" that Ottawa feared.³⁹ They were all ultra-radical expansionists—Alexander Ramsey, James W. Taylor, Oscar Malmros, Joseph A. Wheelock, and the railroad men, George Becker of the St. Paul and Pacific and Jay Cooke of the Northern Pacific.

These men occupied positions of peculiar political strength. Wheelock's paper, the *St. Paul Press*, was undoubtedly the largest and most influential organ in Minnesota. Ramsey, forever enchanted with his state's northern destiny, had held a seat in the United States Senate since 1863. Both Malmros and Taylor, consul and confidential agent respectively, were employed by the State Department. They were, in fact, the State Department's only official sources of information about the British Northwest and the Riel Rebellion.⁴⁰ All the above men collaborated in a common policy to

³⁸In April, Riel's lieutenant, W. B. O'Donoghue, conversed at length with William R. Marshall, ex-governor of Minnesota, then upon a mission of intrigue in Red River. O'Donoghue frankly told Marshall that if Canada met the political demands of the provisional government, Riel would lead the Northwest into the Confederation; but if Canada demurred, he would seek American aid. Riel then joined them and said that his and O'Donoghue's views "were in perfect harmony and accord." N. P. Langford to Taylor, St. Paul, July 10, 1870, Taylor Papers. While in Red River with Marshall, Langford visited with Donaldson, Robinson, and other discredited members of the American party. They asserted that Riel "had led them to believe that he favored annexation, and in this respect had deceived them."

³⁹Sir John A. Macdonald to Sir John Rose, Ottawa, Nov. 27, 1869, Macdonald Papers, Letterbook No. 3, Public Archives of Canada.

⁴⁰On Dec. 30, 1869, Taylor was appointed a secret agent of the State Department to investigate relations between the United States and British North America, with special reference to the British Northwest. He knew more about the region than any other living American; and therefore his appointment would seem to be a logical one. But it was the interposition of his political friends, the Minnesota expansionists,

annex the British Northwest. They intervened in internal affairs across the 49th parallel. They sought in the press to justify the cause of Louis Riel and to awaken American interest in Minnesota's "manifest destiny." They strove to obstruct Canada's efforts to regain her lost heritage and they exhorted President Grant's administration to adopt their own expansionist views.

The Minnesota junto found a most receptive audience. To Americans—and especially the expansionists—Canada was a loosely knit confederation whose future was highly questionable. Moreover, the Canadian dream of a sea-to-sea dominion was fantastic.⁴¹ For geography had cut up British North America into sections that seemed to defy political union north of the line, while it encouraged economic alliances to the south. The Maritime Provinces were more closely akin to the northeastern United States than to Quebec or Ontario. Quebec and Ontario were geographically divorced from the Northwest, which was, in turn, bound to Minnesota. Farther to the west lay the colony of British Columbia, separated from Canada by the Rockies, the Great Plains, and the Shield. The Northwest had already rebelled; disgruntled citizens of British Columbia were soon to petition President Grant for entrance into the United States. And there were signs of disaffection in the Maritimes. Seemingly, British North America was breaking up into its natural, geographical components⁴²—and to Minnesota would fall the Northwest.

Cession of the Northwest to the United States was the obvious solution to Ottawa's troubles. Why should Canada seek a West she could never hold?⁴³ Let England settle the Alabama claims by handing over a territory "divorced . . . from Canada by physical barriers which no human power can overcome."⁴⁴ Writing to a prominent Canadian friend, James Taylor described Washington's climate of opinion in early January, 1870: "The situation in the Northwest—

that led to his appointment. It is interesting to note that Taylor probably wrote his own instructions. Hamilton Fish's Diary, Nov. 28, 1869, typewritten copy in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. See the Taylor Papers for a copy of his 1869 instructions. This collection also includes a draft of instructions, in Taylor's own hand, from the State Department to himself. This draft was composed in 1859, when Taylor had sought a similar post under the State Department. The official instructions in 1869 repeat almost verbatim the language of the earlier document.

⁴¹Cincinnati *Commercial*, Nov. 20, 1869.

⁴²New York *Herald*, Nov. 18, 1869; New York *Tribune*, Nov. 20, 1869.

⁴³New York *Herald*, Feb. 5, 1870.

⁴⁴St. Paul *Press*, Dec. 23, 1869. Cf. New York *Herald*, Feb. 2, 3, 1870.

at Selkirk and in British Columbia—suggests to almost every one I meet the possibility of a treaty with England and Canada for the cession to the United States of the territory . . . simultaneously with the settlement of the Alabama controversy and the adjustment of commercial relations with the Dominion.”⁴⁵ Cession of a precarious province would assure reciprocity and erase the troublesome Alabama claims.

Considerable pressure was brought to bear upon the federal government. The Minnesota expansionists wanted the State Department to follow a policy of unsubtle intervention, not mere diplomatic pressure. And Ramsey made his position very clear to Hamilton Fish, boldly suggesting that the Secretary of State heavily subsidize Riel's government. Failing in this venture, he offered a resolution in the Senate on February 1, 1870: “That the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to consider the expediency of recommending to the President of the United States that this government shall tender its mediation between the Dominion of Canada and the people of the Red River district.”⁴⁶ Justice required American intervention to prevent the métis from being “cajoled or dragooned into this unnatural union with Canada.” Ramsey then suggested that if the British Northwest wished to be annexed to the United States, Canada's territorial loss might be repaid with a reciprocity treaty. Surely England would not stand in the way.⁴⁷

On April 19, 1870, Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan followed Ramsey's suggestion with a bolder resolution: “That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is directed to appoint two or more diplomatic agents . . . to open negotiations with the people of Winnipeg, with a view to the annexation of that district of country to the United States as a Territory or a State.”⁴⁸ Three days later, Chandler spoke to his resolution.⁴⁹ He asserted that Riel's government was the real government of the British Northwest and proposed to negotiate for the entire territory—indeed, for Canada, too. For a Canadian Dominion that reached to the Pacific would be “a standing menace . . . that we ought not to

⁴⁵Taylor to C. J. Brydges, Washington, Jan. 5, 1870, draft letter in the Taylor Papers. Brydges was the managing director of the Grand Trunk Railway and a close friend of Sir John A. Macdonald.

⁴⁶*Congressional Globe*, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., 931-3.

⁴⁷Like Ramsey, other Americans placed great weight upon the force of Little Englandism. Cf. *St. Paul Press*, Jan. 13, 1870; *New York Herald*, Nov. 28, 1869.

⁴⁸*Congressional Globe*, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2808.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 2888-9.

tolerate and will not tolerate." He suggested that Great Britain give the United States a "quit-claim deed" to British North America in exchange for her debts—reckoned at the absurd figure of \$2,220,000,000.⁵⁰

Grant's administration did not require the antics of a Chandler to goad it into adopting a policy designed to acquire British North America, whether in whole or in part. Both the President and his Secretary of State were as expansionist as the Minnesota junto; but their expansionism, tempered by the responsibilities of high office, assumed a more subtle, less obtrusive form. While Joseph Wheelock's *St. Paul Press* exhorted the Fenians to cross the 49th parallel,⁵¹ the State Department conscientiously endeavoured to check their movements.⁵² Far wiser than Wheelock, Hamilton Fish wanted to avoid giving offence either to Canada or the mother country.⁵³

And yet the administration viewed Canada and Canadian politics with the myopic optimism afflicting all imperialists. It was reported that Grant was urging the Northern Pacific Railroad to begin operations and to undertake a branch line north to the 49th parallel—"in the hopes that it will have an effect in maintaining the present attitude of Riel and his party."⁵⁴ Moreover, the administration believed or professed to believe that there existed in Canada a strong, popular movement seeking annexation to the United States. This delusion had been deepened by certain disgruntled Canadians who visited with the President and his cabinet in the fall of 1869.⁵⁵ Travelling along the eastern seaboard of the United States in November, C. J. Brydges found ample evidence of the annexation myth in the administration's mind and of the Canadians who fostered it. Conversations in Washington with Hamilton Fish and "a number of leading and influential men" had convinced Brydges of the annexationist

⁵⁰For adverse comments upon this speech, see the *Boston Daily Advertiser*, April 25, 1870; *New York Tribune*, April 23, 1870; and *New York Herald*, April 23.

⁵¹April 30, 1870.

⁵²Fish and the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, collaborated very closely in their efforts to restrain the Fenians. The State Department employed detectives in constant observation, and Fish reported to Thornton all the information he received therefrom. Thornton, in turn, relayed information of prospective movements—and Fish responded with alacrity. Fish's *Diary*, Oct. 18, 1869 and April 15, 1870.

⁵³J. C. B. Davis' *Diary*, Aug. 5, 17, 1870, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁵⁴Brydges to Macdonald, Montreal, Jan. 26, 1870, Macdonald Papers. Brydges was reporting a conversation with J. Gregory Smith of the Northern Pacific.

⁵⁵C. J. Coursol to Macdonald, Montreal, Nov. 16, 1869, *ibid.* Coursol had heard that Auben, late editor of the *Montreal Pays*, had talked with President Grant.

temper there.⁵⁶ Sir John A. Macdonald was in complete accord, for it was apparent to him "that the United States Government are resolved to do all they can, short of war, to get possession of the western territory."⁵⁷

In repeated conversations with the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, Fish argued for Canadian independence.⁵⁸ He blandly asserted that if the British withdrew, the causes of Anglo-American enmity—"Indians, Fenians, disorderly soldiers, etc. . . ."—would be removed, and the Alabama claims could be settled immediately. He claimed "that with the exception of the Government Officials, the Bankers, and some few wealthy families, there was a preponderance of sentiment in favor of separation from Great Britain."⁵⁹ He pointed out the evidences of political disunity in British North America and drew Thornton's attention to the geographic forces that blocked Canada's transcontinental design but encouraged a north-south intimacy.⁶⁰

To all Fish's overtures, Thornton made the same reply. Although he could discern no annexationist sentiment in Canada, none the less his country was "willing and even desirous" of separation. However, his hands were tied: ". . . The Canadians find great fault with me for saying so openly as I do that we are ready to let them go whenever they wish, but they do not desire it."⁶¹ But in an unpardonable departure from his office, he apparently suggested to Fish that the United States might, by continued commercial restrictions, bring about political disorder in Canada and forcefully change the Canadian attitude towards separation.⁶² The State Department remained delusively optimistic.

President Grant coveted Canada. At a November meeting, he told his cabinet that he wanted to delay settlement of the Alabama claims "until Great Britain was ready to give up Canada." Fish brought out the fallacy in such a policy: the fact that Great Britain

⁵⁶C. J. Brydges to Macdonald, Philadelphia, Nov. 17, 1869, and New York City, Nov. 19, 1869, Macdonald Papers. Brydges was sure that it was Sir John Young, who stimulated American expansionism with his reports of Canada's desire for independence, to be followed by annexation to the United States. Young, however, denied the accusation that he had ever advised the United States to withhold reciprocity in order to accelerate the independence movement. Cf. *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 9, 1869.

⁵⁷Macdonald to Brydges, Jan. 28, 1870, Joseph Pope, *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 124-5.

⁵⁸Fish's Diary, Dec. 23, 1869, Jan. 6, and March 24, 1870.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1869.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1870.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1869.

⁶²Fish reported this confidential conversation with Thornton at a cabinet meeting. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1870.

would never cede an unwilling Canada. However, Grant's policy seemed more promising when McDougall was cast out of the Northwest—and when, less than a month later, residents of British Columbia memorialized Grant for admission into the United States. Here were civil disorders that might be utilized to gain at least a slice of British North America.

Fish sensed the opportunity, but refused to adopt Machiavellian tactics. Perhaps he feared that intervention would forever alienate Canada—a far greater prize than western British North America. No answer was given the petition from British Columbia. Grant concurred with Fish's suggestion that the "proper course is to abstain from action 'to keep our eyes fixedly on the movement, and to keep our hands off.'"⁶³

III

At first, the same hands-off policy was followed in the Riel Rebellion. When Senator Ramsey had inquired (January 15, 1870) of President Grant and his Secretary of State whether money might not be extended to Louis Riel, Fish had replied that there were no funds available.⁶⁴ Furthermore, he piously declared that "we should not use money in this way."

But Fish's policy was already discarding its virtuous garb. For Oscar Malmros had relayed to Washington an amazing conversation that he had held with William Mactavish, Governor of Rupert's Land.⁶⁵ Mactavish had confidentially told the consul "that he contemplated to submit to their House in London (the Hudson Bay Company's House) whether it might not be in the interest of the Company to favor the annexation of this Country to the United States."

This unexpected turn of events spurred Fish into action. He immediately apprised John L. Motley, the American Minister to England, of Malmros' dispatch, instructing him to ascertain whether Mactavish had written the Company in regard to annexation and "also to learn their views or feelings on the subject."⁶⁶ If Motley detected any evidence of willingness by the Company or the British Government to part with the territory, he was "discreetly" to en-

⁶³*Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1870.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1870.

⁶⁵Malmros to J. C. B. Davis, Winnipeg, Dec. 24, 1869, Consular Dispatches, Winnipeg, National Archives. This dispatch was received on Jan. 12, 1870.

⁶⁶Fish to Motley, Washington, Jan. 14, 1870, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United States, Instructions, Great Britain, 1870, National Archives.

courage it—"without however compromising the Government in any respect."

In addition, Fish requested James W. Taylor to give his interpretation of the Malmros-Mactavish conversation. Taylor responded in a lengthy report which may be summarized as follows:⁶⁷ It was his opinion that Mactavish and the other officers of the Company in the Northwest "have been embittered against political connexion with Canada. . . ." On the other hand, their "relations with the people of Minnesota have always been of the most satisfactory character." Moreover, Taylor stated that there was a prevalent opinion "among parties interested in the Hudson [*sic*] Bay Company, both in England and on this continent" that annexation would not harm the fur trade—and would assure the Company a better price for its lands.

The response from Motley was far less optimistic than that from Taylor. In his first reply to Fish, the Minister asserted that Mactavish had never suggested to the Hudson's Bay Company in London that it favour the annexation of its lands by the United States.⁶⁸ And in his second, Motley stated that he had not been able to present his nation's views before any officials of the British Government.⁶⁹ His pessimism was underscored by a clipping from the *Pall Mall Gazette* (February 16, 1870) which he appended to the dispatch. In it, Gladstone's Home Secretary was quoted to the effect that the government was "most anxious to preserve intact the existing relations" between the colonies and the mother country.

And there the matter might have ended had not an unusual opportunity presented itself for direct negotiation with the Hudson's Bay Company itself. Sir Curtis M. Lampson, Deputy Governor of the Company, addressed a personal letter to the Assistant Secretary of State, J. C. Bancroft Davis.⁷⁰ Lampson had met Davis socially while the latter was attached to the American legation in London during the Civil War. But now, in writing his friend, Sir Curtis was presumably acting for the British Foreign Office—although in an unofficial capacity—and seeking a new departure for the settlement of the vexatious Alabama claims:

⁶⁷Taylor to Fish, Washington, Jan. 25, 1870, Dispatches, Winnipeg, Special Agent, Red River Affairs, National Archives.

⁶⁸Motley to Fish, London, Feb. 2, 1870, Diplomatic Dispatches, Great Britain, vol. 101, no. 232, National Archives. Motley did not name the source of his information, which had apparently been given him in confidence; but he was certain of its credibility. Research in the archives of the Hudson's Bay Company by the author also failed to turn up a letter from Mactavish on this subject.

⁶⁹Motley to Fish, London, Feb. 17, 1870, *ibid.*, vol. 102, no. 248.

⁷⁰Davis Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

80 Eaton Square
LONDON, 17th Feb. 1870—

DEAR M^r. DAVIS—

I was surprised and disappointed to learn from my friends on your side that some of the newspapers in New York and elsewhere had commented upon a letter alleged to have been written by me to the London Times wherein it was stated that I sneered at and depreciated the American Government Credit—I have never written any such letter and it is quite evident that the Newspaper Editors in question have mistaken my name for that of Lampson, the City Editor of the Times, whose unfriendly comments and bad feeling towards our Country and Government you are well aware of—I thought it undesirable to write to the Editors on your side to correct this Mistake not wishing to enter into a correspondence with them, but, thinking the false reports they have circulated may have reached Washington, I am anxious that you an old and esteemed friend and a member of the Government, should, if you feel so inclined, be able to contradict this report—Although I have resided in this country since I was 21 years old I believe my loyalty to my native country has never been doubted on this side—and as to my depreciating the Credit of the United States I am happy to say that I bought their Bonds when at the lowest point and not only have I laid out my spare money in them but have induced many of my English friends to invest largely in them greatly to their benefit—I was exceedingly glad to hear of your appointment to so important a post in the Government and trust your health may enable you to take an active part during what I deem a most important period in the history of our Country—the knowledge you acquired here while Secretary of [the] Legation cannot but make your opinion very valuable when dealing with the important matters pending between the United States and this Country—I allude more especially to the Alabama controversy—owing to the business connected with the Hudsons [*sic*] Bay Company I have become intimately acquainted with three Cabinet Ministers, two of the late and one of the present Government, to those Gentlemen I have always stated that this Country would have to pay every dollar's worth of property destroyed by the Alabama—my views were no doubt at first considered very extravagant; but in the end the whole nation began to view the matter in the proper light and the Treaty arranged by Reverdy Johnson and Lord Clarendon,⁷¹ although it provided to refer the matter [,] was considered here tantamount to an agreement to pay—when this treaty was rejected by the Senate the English people as one man declared that the nation could go no farther—I have never yet seen an individual here who would tolerate any more favourable arrangement on the part of this Government for the purpose of settling this difficulty—I look forward to a satisfactory settlement, but it is very desirable with a view to a tolerably early arrangement that the subject should be approached from your side with a full knowledge of the sentiments, which so universally prevail here—My wife joins me in kind regards to yourself & M^{rs}. Davis—

Yours very truly—

C. M. LAMPSON

⁷¹This treaty was an immature effort to resolve the Alabama claims and the Senate rejected it by a vote of 54 to 1. The treaty did not consider the acute sense of grievance experienced by Americans for the British conduct during the Civil War and set up defective machinery—in American eyes—for the arbitration of individual claims only.

The American State Department seized upon this unexpected diplomatic invitation. Davis replied to Lampson at great length, giving an extraordinarily frank statement of his country's views:

1821 H Street
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1870

MY DEAR SIR

It gave me much pleasure to receive your letter of the 17th of February which came in due course. I look back to the years spent in London, when you were all so kind to me, as among the pleasantest of my life. Anything that recalls them, or shows that I am not forgotten there is very gratifying.

I did not for one moment imagine that you had done anything to depreciate the credit of this gov't in Europe. I was too familiar with your course during the war, especially during the trying years of 1863, to suppose any such thing. When I saw the telegram you refer to, I construed it exactly as you say the facts were. I can understand why Lamson [*sic*] during the war assailed us,—it was a part of the politics of the paper—but why he should keep it up I do not understand. It is not generally the policy of the [London] Times to assail successes. If we can keep our hands off the Cuban question —⁷² which will be decided before you get this letter,—there will be no difficulty in restoring the credit of the government and resuming specie payments before the close of Gen. Grant's administration.

What you say about the Alabama claims interests me very much. I hope that when you say that after the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty "was rejected by the Senate the English people as one man declared that the nation could go no farther", you do not mean that Mr Gladstone will not budge from that Convention: because, in that event I see no way of adjusting these difficulties, a conclusion that, in the interest of the human race I should be loth to come to. I do not suppose that the continuance of the present state of things would necessarily lead to war: because we should probably pay the claimants, and let the claims rest, reserving to ourselves the right to stand by the precedent in the future. But I am one of those who think that mere absence of hostilities is not the sort of relations which should exist between Great Britain and this country. Our civilizations and our culture are so similar, that we ought to have a harmonious policy in our general dealing with the world. I must honestly say that I do not think that we can walk along in history together as we should if what the [London] Times calls the sentimental grievance of the Americans is to be disregarded. Mr Johnson's treaty unfortunately made no provision for it.

In truth it strikes me that we both must take a new departure in this affair. The past mistakes have complicated matters, and we shall be more likely to reach a good result if we move on an entirely new course. There is one way in

⁷²The Cuban Revolution, which erupted in the fall of 1868, was a source of almost constant anxiety to the State Department. Many Americans—and their congressmen—sympathized with the Cuban cause and resented the many cruelties which were inflicted not only upon the rebels but also upon American citizens. Moreover, American holdings on the island suffered from the physical damage of war. All the efforts of Hamilton Fish were directed against American intervention in, or recognition of, Cuba, lest the United States be embroiled in a war that would not serve its true interests. Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish* (New York, 1936), 335-71.

which this matter can be adjusted, and I see but one way that is absolutely certain to succeed—I mean a territorial adjustment. Fifty years ago the United States adjusted a similar dispute with Spain in this way. The settlement of claims entered largely, (as you will see by examining the [Adams-Onís] Treaty of 1819 and the correspondence which preceded it) into the acquisition of Florida. It may be that Great Britain is not prepared to consent to the direct transfer of any part of her American empire to the United States. I do not think that that would make it more difficult to settle the Alabama claims, provided Great Britain is willing to use her influence in favor of independence. That policy carried to a successful result would, in my judgement make the simultaneous settlement of the questions growing out [of] the piracies of the rebel cruisers . . . [more certain]. I believe that a large portion of the British empire on this continent would be glad today to come to the United States, and that Great Britain would be richer & stronger for having them do so. Whether we should be as well off may be more questionable. British Columbia certainly . . . [wants] to come, and sees in the connection the only way to tie itself to the railway system of the East. The Red River Settlements [sic] have gone too far in their resistance to Canada to now retreat. Will it be a wise policy for the dominion to attempt to compel them to union with Canada by force? and will such a policy be likely to succeed with the whole Fenian element of this country arrayed against it? After sailing two thousand miles on the St Laurence [sic] and the Lakes, Canada would still have to march her troops over three hundred miles of densely wooded swamps in order to reach them. Such a campaign, even if successful, would cost more than the whole country is worth. Temporary independence, followed by American annexation, will settle more questions than the Winnipeg war, and will give the Hudson's Bay Company a better payment than Canada. The dissatisfaction of Newfoundland . . . [and] New Brunswick with the Confederation is well known. Prince Edward's [sic] and Newfoundland have refused to join it. Why should not all these provinces be permitted to become independent as they desire to be even if they are not allowed to transfer their allegiance to the United States? And why could not this change be accompanied by a settlement of differences on which we now appear to be too far apart to adjust in any other way?

You say that any new proposition must come from us. How can we make a proposition until we have an intimation that such a proposition as we could make would be acceptable to H.M. Govt? Great Britain says, in effect, you need not propose anything in the way of arbitration that differs much from what we have already acceded to. We have gone as far as we can go in that direction. No administration here on the other hand could stand that stopped with Lord Clarendon's Convention. Under these circumstances what can we propose? Clearly nothing until we have some intimation either official or unofficial that H.M. Ministers, like us, are willing to make an effort for settlement in another direction.

It is not well, my dear Sir Curtis, to leave this question open for future trouble: and yet I do not see how it can be avoided unless in some such way as I have indicated. I know that Great Britain can never consent to relinquish any territory on this continent, the settlers of which show a desire to remain with her: nor can she honorably do so in the face of threats or shows of force: but she certainly can, of her own volition, so shape things that the

separation may come at the request of the colonists, without tarnishing her honor.

I have given you my views on this matter very freely—perhaps too much so—certainly too much at length. I will further frankly say that I have been partly induced to write freely because you have stated in your letter that circumstances have brought you into intimate relations with some of the members of the late and of the present cabinet, leaving me to infer that you expressed their views as well as your own: and I wished to also put you in possession of the views entertained here on this subject.

I have myself no personal acquaintance with any members of the Cabinet except Lord Granville,⁷³ the Duke of Argyll⁷⁴ [sic] and Mr. Bright.⁷⁵ The last two gentlemen I knew but slightly: Lord Granville I used to know quite well, and entertained for him a sincere respect and admiration. He has more than fulfilled the expectation entertained of him by his friends when I knew him twenty years ago.

Mr^s Davis joins me in kind regards to Lady Lampson your daughter & yourself, and begging also to be kindly remembered to your son. I am

Very faithfully Yours

J. C. B. DAVIS

Sir Curtis never replied, but in the long silence that followed this most extraordinary letter, the State Department, both in Washington and London, remained delusively optimistic. As late as May, 1870, the American legation in London believed that, "with tact and caution," the United States could get both the Red River Settlement and British Columbia.⁷⁶ And Hamilton Fish agreed: "Our Canadian friends seem to think that they have adjusted the Red River troubles—*For a time* they probably have—Existing relations there cannot be permanent—nor even of long continuance."⁷⁷ But the optimism of the American legation began to wane. Later in the same month, the legation's secretary, Benjamin Moran, reported that, although the British Government would permit the cession of the Northwest, public opinion was against it.⁷⁸ But he added that "if we could use a little money on the press here, we could create a public sentiment in favor of a fair settlement of the Alabama Claims which might give us British Columbia and Red River." However, he had neither seen nor heard from Lampson, and now doubted whether anything could be done through the agency of the Hudson's Bay Company.

⁷³Lord Granville was Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁷⁴The Duke of Argyll was Secretary of State for India.

⁷⁵John Bright was President of the Board of Trade.

⁷⁶Benjamin Moran to Davis, London, May 10, 1870, Davis Papers.

⁷⁷Fish to Moran, May 13, 1870, Letterbook no. 2, 443, Fish Papers.

⁷⁸Moran to Davis, London, May 27, 1870, Davis Papers.

By mid-June, Moran's optimism had turned to despair. He had finally seen Lampson and his doubts had been confirmed.⁷⁹ The Company had completed its sale; the bargain with Canada was sealed. Moran now lamely suggested that the State Department turn its attention back to Canada and manipulate public opinion there to favour annexation. Diplomacy had failed to dislodge the British Northwest, but already Washington was trying another tack—its last. In the spring of 1870, when it was known that Canada intended to send a military expedition against Riel, the United States adopted a policy designed to obstruct the Canadian course of action. It was the apparent belief that the odds on American annexation would grow in proportion to the months of Riel's isolation from Canada.

Geography favoured the American scheme. The easiest access to the Red River Settlement was through Minnesota, but this door was effectively locked by public opinion.⁸⁰ Hudson Bay offered a second avenue of approach, but one that would be dangerously long to follow. The only practicable route was through the Great Lakes and then overland, paddling and portaging over the Precambrian Shield. With but one vital exception—the American locks at Sault Sainte Marie—the path lay within British territory. But if the United States closed the Sault, Canadian steamers could not get into Lake Superior and the expedition would be dangerously delayed.

In November, 1869, Grant's administration had decided that, should the demand be made, Canada would not be granted permission to send troops through American territory.⁸¹ In the spring, when rumours of a military expedition reached Washington, the earlier decision was reconfirmed: under no conditions would military transports be allowed to pass through the Sault.⁸² Indeed, it was Fish's vain belief that Canada would not request permission, for Thornton had expressly denied the possibility.⁸³

Only when the Canadian plans for an expedition had matured did Thornton admit to Fish that troops were being dispatched. But the purpose of the campaign was, in his words, "to keep the Indians quiet."⁸⁴ A fortnight later, the British Minister revealed that the expedition had been sent, and he suggested that the United States open the Sault as Canada had opened the Welland

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, June 16, 1870.

⁸⁰*St. Paul Press*, Nov. 16, 28, 1869; *New York Tribune*, Dec. 27, 1869; *New York Herald*, Jan. 1, 1870.

⁸¹Fish's Diary, Nov. 23, 1869.

⁸³*Ibid.*, April 8, 1870.

⁸²*Ibid.*, April 12, 1870.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, April 14, 1870.

Canal during the Civil War—to vessels “in mercantile or commercial service.”⁸⁵

Five days later, Fish instructed Governor Baldwin of Michigan to close the Sault.⁸⁶ Shortly thereafter, the Canadians sent a “trial” steamer with a “purely mercantile cargo” through the canal,⁸⁷ but when a second vessel, the *Chicora*, arrived, similarly laden, she was forced to turn around and steam back to Collingwood. Thornton complained bitterly, reasserting the peaceful nature of the expedition.⁸⁸ Fish sought to bargain, hinting that if both an Imperial and a Canadian amnesty were granted Riel, the canal would be opened. But Thornton countered with the thinly veiled threat that Canada might, in retaliation, close the Welland Canal.⁸⁹

President Grant called a special cabinet meeting on May 16 to consider the case. The meeting opened in a sportive manner. Grant said that “he regarded the refusal to let the vessel go through as unfriendly to England”—and then added: “I guess we all feel so to.”⁹⁰ His sarcasm brought forth uproarious laughter from the cabinet members. But in the discussion that followed, the decision was made to open the Sault, lest Canada close the Welland Canal. However, the opening was made contingent upon a British promise of amnesty to the rebels before Canada actually assumed the Northwest.

The *Chicora* passed through the straits, carrying supplies and provisions, while the troops portaged the actual implements of war across a neck of land on Canadian soil. The only tangible result of Grant’s policy had been to heighten anti-American sentiment in Canada. The success of the military expedition had not been jeopardized, for there had been but little delay. Moreover, the condition of amnesty attached to the use of the canal was of greater benefit to the Canadians than to the Americans, for Thornton’s diplomatic half-promises of an amnesty prevented American action. Not until mid-September, two months after the Northwest had been secured by force of arms, did the British Minister confess that Riel would not receive an amnesty.⁹¹ By then, Canada’s hold was secure; and, in Thornton’s words, British Columbia stood

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶Fish to W. P. Baldwin, Washington, May 3, 1870, Letterbook no. 1, 677%, Fish Papers.

⁸⁷Anon. [Col. Garnet Wolseley], “Narrative of the Red River Expedition,” *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine*, CIX (Jan., 1871), 48.

⁸⁸Fish’s Diary, May 14, 1870.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, May 15, 1870.

⁹⁰Davis to Fish, Washington, May 16, 1870, Fish Papers.

⁹¹Fish’s Diary, Sept. 15, 1870.

"nearly unanimous for annexation to the Dominion. . . ."⁹² He triumphantly added "that the feeling through[out] Canada, is entirely opposed to annexation and that Independence means Annexation, they are one and the same thing."

The United States had failed to gain the British Northwest. General Malmros' intrigues in the Red River Settlement had borne only bitter fruit. The Minnesota expansionists had stimulated and maintained an annexationist policy in the State Department, but that policy was muffled in soft, diplomatic garments by Fish and Grant. A hands-off, short-of-war policy was destined to fail unless a strong annexationist sentiment existed in the Northwest. And pro-Americanism in the Red River Settlement had enjoyed only a fleeting existence before Riel's patriotism and Sir John A. Macdonald's political powers knocked it on the head.

Active intervention might have led to war—and a war with both Canada and Great Britain. President Grant intensely disliked Great Britain, but his belligerence was tempered by an acute awareness of America's Civil War debts.⁹³ Despite great military strength and a navy whose power created unrest in British circles,⁹⁴ Grant's administration never considered the possibility of fighting to gain any part of British North America. Indeed, with the outstanding exception of Minnesota, it would appear that most of the Middle Western states—the logical section to reap the gains from annexation—were more interested in reciprocity with Canada than in the annexation of her West.⁹⁵

The Red River Rebellion was "a trump card in the hands of American diplomacy . . . by which, if rightly played, every vestige of British power may be swept from the Western half of the continent."⁹⁶ But in the card game for the Northwest, the wily Canadian Premier, Sir John A. Macdonald, had outdealt his American foes—and "redrawn" the 49th parallel. Presented with defeat, Grant's administration lost interest in the Northwest. A plea from Riel, in exile, was left unanswered. From Washington, Senator Ramsey wrote to James W. Taylor, now consul at Winnipeg, that there was "absolutely no interest at all here just now in

⁹²*Ibid.*, 18, 1870.

⁹³*Ibid.*, March 22, 1870.

⁹⁴"The American Navy in the Late War," *Edinburgh Review*, CXXIV (July, 1866), 94-116. Cf. "Our Naval Defences: Where are We?" *Blackwood's*, X (Jan., 1867), 1-17.

⁹⁵Fish's Diary, Dec. 21, 1869, and Feb. 2, 1870.

⁹⁶St. Paul Press, Feb. 8, 1870.

Red River matters."⁹⁷ When Taylor sought (1874) permission from the State Department to report to Ottawa upon the plight of Louis Riel, the Assistant Secretary of State bluntly informed him that the department "didn't care a continental . . . about Riel which shut him up."⁹⁸ The fires of American expansionism had died out—and the Dominion of Canada stretched from sea to sea.

⁹⁷[Winter, 1870-1] Taylor Papers.

⁹⁸Davis to Fish, Washington, April 4, 1874, Fish Papers.

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE TOYNBEE OF THE 1950's¹

F. H. UNDERHILL

Two features are noteworthy in the great mass of reviewing which has greeted the appearance of four new volumes of Arnold Toynbee's magisterial *Study of History*. One is the preponderance of opinion criticizing Toynbee's ideas, opinion which comes either from secular students of history who disagree with his universal pattern-making, with many of his interpretations of past events, and especially with his flight into an apocalyptic religious interpretation of the meaning of history, or from theologians and religious philosophers who agree with his repudiation of secularism but repudiate his views about Christianity as heresy. The other feature is the unanimity with which all reviewers, having said their say about what is wrong with Toynbee, express their admiration for his learning, his insight, and his imagination, and pay tribute to the intellectual stimulus which comes from reading his *magnum opus*.

This present set of four volumes calls for a lot of reading. Outside of the index, which runs to 180 pages, there are 2,566 pages of pretty close print; and nearly every page has one or more footnotes, some of them long ones, in fine print. Toynbee assumes a body of readers with a capacity for sticking at a subject over a long period of concentration.

These volumes are to be followed by two more. One will be a volume containing a gazeteer of names and a series of maps. This is being prepared by friends of Toynbee. The second will be a volume of reconsiderations and revisions, containing Toynbee's second thoughts after digesting the criticisms he has received, and after bringing up to date his analysis of civilizations in the light of all the new knowledge that has been accumulated by archaeologists and other scholars since he began his study in the 1920's. No doubt there will also in due course be a one-volume condensation of the present four volumes along the lines of the Somervell one-volume edition of the first six. But this will inevitably lose some of the special flavour of Toynbee, because any condensation is bound to emphasize the structure of his thought at the expense of the tone and colour of his writing, which is mainly what makes him both so exhilarating and so exasperating. The loss will be more marked in any condensation of these last four volumes, since the author here allows his own personality to intrude much oftener and more directly than in the earlier volumes.

When volumes VII-X came out last autumn Toynbee wrote a short exposition of his work as he sees it in an article in the January, 1955 number

¹Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vols. VII-X (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1954, xxxi, 772; ix, 735; viii, 759; vii 422 pp., \$32). This review was read as a paper in a symposium on Arnold Toynbee at a session of Section II of the Royal Society of Canada on June 7, 1955. For the author's views on the earlier volumes of Toynbee's *Study of History*, see the article, "Arnold Toynbee, Metahistorian," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXII (Sept., 1951).

of *International Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, of which Toynbee himself has so long been a research professor. It may be worth while to give a fairly long quotation from this article, since it is so effective in explaining Toynbee briefly in his own words.

"The particular generation into which I was born happens to be a revolutionary one. In less than one lifetime the face of the World has changed almost out of recognition, and the West's position in the World has undergone the greatest change of all. So, if one has been following the course of World affairs since 1914, one is bound to have gained, from this alone, a good deal of new knowledge about history; and, meanwhile, the forty years that have seen this new chapter of history writing itself have also seen the Orientalists and the archaeologists recovering for us other chapters of history that had been either forgotten completely or had been remembered only in a few shreds and tatters of tradition. . . .

"This re-discovery of the rather less recent past, together with the portentous events of our own day, has given us a wealth of new historical information. Our vision of the history of Mankind, since the rise of the earliest known civilizations about 5,000 years ago, has been enormously enlarged and has also been brought into much sharper focus. . . . This is the origin of my book *A Study of History*. It is one person's impression of history in the new light in which we can now see it; and of course a number of other people have been tempted, by the same opportunity, to take their look and form their impressions. Each of these individual views will show the new picture in a different perspective; and, since it has only lately become possible to take this panoramic view of history, the first attempts (of which mine is one) are sure to be revised and corrected and superseded as time goes on and as more people turn their minds to this exciting intellectual enterprise. . . .

"The traditional pattern in the West down to the end of the seventeenth century had been the Israelite pattern, which Christendom and Islam had taken over with modifications in their own favour. In this Jewish-Christian-Muslim view, history had appeared to be an act of God beginning at the Creation and destined to end in the Last Judgement, while Israel (or Christendom or Islam) had been singled out as being the people chosen by God for carrying out His purposes. The last great Western exponent of this Jewish-Christian-Muslim pattern of history had been Bishop Bossuet. His eighteenth-century successors made the Late Modern Western pattern of history, on which we have been working since Bossuet's death, by cutting God out of the picture and dealing with the Christian Church as the Church had dealt with Israel. Bossuet's successors appropriated the role of being 'the Chosen People' from the Christian Church, as the Church had appropriated it from Israel; and they transferred this role, partly to 'Europe', but mainly to the particular West European nation to which a particular historian happened to belong: to France, Britain, Italy, Spain, and so on, as the case might be. This eighteenth-century Western view of history as a movement in a straight line, leading up to a twentieth-century 'Europe', 'Britain', or 'Nicaragua', instead of leading up to a future Last Judgement, simply cannot take in the new panorama that the twentieth century has now opened out before our eyes. In that antiquated Late Modern Western picture there is no room at all for China or India, and hardly any room even for Russia or America. And

where are we to find in it so much as a niche for the Maya or for the Hittites? In the light of our new knowledge, we are compelled to discard this pattern, as our eighteenth-century predecessors discarded Bossuet's. Once again, we have to look at history with new eyes, as our eighteenth-century predecessors did.

"... In this age our Western Civilization has collided with all the other surviving civilizations all over the face of the planet—with the Islamic Civilization, with the Hindu, with the Chinese, with the Aztec, and so on,—and we can take a comparative view of the effects of these simultaneous collisions upon the parties to them. This comparative treatment can be extended to the whole of history; and it is, in fact, the method of the human sciences: the theory of knowledge, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics. The human sciences, like the natural sciences, make a comparative study of their data in order to discover the structure of the facts and the events; and I believe that here the historians ought to take their cue from the scientists. The academic division between history and the social sciences is an accidental one which is an obstacle to the progress of understanding. We need to break down the traditional partition, and to throw history and the social sciences together into a single comprehensive study of human affairs. . . . One of my aims in *A Study of History* has been to try out the scientific approach to human affairs and to test how far it will carry us. . . .

"More than twenty-seven years have now passed since I began to make my first notes for *A Study of History*, and I am conscious that, during these years, my outlook has changed. As I have gone on, Religion has come, once again, to take the central place in my picture of the Universe. Yet I have not returned to the religious outlook in which I was brought up. I was brought up to believe that Christianity was a unique revelation of the whole truth. I have now come to believe that all the historic religions and philosophies are partial revelations of the truth in one or other of its aspects. In particular, I believe that Buddhism and Hinduism have a lesson to teach to Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in the 'one world' into which we are now being carried by 'the annihilation of distance'. Unlike the Judaic religions, the Indian religions are not exclusive. They allow for the possibility that there may be alternative approaches to the mystery of Existence; and this seems to me more likely to be the truth than the rival claims of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to be unique and final revelations. This Indian standpoint is the one from which these last four volumes of my book have been written."

Toynbee's mission to his fellow historians cannot be said as yet to have succeeded. They continue for the most part to devote themselves to specialist studies of "parochial" national or regional societies, to shun his wide synoptic generalizations, and to shudder at his flights into apocalyptic religion. It is only from their undergraduate students that requests come up for courses on the philosophy of history or the meaning of civilization. The professional historian still gets his chief inspiration from immersing himself in some particular individual society at some particular period of its history, and seeking to know it so intimately that he can think its thoughts and look out on life through its eyes. He, of course, finds similarities between different societies, and arranges the facts of his society into patterns that may repeat themselves in other societies. But he is suspicious of the demand for general

laws of society which are to be deduced from comparative studies. He is endlessly fascinated by the one unique society of which he has become spiritually a citizen. And he tends to regard the sociologist, with his classifications and categories and laws, as a pretentious, shallow fellow who has never grown up, who has never got beyond the child-like pleasure of arranging his toy soldiers in parade-ground patterns.

It was primarily this sociological aspect of Toynbee's demand on his fellow historians which repelled them in his early volumes. But he had already made it clear then that he himself had passed beyond the sociological phase of his development and had become a religious philosopher seeking the meaning of man's life here on earth in new other-worldly dimensions; and it is this religious side of Toynbee which shows up most prominently in the four new volumes. The reviews which he will receive from professional historians will no doubt, therefore, continue to be sharp and unkindly. Of course it may be suggested that their tendency to be critical of him is intensified by the fact that Toynbee has become a popular and doubtless well-paid writer for the mass audience of the English-speaking middle classes, and that the prestige of Toynbee, the religious prophet, lends undue weight with the public to the interpretations of Toynbee, the historian. He has been an itinerant lecturer to North American college audiences almost as much in demand as if he were a best-selling novelist. He has been one of the favourite heroes of the Luce journals, and one of the frequent preachers of sermonettes-for-our-day in the *New York Times* Sunday magazine section. A modern John the Baptist, he preaches repentance and the renunciation of twentieth-century materialism while commuting between the well-staffed offices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and the opulent quarters of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton.

Nevertheless, in spite of this professional disapproval, one of the noteworthy facts about the publication of Toynbee's last four volumes has been the amount of serious and lengthy comment which they have received from first-class reviewers.² It may be that all this writing about Toynbee only illustrates the fact that he has become, in the words of one of the reviewers,³ the Billy Graham of the eggheads; but I think a reading of these reviews will show more than that. A response of this quality as well as quantity demonstrates how far-reaching is the challenge which Toynbee has made to the thinking of his generation.

Perhaps one should begin one's own review by drawing attention to the rather effective reply to his historian-critics which Toynbee has made in these new volumes. In volume IX there is a long and very Toynbean section on "Law and Freedom in History" which contains some acute discussion on when and how uniformities, recurrences, laws show themselves or fail to show themselves in human events, though it culminates in mystic verbiage about "the freedom of human souls that is the law of God." During the discussion Toynbee devotes some pages to what he calls "the antinomianism of Late Modern Western historians," their refusal to seek for general laws to organize the confusion of their subject-matter. He chastises them for this

²A list of some of the most important reviews is appended at the end of this article.

³Hans Morgenthau in *Encounter*, March, 1955.

refusal, and he has a good time making fun of the agnostic skepticism of modern historians who, having given up seeing the hand of God in history, now refuse to look for any ultimate pattern in events at all. His particular victim is the late H. A. L. Fisher of Oxford whose famous preface to his *History of Europe* has become a classic statement of the historical agnosticism of our day. "One intellectual excitement has been denied me," says Fisher. "Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in History a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another, as wave follows wave." To which Toynbee replies: "An historian who had thus publicly declared his allegiance to the dogma that 'Life is just one damned thing after another' might have been expected to give his work some such conformably non-committal title as 'A History of Some Emergencies in Some Human Affairs'; but in calling it as he did 'A History of Europe' he was recanting in his title his own denial in his preface that he had discerned in his History a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern."⁴

It is worth noting, also, that Toynbee presents here an answer to all those critics, historians, and social scientists who condemned his earlier volumes because he nowhere clearly defined his leading idea, a civilization. He was not certain how many of these civilizations there have been in the last six thousand years, which societies qualify as civilizations and which do not, so that his whole process of pattern-making, it was said, became unscientific. With such an indefinite intellectual instrument, said his critics, how could he make genuinely scientific generalizations? But since 1939 Toynbee has been studying how professional economists go about the analysis of business cycles. He points out that these cycles seem to be phenomena of perplexing variability, that there is no exact agreement on how they should be measured, what causes them, or what is their periodicity, but that no one questions the scientific value of the work done by Wesley Mitchell and his economic colleagues.⁵ Toynbee regards himself as a pioneer in studying the much more complex phenomenon of civilizations; but the necessary weakness of the pioneer does not mean that scientific work cannot be done in this field. So he invites his fellow historians to shake off their mental shackles and become sociologists. The professional sociologist would no doubt remark about Toynbee's work that he shows a remarkably limited knowledge of what modern scientific sociology has been doing and of the intellectual tools it has been using. But, of course, Toynbee is only a sociologist on the way to becoming a religious seer. In the end this world is not explicable to him through purely this-worldly concepts. And faced with Toynbee the mystic, Toynbee the religious prophet, all this-worldly historians and sociologists can do nothing but form a united front against him, a reluctant and purely *ad hoc* united front.

Toynbee himself remains at the end of his *magnum opus* remarkably humble and undogmatic in his replies to criticisms. In fact his modesty is one of the things which make him a unique kind of sociologist as well as a unique kind of religious prophet. On the other hand these last four volumes reveal another aspect of Toynbee, an aspect which is inevitable in any

⁴A *Study of History*, IX, 195.

⁵*Ibid.*, IX, 223-34.

scholar who has worked at a chosen subject for over a generation. It is what has been called a hardening of the categories. These four volumes are constructed on the framework made familiar in the previous six: the twenty-one or a few more civilizations; challenge and response; the birth, growth, breakdown, disintegration, and death of civilizations; creative minorities changing to dominant minorities; internal and external proletariats; the universal state as a stage in a civilization's disintegration; higher religions emerging among the internal proletariat and producing a universal church; the church as the chrysalis through which a new affiliated civilization is brought to birth; etc. All of these concepts were introduced earlier as tentative, hypothetical ideas to be tested out to see how far they would serve in organizing the synoptic historian's material. Now, in the last four volumes, they are all taken for granted as having been proved and established, as being in fact the framework within which the events of history do actually arrange themselves. What was once a subjective suggestion is now objective fact. What has happened is, of course, that the individual historian has become so accustomed to his own categories that he is now unable to think in any others.

One minor example of this hardening of the categories may be referred to, an example trivial in itself, though Toynbee's use of it has naturally angered the people concerned. It is his treatment of the Jews. Early in his investigations he placed Jewish society as a fossilized remnant of an extinct Syriac civilization which has continued to survive through the Hellenic and modern Western civilizations. In the long ages of the Diaspora the Jews were a "millet," a religious group in a wider society, living their own distinct life without a political organization or any definite geographical basis. Toynbee is very fond of this idea of the millet as a form of social organization. He sees it as a possible alternative to our modern Western separatist independent national state, which corresponds to the separatist city-state of Hellenic civilization. He looks forward to some future oecumenical society in which the people adhering to his four Higher Religions—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Mahayana Buddhism—would live peaceably side by side organized in millets within a world community. Well, he had pigeonholed the Jews away back in the early 1930's at the beginning of his *Study of History*. And now these ungrateful fellows have refused to stay put. They have committed the ultimate atrocity, the unforgivable sin in Toynbee's eyes, of forming themselves into the national state of Israel on the best Western model. Toynbee upbraids them severely. If he were, what he is always professing to be, an empiricist historian, basing his conclusions on empirical observation, he would surely allow the poor Jews one more response to the grim challenge which has faced them for centuries. He would, that is, adjust his categories to newly emerging historical facts instead of requiring the Jews to stay adjusted to the old categories. But his categories have inexorably hardened on him, and so the Jews must suffer for it.

Because these Toynbean categories are by this time very familiar to every student of history, because in fact they have to some extent taken possession of our minds as well as of Toynbee's, these four new volumes are apt to strike the reader as not being so freshly written as the first six. To me they give the impression, rightly or wrongly, of being unnecessarily repetitious and verbose. As I plough through pages filled with names of men and places, names which I have never seen before and shall probably never see again,

I am apt to become impatient or bored. And I find that I tend to be annoyed at the long involved sentences, the Platonic profusion of metaphors and similes, instead of being stimulated and refreshed as when I read the first volumes. Sir Ernest Barker⁶ has some remarks on Toynbee's style which crystallize the ideas that were vaguely forming in my own mind.

A sad feature of Dr. Toynbee's classicism is its effect on his style. . . . It is plus quam Ciceronian in the prolonged rotundity of its voluminous periods. He writes English almost as if it were a foreign language, in long periodic sentences, with one relative clause piled on, or dovetailed into, another. What is more sad is that he writes on a high and strained note with a wealth of curious adjectives and with the liberal use of a peculiar technical terminology which falls away into slogans. . . . The reader cannot but wish that the style were simpler and the sentences shorter: that adjectives were fewer, less high-pitched and less far-fetched: that there were more Attic restraint, and less Asiatic luxuriance.

Perhaps in fairness I should also quote a tribute to the Toynbean style, a tribute coming from Randall Jarrell who is certainly qualified to make judgments about style. "My eyes are still blurred, my ears echoing, with that strange, stiff-robed, grandly conventional, innocently monumental style. Hokusai used to call himself the old man mad about painting; Toynbee could call himself the old man mad about metaphor. Metaphors dead for many centuries are revived by his impartial trust, and go slowly by, their draperies billowing in the wind of Time. For as you read *A Study of History* the air of all the earth, of all the ages, is circulating around you."⁷

Toynbee's first six volumes had treated of the births of the twenty-one civilizations, of their growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations. He had found that in the process of disintegration the dominant minority, trying to save their civilization, produced a universal state, and that the internal proletariat developed new, higher religions from which there eventually emerged a universal church. Volume VII discusses at length these two subjects of universal states and universal churches. Volume VIII is devoted to the contacts between different civilizations in time (Renaissances) and in space, devoting most of its attention in the second theme to the contacts of our Western civilization with other societies. Volume IX takes up the question of "Law and Freedom in History" and then goes on to discuss the subject that has provoked most of the popular interest in Toynbee's recent writings, "The Prospects of Western Civilization"—a subject about which he did a good deal of lecturing between 1939 and 1954 and wrote several small books. Volume X, apart from the index, might almost be said to be autobiography, for it is mainly devoted to a discussion of "The Inspirations of Historians," with a good deal about the inspirations of one particular historian, Arnold Toynbee, and with a fascinating note of "Acknowledgements and Thanks" which tells of the influences that made Toynbee the kind of historian he is.

Of these four volumes, the author tells us in his preface, the sections on Universal States, Heroic Ages, Contacts of Civilizations in Time, and The Inspirations of Historians are written more or less on the lines of his original notes made in the 1920's. The sections on Universal Churches, Contacts of

⁶In his review of Toynbee's last four volumes in *International Affairs*, Jan., 1955.

⁷*Atlantic Monthly*, Nov., 1954.

Civilizations in Space, Law and Freedom in History, and The Prospects of Western Civilization, have been treated very differently from the original design.

The autobiographical bits provide some of the most fascinating reading in these four volumes. There are personal anecdotes scattered all through the 2,600 pages which tell about particular mental experiences of his, some of them giving him a kind of mystical illumination and all helping to lead him to his present views. The first notes out of which came these ten volumes were made by him on the back of an envelope one day in 1921 as he travelled through the Balkans by the Orient Express from Constantinople towards England. He had earlier tried to write something, taking as a starting-point the famous chorus in the *Antigone* about the wonderful nature of man. But he gave this up. Presumably there was too much Greek *hubris* in that chorus for Toynbee's spirit.

In the thirty pages of his "Acknowledgments and Thanks" in volume X he fills in many more details. His mother was an historian and used to read history to him from his earliest years. "The Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens peopled my world for me, while I was still in the perambulator, with continents, quadrupeds, poets, artists, sculptors, philosophers and men of science. . . . The genealogy of the descendants of Noah's three sons in the Tenth Chapter of Genesis gave me my first notion of the differentiation of the Human Race into divers groups and sub-groups. . . . *Paradise Lost*, when I discovered it and devoured it in three days before I was eight years old, instilled into my mind, without my understanding it, my first idea of a theodicy." And now Toynbee has given us his own theodicy in ten thick volumes, his justification of the ways of God to man. Just before he was ten years old he came into contact with four volumes of the *Story of the Nations* series. These dealt with Babylonia and Egypt and gave him that fascination with the near and middle East, the countries east and southeast of the Mediterranean all the way to India and China, which has remained with him for the rest of his life. He also discovered, so he tells us, at the age of ten, that two of these volumes were inconsistent with each other in their time scales, and this started him on difficult historical research.

He became steeped in the classical civilization of Greece and Rome as a schoolboy and a student at Oxford. Still today, he tells us, when he wants to express his deepest feelings, he does so in Greek or Latin verse. There is a long Greek poem written by him at the beginning of volume I and a long Latin one at the beginning of volume VII, from which, I notice, no North American reviewers seem to have quoted. He regards this Hellenic training as invaluable in that it emancipated him from local Western or English patriotism.

Mommsen, whom he read just before going up to Oxford, taught him that an historical work was a better presentation of history for being also a work of art. Eduard Meyer, the other great German ancient historian, in his *History of the Persians* taught him the functions of a universal state, and in his *History of Greece and Rome* the essential unity of what Toynbee has himself labelled the Hellenic civilization. And he goes through the names of a host of other authors to whom he feels indebted. "The Gospels and Herodotus made me aware of the divine irony in human affairs, the most tremendous of all the lessons in History. . . . Aeschylus anticipated my ex-

perience in life in teaching me that learning comes through suffering. . . . Ibn Khaldun in his *Universal History* gave me a vision of the study of History bursting the bounds of This World and breaking through into Another World" (capital letters for This World and Another World). From a subconsciously remembered passage of Browning which he read with his mother in early years came the idea of challenge and response.

Above all Gibbon has always dominated his imagination. A large part of his ten volumes may be said to be a response to the challenge of Gibbon. For Gibbon, says Toynbee, on that famous fifteenth of October, 1764, when he sat musing on the Capitoline hill, listening to the monks chanting their Christian liturgy among the ruins of imperial Rome, was inhibited by his eighteenth-century rationalism from realizing that what should have struck him on that occasion was not the impermanence of all human achievements, the fall of the *old* Empire, but the theme that the monks were chanting, the *new* drama "in which the action was raised to a higher spiritual dimension through the invasion of Time by Eternity." It is to this vision of "the study of history bursting the bounds of This World and breaking through into Another World" that Toynbee seeks to carry us in the most important section of his last four volumes, that on Universal Churches.

This demand by Toynbee that the historian in his search for an ultimate pattern of human history shall turn himself from a this-worldly social scientist into a theologian is the most significant feature of these last four volumes. If one asks what is new in these volumes beyond what was already sketched out in the first six, it has to be said that every main aspect of Toynbee's thought in the 1950's was there to be discerned by the attentive reader in the 1930's. What is new is the greater emphasis on a religious interpretation of human life; and this results in a reconstruction of Toynbee's framework which he was already contemplating before the end of volume VI. He had been shocked into creative thought when, as a young teacher of ancient history at Oxford in 1914, it dawned on him that he was a philosophical contemporary of Thucydides—both were watching their civilization being torn apart in a destructive war. This started him on a study of civilizations as all philosophically equivalent to each other. He found twenty-one or a few more of them. He observed that out of some of these as they disintegrated there emerged higher religions and that a church—the Christian Church, for example, on the death of the Hellenic civilization—served as a chrysalis out of which a new civilization was born. By 1939 he was doubting whether this was an adequate account of the function of these higher religions in human history. And now, his doubts confirmed, he argues that civilizations are not societies existing for their own sake, each with its own autonomous life history, but that their final purpose has been to produce higher religions which represent the ultimate form that human society can reach during man's pilgrimage on this earth.

So the present Toynbean framework of history is as follows. First there are primitive societies. These fall outside the scope of his history. Out of these emerge the primary first-generation civilizations; and when they die a group of second-generation civilizations appear. These latter are of a higher order than the first-generation ones because, when they disintegrate, the spiritual turmoil generated in human souls by their sufferings is sufficient to produce higher religions. Four great religions have emerged from the

second-generation civilizations—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Thus human history turns out not to be just a cyclical succession of civilizations, all philosophically equal. It ascends in a progressive order through four stages: (1) primitive societies; (2) first-generation civilizations, of which an example is the so-called Minoan civilization in the Aegean, which we now know to have existed before the classical Greeks arrived; (3) second-generation civilizations, such as that of the Greeks and Romans, which Toynbee calls the Hellenic; and (4) higher religions, such as that of the Christian Church which survived when Hellenic civilization died.

This religious society is a new higher kind of society than a civilization. Out of it, of course, there may arise a third-generation civilization like our modern Western one, but this represents not an advance but a regression. These third-generation civilizations are of no significance, they are but vain repetitions of the gentiles of the second-generation civilizations. Toynbee's chart of progress ends with these four higher religions. He has thus restored a unity and a linear teleological progression in history which was absent from his earlier cyclical conception. But his progress is essentially one on the religious level.

Western civilization, though it is so insignificant in Toynbee's scale of values, has, nevertheless, spread its influence in recent centuries over the rest of the planet; and all other civilizations are now either extinct or clearly in a process of decline. Toynbee's conclusion from these events is that the next great stage in human history is going to be determined by what comes out of the spiritual encounter, now made possible by Western communications and technology, among these four main higher religions—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Mahayana Buddhism. On the basis of his present interpretation of history, it perhaps doesn't really much matter what happens to our Western civilization as such. The purpose for which we exist on this earth is to discover man's relation to God; and since the higher religions carry us further on this path than do the secular civilizations, the study of history inevitably carries us, or at least it carries Toynbee, from *This World to Another World*.

In the 1930's Toynbee seemed to be of the opinion that, if our Western civilization should go to pieces, the Christian Church would once again stand forth as the saviour of mankind. But, if so, he has now changed his mind. He has reached a kind of religious syncretism, looking forward to some form of an amalgamation of the four higher religions or of peaceful coexistence among their adherents. As he expounds this view, he allows various Christian friends of his to point out most cogently in footnotes and appendices that his conception of the theological equivalence of all higher religions is fundamentally incompatible with orthodox Christianity. He acquiesces in the charge that his present position is not Christian. Again and again he criticizes the Christian faith for the element of dogmatic intolerance and arrogance which it has inherited from Judaism. "In claiming to possess a monopoly of the Divine Light a church seems to me to be guilty of hybris. In denying that other religions may be God's chosen and sufficient channels for revealing Himself to some human souls, it seems to me to be guilty of blasphemy. If it is inadmissible to call oneself a Christian without holding these tenets, then I am not entitled to call myself a Christian." (VII, 428)

A mere secular historian, watching from the outside these quarrels among the faithful, must congratulate Toynbee on this reassertion of his liberalism

against his dogmatic Christian friends. But since this broad, imaginative, tolerant, humane attitude towards all higher spiritual faiths is obviously something that Toynbee must have absorbed from the liberal nineteenth-century England in which he grew up, one wonders whether secular liberal humanism does not deserve from him some rather kinder words than he has been apt to bestow upon it in recent years.

I have to confess, also, that I cannot understand in what sense Toynbee's "higher religion" is a higher form of society than a "civilization." Surely it is only an organized group of human beings, a "civilization" that is, whose members agree in certain mystical religious beliefs about man's relation to the universe. They are all still subject to original sin, and they still require the non-religious, political and economic and social institutions that a civilization provides. It is only in Toynbee's subjective judgment, and not necessarily in the objective order of history, that their religious beliefs at their best are "higher" than those, say, of Greek philosophy at its best.

As for Toynbee's attempt to make theologians out of us historians, and to deduce other-worldly religious conclusions from the facts of this-worldly history, the mere secular historian must say that this is purely fantastic. From the events of this world the historian-scientist can reach only this-worldly conclusions, and these must be very tentative. The study of theology may or may not be a higher form of intellectual activity than the study of history, but most historians will remain content to leave it to theologians. Theologians, so they observe, have usually turned out in the past to be very bad historians; and they have no ambition themselves to become bad theologians.

When Toynbee leaves his adventures in theology and proceeds to discuss in volume IX the future of our Western civilization, it is to be remarked that the note of secular liberalism is much stronger than in the sections on Universal Churches and Law and Freedom in History. Various lectures of his between 1939 and 1954 had led critics to charge that he was unduly defeatist about the society of which he is himself a member. And, of course, if the general pattern which he has found in the history of other civilizations holds good for ours, and if all his previous indications in earlier volumes are of any weight, to the effect that our civilization suffered its breakdown with the disruption of Christendom at the end of the middle ages, then our four hundred years of a Time of Troubles must be almost completed, and we are headed in the very near future for a universal state. But Toynbee writes in this section now as if he had never been the author of this framework of history. He discusses our prospects, our strength and our weakness, very much as any other perplexed liberal historian would do—"on the one hand, on the other hand." He is prepared, after all, to find quite a bit of good in our Western City of Man, and there is none of the Augustinian repudiation that one might have expected from many of his earlier remarks.

In his earlier writings you will search a long time before you will find anything favourable about us and our experiences since the seventeenth century—in the post-Christian phase, as he calls it, of the history of Western civilization. Western industrialism and Western democracy had almost uniformly been referred to by him as "demonic." Western science he had criticized as tempting us to self-worship. And Western political achievement, the building up of the national state, seemed to him to lead to the most evil of all forms of man's self-worship. But now he admits that the Western

liberal-democratic state has something to be said for it. The abolition of slavery in modern times, for example, is a mark in our favour. The spread of social justice shows moral advance; the recognition that it is part of the duty of government to concern itself with social welfare has been a landmark in the political history of man. He thinks that there are grounds for hope "that the governments and peoples of the United States and the Soviets might have the imagination, wisdom, tolerance, self-restraint, patience and fortitude to seek and ensure a pacific partition of the world for an indefinite time to come."

Note Toynbee's list here of humane qualities of mind. It bears a striking similarity to the features of eighteenth-century civilization which Gibbon discerned after the dark ages of "barbarism and religion" and on which he based his optimistic conclusions "that every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the Human Race." Toynbee also praises the modern British and Scandinavian peoples for their low ideological temperature, which was exactly what Gibbon admired in the civilized western Europe of his day. Moreover, he has here a rather surprising defence of the spirit of science against anti-intellectual religiosity. On the basis of a good many of the pages in this long section dealing with *The Prospects of Western Civilization* one can almost welcome Toynbee as a liberal brand plucked at the last moment from the fires of religious enthusiasm.

His rescue is, of course, only temporary. Volume X ends with a wonderful litany composed for the new syncretic Toynbean Church of the future. Here the Christ of the Christians is invoked along with "Christ Tammus, Christ Adonis, Christ Osiris, Christ Balder." Mother Mary, Mother Isis, Mother Cybele, Mother Ishtar, Mother Kwanyin are implored to have compassion on us. And Buddha Gautama, Saint Michael, Mithras, St. John Baptist, Noble Lucretius, Valiant Zarathustra, Saint Peter, Tender-hearted Muhammad, Saint Paul, Blessed Francis Xavier, Blessed John Wesley, Strong Zeno, Pious Confucius, Saint Stephen, Blessed Socrates, Saint Gregory, Blessed Asoka, Saint Augustine, Jalal-ad-Din Mawlana, singing reed, Saint Benedict, Epicurus, St. Anthony, Marcus Aurelius, Blessed Francis are all called upon together one after the other.

At the end of this litany Toynbee writes *finis* to his great work, and he appends the historical note: "London, 1951, June 15, 6.25 p.m., after looking once more, this afternoon, at Fra Angelico's picture of the Beatific Vision."

Well, if it is the duty of the historian to prepare himself by his studies for the attainment of the Beatific Vision, he is obviously wasting his time by settling down into Canadian history.

What is one to say in conclusion about Toynbee? I do not find the elaborate pattern into which he wishes to fit all the events of history particularly convincing. The stimulus one gets from him, after this pattern has become familiar, is provided by the flashes of insight in which his ten volumes abound. And while his capacity for insight must have been nourished by his broad and deep historical study, his unique insights are not those typical of the historian, but rather those of the prophet, the seer, the poet, the mystic. He has very little of the usual historian's interest in political organization as such. The passion with which he is apt to denounce the political state, whether the Greek city-state, the modern nation-state, the

mediaeval empire or contemporary totalitarian empires, shocks an ordinary historian. As a prophet and a mystic he also denounces our modern devotion to material progress. But at the same time, when his own religious inspiration carries him on to imaginative flights about ever growing accumulations of divine grace and illumination being stored up through history for the benefit of human souls, he shows himself to be just as utopian a believer in progress as ever Condorcet showed himself in his visions of the future progress of human reason—though Toynbee's is a very different kind of progress.

There is one final remark to be made. Many critics have commented on how deeply Toynbee seems to be alienated from his own society, to judge from his own statements spread through so many of his pages. I think a case might be made, using Spenglerian language, for the thesis that he is a Magian soul born out of due time. In spite of his belief about himself that the Hellenic civilization is his spiritual home, he is not really an Apollinian man. His sharp criticisms of Greek philosophy, which provided first the alternative to and then the intellectual framework for Christian theology, the tone of strong distaste with which he so often refers to Greek democracy and the Greek city-state and to the heritage they handed down to our modern Western civilization, are enough to show this. His spiritual home is really in that part of the world beyond the Hellespont, in the society that produced the mystical magical "higher" religions which were eventually to defeat Hellenism. It is the historical development of this part of the world that fascinates him most; he devotes more of his pages to it than to any other area. I have a feeling that some day a psychologist who is interested in history will turn up and proceed to demonstrate that Toynbee's whole adult life has been spent in a long struggle by his subconscious Magian self to overcome the Hellenic education imposed on his conscious English self at school and college.

Nor has Toynbee any instinctive sympathy with the Faustian man who is the typical figure in our modern civilization, with his Faustian science and technology or his Faustian lust for power. He remarks somewhere in these pages that the modern man of our recent centuries was prefigured by Milton's *Paradise Lost* in Satan. Toynbee himself is a Magian soul born in the wrong century and in the wrong country.

SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT REVIEWS OF VOLS. VII-X

- NOEL ANNAN, Professor Toynbee's Grand Obsession (*Manchester Guardian*, Weekly, Oct. 21, 1954)
 ANONYMOUS, Study of History: A Personal View of History (*Times Literary Supplement*, Oct. 22, 1954—front-page leading article)
 SIR ERNEST BARKER, Dr. Toynbee's Study of History: A Review (*International Affairs*, Jan., 1955)
 GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, The Prospects of the Western World (*Listener*, Oct. 14, 1954)
 CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, Toynbee's Odyssey of the West (*Commonweal*, Oct. 22, 1954)
 ——— Toynbee's Study of History: the Place of Civilizations in History (*International Affairs*, April, 1955)
 G. F. HUDSON, Toynbee versus Gibbon (*Twentieth Century*, Nov., 1954)
 W. M. PARKER, Professor Toynbee's Magnum Opus (*Quarterly Review*, April, 1955)

LAWRENCE STONE, Historical Consequence and Happy Families (*Spectator*, Oct. 29, 1954)

*DOUGLAS JERROLD, Professor Toynbee, the West and the World (*Sewanee Review*, Winter, 1954)

**Counsels of Hope* (a series of letters in the *Times Literary Supplement* in 1954 on Toynbee's B.B.C. lectures, "The West and the World"; reprinted by *The Times* as a pamphlet)

ANONYMOUS, Toynbee and the Future (*Life*, Nov. 4, 1954)

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HANS MORGENTHAU, Toynbee and the Historical Imagination (*Encounter*, March, 1955)

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FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Paradoxes of Toynbee (*Nation*, Nov. 6, 1954)

ROGER SHINN, The Religious Vision of Arnold Toynbee (*Christianity and Crisis*, April 18, 1955)

*These two items precede the publication of vols. VII-X, but deal with topics discussed by Toynbee in these volumes. Toynbee answers Jerrold in an article in the *Sewanee Review*, Winter, 1955, entitled "Pharisee or Publican."

REVIEW ARTICLE

CANADA AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

D. J. McDUGALL

AMONG the books on Commonwealth affairs published during the year, an unusual number are concerned with problems and disturbances in the peripheral areas, the communist rising in Malaya, and the complex situations that are arising in several of the dependent territories in Africa. Interest in this subject, a matter of vital concern to Britain and to the whole free world, is attested not only by the number of publications, but by the space given to it in the English press, and by the number of white papers and similar documents issued by the Stationery Office. There are fewer books on the older dominions; and it is perhaps significant that the only one here listed is a study of the manner in which they are building their own particular forms of the welfare state.

There are in the list three books of unusual distinction: Professor Feiling's *Life of Warren Hastings*, the second volume of Mr. Woodruff's series on *The Men Who Ruled India*, and a history of *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* by the late Sir Reginald Coupland. Each of these deals with a subject of great historical importance. Each is the work of a scholar who is thoroughly master of his subject; and all three have the added merit of being a pleasure to read. Lord Templewood's memoir on British policy during the 1930's is a historical document of more than ordinary interest, and some of the others, notably Mr. Robson's volume on the laws and constitution of New Zealand, are works of permanent importance.

Professor Coupland's book has an added interest. For a number of years, in the later part of his life, he was drawn to some extent into the world of public affairs. His extensive knowledge of conditions in the Asian and African dependencies made him an invaluable adviser in many of the crises that have arisen in recent years; and his work at that time consisted largely of reports, such as that on India in the period of confusion and strife which preceded independence. This book marked his return to the world of scholarship in which he deservedly held so eminent a place. It was to have been the opening volume in a series on nationalism in the Commonwealth; and its readers will appreciate more fully the loss which historical scholarship has sustained in his death.

The theme is timely. In one form or another nationalism has become a powerful force in almost every community which still acknowledges allegiance to the Crown. That is of course not a new phenomenon. The evolution of the Commonwealth during the past century has been in large measure a response to the challenge of local nationalism. That has been in most cases a peaceful process; and the results, though they may not satisfy the more ardent nationalists among us, have been wholly beneficial. But it has not always been so. In Ireland, where the moderate demands of a genuinely nationalist movement were thwarted by the intransigence of English conservatism, the result was very different. And in India the response came only just in time.

In the territories that remain in Asia and Africa this spirit of nationalism assumes strange forms and produces curious, often bizarre, consequences. In South Africa, where it is reinforced by racial and religious feeling reminiscent at once of Hitler's Germany and of the religious wars of earlier centuries in Europe, it is being used nominally in defence of European civilization, but with results that are too often the negation of civilized living in any form. In the kingdom of Buganda, the most important region in the Uganda Protectorate, it has assumed the form of an intense conservatism, and has become the chief obstacle to the ambitious plans of the Colonial Office and its local agents to modernize the country and its institutions. The situation in Kenya is more obscure. There is perhaps little that can properly be described as nationalist spirit in the present revolt against British rule. But a number of the Mau Mau leaders have had contact with nationalist or revolutionary movements in Europe; and whatever its reality, something akin to a vague nationalist sentiment finds its place among the varied grievances on which they make their appeal to the Kikuyu tribesmen. Similarly in Malaya, where the communist party in its present form has developed from a more widely popular movement organized to free the country from Japanese control, the appeal against foreign rule has not been without effect. On the other hand, the more moderate and probably more genuine nationalist feeling of the Malayan people is perhaps the principal obstacle to a union with the Chinese population of the country, without which any real advance to self-government is difficult, if not impossible.

In Wales and Scotland, the spirit of nationalism remains a living force; but the movements which it engendered have developed under more favourable conditions. Political union with England has not meant the loss of national identity. To all three countries it has brought great practical benefit; and, except among a small minority in Scotland, there is now no evident desire to alter the relationship that has lasted for centuries. None the less, as Professor Coupland points out, this has been the creation of a multi-racial, or a multi-national political society. That result has not been achieved without conflict and much bitterness; but that is in the past. In the end it has come to rest on an almost universal consent, mainly, as it is here suggested, because unity has not been accompanied by any attempt to impose uniformity.

This book is a record of that conflict and of the many forces which, at various times, have operated to bring Wales and Scotland into the orbit of their more powerful neighbour. It is in effect a selective history of these two communities, with the emphasis on those features which illustrate their distinctive national character and on events and circumstances which have helped to preserve it.

In neither country was it a simple contest. In both Wales and Scotland there were marked differences between north and south; and more than once events that have tended to foster the larger unity have had the effect of accentuating those internal differences. The most striking illustration of that cleavage is to be found in the history of the industrial revolution, although a similar result had been produced, at least in Scotland, by the Reformation and the religious and constitutional struggle of the following century. In South Wales and in the Scottish Lowlands the new industrial order quickly took root. It brought them unprecedented prosperity, together

with vast social evils, and it united them more firmly than ever to London and to those regions in England where similar developments were taking place. But in the northern portions of the two countries, where industrial resources were lacking, it had the opposite effect.

There were, however, forces at work creating internal unity in both countries. The breaking up of the clan system and the opening up of the Highlands, followed almost immediately by the great intellectual movement of the late eighteenth century, gave to Scotsmen of all regions a new consciousness of their national identity; and that has not been lost. A similar result has been produced in Wales by the Evangelical movement and by the literary and linguistic revival at a slightly later period. One event of these years is especially important in the history of Welsh nationalism. The report of an education commission in 1846, containing some very unflattering comments on the ignorance, sloth, and immorality of the Welsh people, had an effect not unlike that of the more famous Durham report on the people of Lower Canada. It gave a powerful stimulus to the cultural life of the country; but Welsh nationalists have, on the whole, been content with that; and none of the occasional efforts to alter the existing political arrangements have had much popular support.

In Scotland political nationalism has been a more active force. It has a continuous history since 1850; and Scottish members have been prominent in initiating and supporting the many schemes of devolution which have been considered at various times in the House of Commons. These have not been without support, even among English statesmen; and one of the most interesting sections of Professor Coupland's book is that in which he examines these various schemes and the arguments for and against their adoption. That movement was in large measure a consequence of the struggle for Home Rule in Ireland; and little has been heard of it since that struggle was ended by the settlement in 1921. The two world wars, like the long struggle against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, have drawn closer the bonds of union; and that union has been powerfully reinforced by the economic development of the past century. It is significant that the strongest opposition to the various movements for devolution or some measure of national autonomy for the two countries has come from such industrial and commercial centres as Cardiff and Glasgow.

This is one of the best of Professor Coupland's many books. It is the more to be regretted that it is the last. The text has been published exactly as it was left by the author. Unfortunately little care has been taken to remove misspellings, obvious errors in dating, and similar inaccuracies. These are not numerous, but they are an unnecessary blemish on a very distinguished book. Few English scholars have written with equal sympathy for the national aspirations of the Welsh and Scottish peoples. Few have shown a keener insight into the moral and intellectual forces that have given them their continuing vitality.

In the case of these two communities Professor Coupland is able to answer his basic question, whether a nation can preserve its identity without the political institutions of a sovereign state, with a definite affirmative. He recognizes of course that the circumstances have been exceptional. Neither in Wales nor in Scotland has there been any extensive English settlement, nor any serious effort at Anglicization. The forms of religion adopted in

both countries, while not identical with that in England, were sufficiently similar to create a bond of union rather than a cause of division and conflict; and in both countries the question was answered before nationalism became the powerful and aggressive force that it has become in the past century.

In Ireland the case was very different, and no such peaceful solution has been possible. Some of the reasons for that difference may be discovered in the records of a number of travellers who visited the country at various times between the reign of Elizabeth and the famine of the 1840's, printed in Dr. Maxwell's *The Stranger in Ireland*.

The author's introductions to the four sections into which the book is divided form a general history of Ireland during these troubled centuries, orthodox in interpretation, and skilful in the avoidance of those issues over which feelings still run high. The material itself is of varied quality. The "strangers" are a mixed lot. They include the Earl of Essex whose purpose was not to visit, but to conquer the country, and thereby to restore himself to the good graces of his queen. With him is the poet Spenser, the recipient of a large estate recently confiscated in the province of Munster. His visit was shorter than was intended, for his lands were overrun and he was driven out by a rising of the Irish at the end of the century. In many instances the reports are more illuminating on the mentality of the writers than on conditions in Ireland. An English Puritan who visited the country in the 1630's was shocked to discover that the mass of the inhabitants not only continued their superstitious and idolatrous practices, but did not appear to be at all ashamed of the fact.

Among the records of English travellers the most valuable and the most familiar is Arthur Young's *Tour of Ireland*, a searching criticism and a thorough condemnation of the whole social structure of the country and of the economy on which it was based. Young eschewed politics as such; but his strictures on the extravagance, the ostentation, and the arrogant assumptions of the ruling oligarchy leave little doubt as to his opinions. Conversely, the wife of an Irish dean, writing at a slightly earlier period, paints a more pleasing picture of Anglo-Irish society and of life among the humbler folk. But the dean's income was generous, his duties were apparently light, and the lady was able to write a substantial part of her memoir in the more comfortable environment of Bath.

The list includes a good many foreigners, especially after the period of the French Revolution. Their impressions vary, but most of them are amazed at what they discover, the curious state of the land law, the exaction of tithe for the support of an alien church, and similar conditions on which the Irish themselves were having a good deal to say. The best of these reports is that of the German traveller Kohl, whose comments on the disorderly scene were no less severe than those of Young.

Some of this material is valuable, and it is useful to have it thus brought together. But there is a certain sameness about a good deal of it. Most of these people visited the same places, met the same kind of people, and made much the same kind of comments on what they saw and heard. They have little to say about politics; but their observations and the conditions they describe point the contrast occasionally made by Professor Coupland with the more peaceful evolution of nationalism in the other two countries.

The history of Irish nationalism has yet to be written in the spirit in which Professor Coupland has written that of Scotland and Wales; but the material for such a history is accumulating. There has been occasion in earlier articles of this kind to refer to particular volumes in the admirable series being published under the general editorship of Professor Moody and Professor Edwards. Mr. Inglis' little book on *The Freedom of the Press in Ireland* adds one more to the series. Like its predecessors it is a carefully documented study, based in large measure on primary sources, and agreeably free from the heat and passion that have characterized much of the earlier history of this period.

The title seems a little inappropriate. There was, in truth, very little freedom to record; and, considering the character of Irish government in these years, of the journals whose fortunes are here described, and of the men who directed them, that is not surprising. The book is in substance an account of the methods employed by Dublin Castle with the support and co-operation of the legislature and the judges to silence all criticism, and to create a press that could be relied upon to guide public opinion in the direction preferred by government. The first object could be accomplished without difficulty. The owners and editors of most of these petty journals were, as Mr. Inglis observes, "men of elastic principles." Pensions, sinecures, contracts, and payments from the Proclamation Fund were usually effective in persuading them to change their opinions.

Prosecutions were occasionally necessary; but carefully chosen juries and ingenious judges, armed with legal devices long obsolete in England but still current in Ireland, could be counted on to secure the required verdicts. Where these methods failed, as in the case of the United Irish journals, the military could be turned in to break up the presses. The second object could not be so easily attained. Subsidized journals immediately lost their circulation and became little more than costly appendages to the Castle, with virtually no influence on the public mind, even in Dublin.

In this respect, as in so many others, the Union meant very little. The techniques developed in the earlier period were continued, often with greater effectiveness. The peak of efficiency was reached during Peel's administration as chief secretary. What his predecessors had done in a haphazard way he reduced to consistent policy; and when he left Ireland in 1818, hardly the vestige of an independent press remained. In the years that followed, the struggle for Catholic emancipation created new difficulties, and the same rigid control could not be maintained. But the effort continued under both Tory and Whig governments; and it was not until 1835, when Thomas Drummond became under-secretary, that newspapers in Ireland began to enjoy any part of the freedom which those in England had long possessed. The appearance of the *Nation*, the organ of Young Ireland, just beyond the period covered by Mr. Inglis, is evidence of the change. It may also be evidence, as he suggests, that through it all some spirit of independence did persist in a few of the strange characters whose careers are not the least interesting part of his book.

In India, as in Ireland, the events of the past generation have cleared the way for a more sober and objective appraisal of British rule and its consequences. The debate in both cases may still be heated; but the problems with which the historian has to deal are no longer living issues in imperial

politics. Warren Hastings' administration in India is one of these episodes in the history of the empire on which opinions may still be sharply divided. His fame has long been cleared of the grosser charges levelled against him by Burke and his fellow Whigs; but some of his more enthusiastic admirers have pushed the argument rather too far in the opposite direction. To all this Professor Feiling's biography is a sound corrective. Its claims are modest: simply to explain Hastings' objects and methods and in the process to demonstrate what the man's actions and statements will reveal of his true character. It may not be the definitive life. Hastings had in him some of the qualities and some of the defects of a Pitt or a Cromwell; and his career raises questions to which there can perhaps be no agreed answers. But it is the most balanced and judicious account that we are likely to get; and the Hastings who emerges from it is a more convincing figure than the monster of iniquity who appears in Burke's speeches, or the super-human embodiment of strength and virtue portrayed by some later apologists.

Hastings' view of the British position in India differed from that of most of his contemporaries. He would have preferred an immediate assumption of direct authority by the Crown; and the longer he remained in India the more convinced did he become of the unwisdom, if not the injustice, of entrusting the exercise of sovereign power to a trading company. He accepted the system. He tolerated—all too easily, as much of this evidence reveals—the scandalous abuses which in principle he condemned; and on numerous occasions he himself resorted to methods that were more than dubious to satisfy the exigent demands of his employers for money. But through it all he clung to his higher ideals. Under whatever form it was organized, his great desire was that government should be made acceptable to the Indian people, that it should be conducted "in sympathy with their traditions, their religious faith and their ancient civilization." His constant object was to build the structure of British rule, though it might be of only brief duration, "by a blend of Indian forms with British aspirations"; and Professor Feiling is satisfied that he did, in large measure, achieve that purpose. His success was not very evident during his years of administration. But his advice was of the greatest importance in the framing of Pitt's India Act in 1784; and that measure brought a most necessary and salutary change.

He was given a difficult, perhaps an impossible task. His powers under the Regulating Act were uncertain. He got virtually no support, either from the British government or from the directors, themselves divided into warring factions and periodically faced with bankruptcy, despite the enormous revenues being drawn from India. Professor Feiling describes the opposition of Philip Francis and his coterie in the council in Bengal as a "conspiracy," and it may not be too strong a word. But it is clear that not all the difficulties were due to these causes. Hastings was a difficult man. Like the great Pitt, his model in politics, he was convinced that he alone could govern India. "I know of no man," he said on one occasion, "who can more suitably be entrusted with extraordinary powers than myself." He may have been right; but it is not surprising that others declined to accept him at his own valuation; and their refusal to do so merely intensified the strains of obstinacy and autocracy that were all too evident in his character. As between Hastings and the types represented by Philip Francis, Professor Feiling's readers will follow him without question. Yet one may doubt whether Hastings could for

long have worked with any councillors who were not prepared simply to do his bidding. In all this sorry business, his hands, though not spotless, were cleaner than those of most of the men who surrounded him; but the most unimpeachable integrity becomes a little tiresome when it is paraded quite so ostentatiously.

On one major question there will be disagreement. No one will now doubt that Burke was almost entirely wrong in his charges against Hastings, and his admirers can only deplore the lengths to which he went. But the charge, implicit in much that Professor Feiling writes, that this attack was prompted solely by party and personal motives, is difficult to accept. It is suggested indeed that Fox's India Bill, which has been commended by some competent authorities on the history of India, was designed chiefly to recoup the fortunes of "the Burke clan," then at a low ebb; for, as Professor Feiling remarks, "Edmund saw that the road to all the good things at Westminster and at Beaconsfield passed through India." It is in that spirit that the account of the impeachment is written. It is described quite simply as persecution; and the emphasis is placed throughout on what was most wild and extravagant in Burke's conduct. The criticism goes further. One of Professor Feiling's statements seems to impugn the honesty of Burke's whole political career. "No public cause," he says, "weighed in the balance, unless it could be made to coincide with the fortunes of the Burke clan."

Burke's unwise zeal in promoting the interests of his family need not be denied. But before these sweeping conclusions are accepted one or two points need to be considered. The bill prepared by Fox and Burke to regulate the affairs of the East India Company was, in some of its provisions, a dubious measure. But the need had been revealed by an inquiry recently conducted by a committee of the House of Commons. The measure had received wide and unfavourable publicity, much of it paid for by the directors of the Company; and it is going very far to suggest, or to imply, that the large majority who voted for it were deluded by Fox and Burke into supporting a bill designed merely to advance the interests of the Whig party and save the fortunes of the Burke clan.

A similar consideration applies to the impeachment. There is much in the conduct of Fox and Burke and Sheridan that cannot be condoned. But when the impeachment was launched, they were in a minority in the House of Commons. Pitt was in command, with his position strengthened by the King's support and by a recent general election; and Professor Feiling's own evidence shows that without the concurrence of Pitt and Dundas the impeachment could not have been undertaken. That situation did not change during the long course of the trial. At least, if there was change, it was in the direction of further strengthening Pitt's position and weakening that of the group to which Burke and Fox belonged. Many of their charges were unjust. Others were grossly exaggerated. But it seems improbable that this travesty could have gone on for so many years if it had been merely a matter of persecution, or if Pitt and his fellow ministers and a majority of the members, placemen, independent country gentlemen, and the rest, did not believe that it should go on. This is an admirable study of the character and career of a man who has no doubt been misjudged. But it contains some passages—not always on unimportant issues—whose implications go beyond what the evidence would seem to warrant.

Mr. Wurzburg's life of Sir Stamford Raffles is an essay in a more old-fashioned brand of imperialism. The publishers describe it as definitive, and in one respect the adjective is appropriate; for no one is likely to attempt a more extended study. The author, who spent most of his active life in Singapore, has collected every document that could be discovered; and the value of his book lies in the wealth of this material which it contains, the greater part of it from Raffles' own papers. As an interpretation, it presents certain difficulties. For the general reader it is too long. For the more serious student, who presumably has some sense of relative values, it is overloaded with detail on petty and unimportant episodes and the judgments on men and events with which the book abounds are too dogmatic to inspire much confidence.

Raffles was an exceptional man. He probably did more than any other individual to break the monopoly of the Dutch in the eastern seas and to expand British commercial interests in that region. His achievement brought immense material benefit to the British Empire and probably also to the peoples who came under its dominion. But his methods aroused strong opposition, often stern condemnation, among officials in England and in India, who were obliged to take responsibility for actions which they had not sanctioned, and which in many cases went far beyond the sphere of Raffles' official duties. Their reaction was natural; and it seems unnecessary to insist, as Mr. Wurzburg does, that the criticism was due solely to the malicious jealousy of small-minded men who could not appreciate the genius in their midst.

The first volume of Mr. Woodruff's series, *The Men Who Ruled India*, was reviewed in these pages a year ago. It was then evident that this was a work of more than ordinary interest; and that impression is heightened by this final instalment, *The Guardians*, carrying the record from the Mutiny to the partition and the withdrawal of British power in 1947. In some respects this has been a more difficult task; for much of it is contemporary history, and history in which Mr. Woodruff himself had a part. The second part of the book, entitled the "Demission of Power," deals with the work of men who were still responsible for the government of their districts, and who were required at the same time to instruct the Indian officials who would shortly replace them, men who, in too many instances, were themselves making the task of maintaining law and order all but impossible. What is remarkable in the circumstances is the wholly dispassionate spirit in which this book is written. There are occasional passages of telling irony, as for example, on some of Lord Curzon's more pompous performances, and on the plan of dyarchy established under the Act of 1919. There are passages of penetrating criticism on certain features of the old system, notably on the work of the secretary of state and his council. But on the great struggle for Indian independence, with all its attendant difficulties for the members of the service, Mr. Woodruff writes with singular detachment.

The spirit of the book is indicated by a statement of E. H. Edye, a member of the service in the early years of the century, whose work is recorded with special enthusiasm. "India has benefitted by a hundred years of control and guidance by British services; but that is no argument that she would acquiesce in, or would benefit by, a further period of such control and guidance. On the contrary, if in a hundred years India has not been trained

to stand" without the support of these services, then "they have so far failed in their fundamental task."

Like its predecessor the book consists of a series of biographical sketches, interspersed with descriptive passages on the life of these men and of the people whom they governed and among whom they lived, usually on terms of mutual friendship and respect. The gallery is wide and representative: Bartle Frere, an enlightened advocate of the Platonic idea of benevolent despotism, one of the almost flawless characters as Mr. Woodruff sees him, who took very seriously the guardian's duty of providing care, protection, and guidance; A. O. Hume, not so ideally a Platonic guardian, but one of the first of the English officials to sympathize with, and to give active support to, the movement for a greater measure of national autonomy; one or two Indians, including Romesh Chander Dutt, the first to break into the charmed circle, an honest if not brilliant administrator, who was treated by too many of the English with undeserved suspicion and hostility; and Alfred Lyall, one of the most interesting and attractive characters in the service, and one of the shrewdest critics of the whole system which he helped to administer.

Among the non-official Europeans, the view held by most of these men that government should be conducted for the benefit of the Indian people was regarded as a "loathsome Un-English piece of cant"; and their task was not made easier by the constant friction between planters and magistrates. But they adjusted themselves to the changing situation in the early years of the present century. In theory the system was rigid, much too rigid and bureaucratic, as many of them complained in their private correspondence. In practice, as Mr. Woodruff shows, the district officer usually contrived to adapt it to the needs of his particular locality; and nothing in this book is more interesting than the revelation of the wide differences in the various provinces and districts that were comprehended within a single service.

The real change came with the events of 1919 and the years immediately following. It was not simply a constitutional change. It was a change of atmosphere brought on by the more intensive nationalist agitation led by Gandhi, by the obstructionist tactics of the Congress party, and by such disastrous episodes as that at Amritsar. The significance of this last incident is indicated by the statement of an Indian who lamented that "the British now regard us as enemies on whom they must make war."

Dyarchy itself created unprecedented problems. Mr. Woodruff defines it as "a technical term for handing over the steering-wheel, while retaining control of the accelerator, the gear-shift and the brakes." The Indian would probably add that even the steering-wheel was given to him only on the side roads; and he showed an increasing determination to get complete control of the machine and to keep it on the main roads. In the circumstances the functions of the district officer and the magistrate underwent a drastic change. Hitherto they had been the pivot of the provincial administration, looked to, especially by the humbler classes, for protection, security, and the solution of all their problems, great and small. To an increasing extent they were now regarded as the representatives of the enemy who must be driven out. Very few of them opposed the impending change. Most of them seem to have cordially sympathized with the aspirations, though not with the methods, of the nationalist party. But they were forced in many districts into what Mr. Woodruff calls "a kind of surreptitious civil war" against the

very men whom they were supposed to be training to take their places. To the end they continued to give loyal service, and in most areas they contrived in one way or another to keep administration going; and that is a record which has few parallels in history. Much has been written, and no doubt much more will be written, about the Indian civil service; but it is unlikely that any book will be written which reveals so vividly the spirit in which these men did their work, or which records their achievements in so interesting and attractive a form.

These later years of British rule in India are surveyed from a very different point of view in Mr. Bolitho's life of Jinnah. It is the first English biography of the Muslim leader, and as a portrait, it has much to commend it. But it cannot be regarded as more than a preliminary sketch. It must be assumed that Mr. Bolitho was confronted with serious difficulties. Whether any collection of Jinnah's papers exists is not stated. There is no reference to them in the book, and there is little evidence that the author has consulted any other sources of the kind. He has relied in large measure on interviews with people who knew Jinnah; and this information has been supplemented by occasional passages from contemporary newspapers and from the accounts of travellers and correspondents who visited India during the years of communal strife. That he has written so good a book from such slender sources is in itself something of a feat; but his book is very far from being the biography of Jinnah which students of Indian history require.

Jinnah is presented as the one uncompromising realist among the Indian nationalist leaders, the man of clear vision and inflexible purpose, who never deviated from the course on which he set his feet from the beginning of his political career. He wholly disapproved of Gandhi's methods—"an appeal to inexperienced youth and to the ignorant and illiterate" which could result only in confusion and chaos; and in the end, he came to regard the Congress as potentially a "fascist organization of the worst kind," aiming at the annihilation of all other groups. His own temper was autocratic in the extreme. For the vague democratic aspirations of the Congress leaders and their English sympathizers he had nothing but scorn. "You talk of parliamentary democracy," he said to one of the latter; "but you should know that the assumptions upon which it depends have no application whatever to Indian conditions." He was probably right; but his own record, even as presented here, does not suggest that he did much to alter the conditions, or to lessen the antagonism which was the great obstacle to a peaceful settlement. Within limits this is a useful study; but it leaves many questions unanswered, and the answers will perhaps come better from one who does not identify himself quite so unreservedly with Jinnah's point of view as does the author of this book.

Mr. Bolitho is probably right in his assumption that without Jinnah's leadership the Muslim community would not have secured its separate state of Pakistan. Whether that will turn out to be an advantage to them, or to anyone else on the sub-continent, is yet to be seen. For one particular community, the Sikhs, the partition was stark tragedy. The line which divided the Punjab ran through the heart of their country; and it was on them that the brunt of the fighting and of the suffering in those dark days principally fell. These events have put an end to the existence of the Sikhs as a distinctive group with its own way of life; and it is with this reflection in mind

that Mr. Khushwant Singh has written their history. Much of it will probably have little interest for anyone outside the community. The later part, relating the course of events from the British conquest of the Punjab in 1846 to the partition, will attract a wider public. The best chapters are those on recent political movements, especially the Gadr conspiracy, centred in the Punjab but with strong support from Sikhs settled in Canada and the United States. These include a good, short account of the Sikhs in British Columbia, based in part on papers obtained by the author during his residence in Ottawa. A final chapter surveys the not very impressive contribution of the Sikhs to the literary and artistic life of India. Mr. Khushwant Singh writes with restraint; but there is inevitably a tinge of bitterness, and an underlying suggestion that this "nation of warriors," whose service to the Crown was famous, has received something less than its due reward in the settlement.

In his memoir on the *Nine Troubled Years* from the crisis of 1931 to the fall of the Chamberlain Government in 1940, Lord Templewood has included a long and interesting account of the conferences and negotiations from which emerged the ill-starred Government of India Act of 1935. A good many of the documents on the subject have already been published, including some of Sir Samuel Hoare's own speeches. But as Secretary of State for India, he was responsible for the measure; and if his narrative adds little that is especially important, it is none the less a valuable piece of first-hand evidence. It relates the story from the point of view of the man whose duty it was to bring the opposed parties together and to find, or to create, some common ground upon which they could proceed to an agreed settlement. That was an extremely difficult task, not only because of the apparently unbridgeable gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims, but even more because of the diehard opposition led in the House of Commons by Churchill.

On most of the controversial issues with which he has to deal—and this book abounds in them—Lord Templewood writes with restraint. But in his remarks about Churchill and his supporters there is an undisguised note of bitterness; and it is to them, even more than to Gandhi and Jinnah and the Indian princes, that he attributes the delay which wrecked the measure. There is no doubt something to be said for the argument that, had the Act been passed quickly, it might have been in effective operation before 1939, with very different consequences for India during the war years; but it is not wholly convincing. The plan of federation in the central government, the only one which the Muslims could be induced to accept, was frustrated at the outset by the flat refusal of the princes to participate; and there is no evidence that their attitude had changed in the intervening years, or that it would change until they were confronted with the imminent withdrawal of the paramount power.

The greater part of the book deals with matters of wider interest. The writer served under four prime ministers and held six cabinet offices, in addition to being a member of the Imperial Defence Committee. The book is therefore an invaluable record of the actual working of British government in these years. What will interest most readers is the explanation—perhaps one should say the defence—of the foreign policy with which the writer was so closely associated. His task has been difficult. Mr. Churchill has already occupied the field; and this book will probably not affect many who have been captured by the eloquence of *The Gathering Storm*. But it is

a frank statement, supported at crucial points by evidence now printed for the first time. In the end, it is a record of failure; but with opinion as it was in Britain and the other countries of the Commonwealth, it is not certain that others would have succeeded any better.

Mr. Trumbull's paper, one of the series issued by the Foreign Policy Association, is a clear and informative statement of conditions in India since the partition. It is less illuminating on the situation in Pakistan. Its most interesting section is the discussion of party development in the Republic and in the provinces since 1947. There is, in the author's opinion, an underlying current of opposition to continued membership in the Commonwealth; but Mr. Nehru is convinced that there is solid advantage in the present arrangement, and no change is foreseen so long as he remains in power. The paper ends with a short account of the situation in Kashmir and with a summary of the arguments on both sides.

The war in Malaya, now in its eighth year and with no end in sight, is potentially a more serious matter. This is not a domestic quarrel, nor does it stem from the discontent of a subject people seeking freedom from foreign rule. Those elements are present. The conflict is coloured to some extent by the jealous rivalry that has long existed between the Chinese and Malay sections of the population. The communists make the most of a thoroughly specious appeal to national sentiment; and until recently they have probably had some success in posing as the champions of independence and self-government. But these things are incidental. This is part of the struggle that is being waged, sometimes openly, more often covertly, for communist supremacy in the whole of southeast Asia; and its outcome is fraught with significance, not alone for the people of Malaya but for the whole free world.

That is one central point upon which all three of the books here listed are in agreement. Two of these books are by correspondents who have been given access to the required materials. The third is by a university lecturer who has made a particular study of the communist party and its activities in various parts of Asia during the past few years. This last, Mr. Hanrahan's *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*, is perhaps the most important, although it is unlikely to have the same attraction for the general reader as the others. It is in substance a carefully documented history of the communist party, which began its operations in Malaya some years before the Japanese invasion, and which was in a position to profit by the disorder which accompanied and followed the war. It explains in some detail the organization of the party and its relations with Moscow, with the Communist International, and with like-minded groups in China and elsewhere. Communism in itself apparently makes little appeal to the Malay people, and the party has never had more than a few thousand genuine adherents, almost exclusively Chinese. But it has been skilfully led by men who know what they want, and who are utterly ruthless in their methods. They were aided in the post-war period by the dilatory methods of the authorities, who failed to appreciate the nature of the contest before them, and by a very general opposition to some of the proposed constitutional changes. That is in the past. There is no longer any doubt about what this war means, nor any weakening in the determination to bring it to a successful end. The most effective method so far adopted is the Briggs plan, under which the peasants are being brought in from their

scattered holdings along the fringes of the jungle and settled in newly organized village communities, partly for their own protection, partly to deprive the rebels of their principal source of food and other supplies. It is a slow and costly procedure; but its results are becoming apparent, and they will go beyond the defeat of communism. For in these villages the foundations of local self-government are being laid, and Malays and Chinese are being taught to live together and to co-operate in a way that has not been common in the past.

In his volume, *Menace in Malaya*, Mr. Miller tells much the same story in a less formal way. This is a popular book in the best sense of the term. The more captious critic might describe it as journalism; but it is a vivid account of life as it is being lived by a peculiarly attractive people, under conditions of almost incredible difficulty. Mr. Miller has lived in Malaya for many years; and his work reveals on every page his intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants. It is based, in part, on documents of various kinds, some of them captured from the communists or found on the bodies of rebels killed in action, partly on his own observations and on discussions with people of all classes and in almost every part of the country. One of its most interesting features is the series of pen portraits of communist leaders, past and present. In Mr. Hanrahan's work these men are little more than names. Under Mr. Miller's hand they come to life. The book has a particular value for the detailed account of life in the new Briggs plan villages; and the author pays a warm and deserved tribute to the leaders, Englishmen, Australians, and others, who are training the people in the difficult art of self-government and laying foundations for the new Malaya which, it is hoped, will emerge from this ordeal.

Mr. Bartlett's *Report from Malaya* is a less ambitious work. It is indeed little more than an essay, written at the suggestion of Sir Gerald Templer to explain to the reading public what this struggle really means. For its purpose it is eminently successful. In a hundred pages of crisp and incisive prose it relates the essential facts, suggests the menace that is latent in the exploitation of nationality for purposes the very reverse of national freedom, and explains the methods by which the danger is being met. Military operations are described very briefly. The author's interest lies rather in the measures required to defeat and destroy communism itself, and to remove the causes which have enabled it to secure a foothold.

Some useful reforms have been inaugurated; but progress is necessarily slow. The poverty of the country, the financial strain caused by the emergency, the division between Chinese and Malays which prevents any real national unity, and the present constitutional arrangements, all militate against quick and easy solutions. But Mr. Bartlett is cautiously optimistic. Self-government, one essential element in any long-term policy, is being developed as rapidly as circumstances will permit. Racial rivalries persist; but there is in them little of the bitterness of the communal strife in India. The crisis is not ended, but there is some reason to hope that the people of Malaya may soon enjoy a more peaceful and prosperous life than they have known for the past decade or more.

The disturbances in the East African dependencies are of a wholly different nature. It is possible that communist theory, as interpreted by Jomo Kenyatta, had some influence in the early stages of the Mau Mau movement.

But even under his leadership, and more noticeably since his imprisonment, it has ceased to conform to the familiar pattern. Probably no book has yet been written which fully explains this extraordinary phenomenon. Sir Philip Mitchell, who has had long personal experience in dealing with it, describes it as "an advanced form of group mania"; and Dr. Leaky, whose new volume, *Defeating Mau Mau*, has been generally accepted as an authoritative statement on the subject, is hardly more precise. Emphasis is placed consistently on the religious character of the movement, although no details are given, apart from statements of its implacable opposition to Christianity and some veiled references to the obscene rites which are essential parts of its ceremonial.

It is difficult to fix the point at which the unrest among the Kikuyu, born of some real and practical grievances, merges into the sinister Mau Mau conspiracy. Historically, the movement had some connection with, if it did not actually grow out of, an earlier political organization which was considered subversive and was sternly suppressed by the government of Kenya. In the hands of Kenyatta and his successors it has assumed a form wholly alien to the feelings and traditions of the great majority of the Kikuyu people, upon whom the brunt of the attack regularly falls. The avowed purpose of the movement is to drive the Europeans from the country. That is to be achieved, not by direct assault, which offers no hope of success, but by making conditions so intolerable that they will be forced to leave. Hence the attack is directed, not immediately against the Europeans, but against the natives who serve them and whose labour is essential to the maintenance of their estates. The policy required to meet the danger is not unlike that slowly evolved in Malaya; on the one hand, military operations to destroy the guerillas; on the other, a programme of constructive reform to remedy admitted evils, and to redress the grievances which have been successfully exploited by the Mau Mau leaders.

It is mainly to this latter aspect of the problem that Dr. Leaky addresses himself. His recommendations include some far-reaching social, economic and political reforms, obviously designed to lay the foundations of a multi-racial state on lines very different from those which have obtained up to the present. Whether they will be acceptable, either to the Kikuyu or to the European residents of Kenya, remains to be seen. In any case, they would seem to involve an expenditure which, in its present condition, the country is hardly able to bear. On one major problem, that of over-population in the Kikuyu reserves, the suggestions are a little vague. As a statement of long-term policy the book is no doubt valuable. But there are serious obstacles to be overcome before any part of the programme can be carried out.

Two of the remaining books deal with a wider range of problems in Africa. Sir Philip Mitchell's *African Afterthoughts* is a record of the author's life during forty years of service, most of it in the East African dependencies, and a judicious appraisal of the present situation. As an administrative officer in Nyasaland and Tanganyika, and as the governor, first of the Uganda Protectorate and later of Kenya, he has watched these territories develop from a state of primitive barbarism and poverty to their present condition of moderate but increasing prosperity and enlightenment; and he is optimistic about their future. His judgment is based on an experience that few men have had, and his recommendations are for that reason the more valuable.

Sir Philip wholly condemns the ideas and methods that have long prevailed in the Union. Segregation is neither possible nor desirable. The notion that a series of "zoological gardens" can be created in Africa, "where black men are to be carefully fenced off to develop in their own way," is not only an illusion; it is to invite disaster. He is convinced that the Africans "have it in them to become as civilized as any race of men"; and while he recognizes that "a little time will be needed" to equip them for the new place which they must occupy, he apparently does not consider that so formidable a task, nor one requiring so much time, as many others have assumed. The book contains some mildly scathing comments on certain aspects of Colonial Office administration; but the sternest criticism is reserved for the European communities settled in various parts of the continent. One agency upon which he relies in the great work of education and the breaking down of present barriers is Christian missionary enterprise, a point on which he differs completely from Dr. Leaky. Sir Philip was himself largely responsible for the establishment of the East African Commission, and he is a strong advocate of the more complete plan of federation that has often been discussed. There is no very definite suggestion for overcoming the present opposition in Buganda; but he considers this a temporary check. The advantages of the plan are, in his judgment, so self-evident that all parties will be led to adopt it, and one of the great objects of his public life will shortly be realized.

Mr. Legum's book with its challenging title *Must We Lose Africa?* presents a less sanguine picture. It has been prompted by the present situation in Buganda; and about one-third of the book consists of a detailed account of the history of British rule in that community and of the circumstances that have led to the present crisis. The author has strong sympathy with the Kabaka and his people, and there is some very plain speaking on the hasty and ill-judged actions of the Colonial Office, and of the Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, which have turned a constitutional dispute into a crisis whose repercussions will be felt in every part of Africa. The situation is the more serious by reason of Buganda's position on the upper Nile. There is a danger that, unless confidence is quickly restored, the country will be drawn into the orbit of Egypt, with the consequent loss to Britain of the most important region from which her influence can be exercised throughout the northern part of the continent.

The opposition of the Kabaka and his people to the proposals of the Colonial Office is an expression of nationalism in the most authentic sense of the term. It springs from the fear that their country is about to be swallowed up in a great multi-racial community, and that industrial development, which is part of the general plan of improvement, may reproduce conditions in their country similar to those in the Union. Repeated assurances by the British government that "the larger measures of unification" will not be undertaken so long as "the opinion of the Buganda remains as it is at present," have not allayed their suspicions; and no compromise has yet been found. The most hopeful proposals were those adopted by the Namirembe conference under the chairmanship of Sir Keith Hancock. But in their present form these have been refused by the Great Lukiko; and there is little prospect of a settlement so long as the decree of banishment against the Kabaka remains in force.

The incident illustrates the kind of challenge that is everywhere being presented to the European rulers of African peoples; and Mr. Legum's book

is inspired throughout by the belief that the response to this challenge is too often tardy and inadequate, if not wholly negative. In his later chapters he surveys the situation in each of the communities under European rule, and suggests methods which he considers necessary to restore and retain the waning confidence of the native population and to preserve Africa within the area of European influence. The prospect, as he sees it, is not hopeful. The number of Africans intellectually endowed to give leadership to their people and to co-operate with the Europeans on terms of equality is tragically small. In most regions comparatively little is being done to increase their number; and there is not yet much evidence that the Europeans are prepared to receive these men and to co-operate with them on the only terms that will bridge the gulf. Power is no longer an answer to the kind of questions that are arising in Africa. It must be replaced by influence, more difficult to establish but immeasurably more beneficial in its effects. Whether the change can be made before African nationalism assumes a form that will remove the whole argument from the plane of reason and discussion is the question that informs the whole of this book.

Over all these regions the shadow cast by the situation in South Africa is plainly discernible. That is not the least part of what Mr. Legum calls the "African crisis"; and it is certainly one of the factors creating uneasiness and insecurity everywhere in the continent. The situation is described in all its stark reality in Mr. St. John's record of his journey *Through Malan's Africa*. Whether this was the author's first visit to the Union is not stated. It can be assumed that it will be his last. Whatever other results his book may produce, it will almost certainly place his name high on the list of "prohibited immigrants," a category reserved in the main for those whose interest in the native and the coloured population goes beyond what the present authorities consider desirable. Except in detail the story is not new; but others have written of it with more restraint. Mr. St. John spares no details. His purpose, as he states it, is simply to set down what he has seen and heard; and his pictures of some of the dark spots in this troubled scene will not soon be forgotten by his readers. There may be some exaggeration; but if only a part of this description corresponds to the realities, it is difficult to believe that the situation can long continue without an explosion.

Some of the most interesting chapters are based on interviews with members of the Nationalist party, politicians, magistrates and other officials, ministers of religion, and university professors. Whether all the leaders believe in the high missionary purpose alleged as justification for present policies, it is certain that among a great mass of their supporters that profession is accepted simply and sincerely; and that is a support of incalculable importance for Mr. Strijdom and his successors within a foreseeable future. There is, in the author's opinion, no real opposition. The United party has neither the means nor the will to offer effective resistance even to the most extreme measures, such as the acts passed by the Union Parliament after the disturbances in Port Elizabeth and East London in 1952. Parliamentary forms continue, but the substance is gone from them; and the Union is today ruled by a government which, in its ideals and its methods, does not differ greatly from that of pre-war Germany.

On the other side is the picture revealed by discussion with leaders of the Africans, the Indian community, and the coloured population. Among the first two groups there are some signs of political activity, largely inspired

by Manilal Gandhi on lines laid down by his father half a century ago. At an earlier stage such methods might have accomplished something. In the harsh atmosphere created by triumphant Afrikaner nationalism, they are not likely to be very effective. Yet the lines are being drawn; and unless there is drastic change, they point to conflict. "What we want," said the president of the African National Congress, "is not social services. We appreciate these services. . . . But many Europeans forget that we too are citizens of this country. We want our full democratic rights." That is a new language. What significance it holds remains to be seen. There are few people of any colour in the Union today who can look with confidence to the continued enjoyment of such rights. If the bond which unites the nations of the Commonwealth is their common adherence to the principles and practice of democratic government, the link between South Africa and the other members has become extremely thin.

By contrast the history of New Zealand is a record of the peaceful evolution of a form of social democracy which has made the country one of the most genuinely democratic communities in the modern world. That is the central theme of this new edition of Mr. Condliffe's short history. The original text has been revised by Mr. Airey, notably in the sections dealing with the Maori wars and with the reforms carried out by Seddon and Pember Reeves at the end of the last century; and a section has been added dealing with events since about 1935. This includes chapters on the growth of the Labour party, the programme of social welfare carried out before 1939, and New Zealand's role in world affairs during and since the war. The revision has been skilfully executed; the new sections maintain the standard of scholarship of the original; and the book remains what it has been, one of the best short histories of New Zealand that we possess.

Mr. Robson's volume on New Zealand, one of the series on the constitutional laws of the Commonwealth nations, is a more highly specialized book. It is at once a history of New Zealand's constitution and a comprehensive treatise on her present laws. Much of it will perhaps be of interest only to the student of legal history; but the chapters on Parliament, the civil service, the administrative tribunals, the courts of law, and the immense volume of social legislation which has been a feature of the country's history, will have a wider appeal. The arguments in past legal battles, many of them long since forgotten by all but the pundits, are at times a little arid but on the major questions, such as those relating to the evolution of the unitary form of government and of the now single chamber legislature, the book is invaluable as a work of reference.

A substantial part of the book was written by Mr. Robson, sometimes alone, sometimes in collaboration with others. But there are chapters by other scholars, presumably experts on particular aspects of the subject. That by Mr. Scott on Parliament is in itself almost a constitutional history of the country. It relates the beginnings of a legislative assembly in the years before 1852, analyses the Act of that year, which is still the basis of the constitution, and explains the subsequent changes down to the legislation of 1947. New Zealand was the last of the Commonwealth countries to adopt the Statute of Westminster, an indication of the country's hesitation to follow the road to national sovereignty favoured by Canada and South Africa. When it was adopted in 1947, another measure was passed securing to the local Parliament full

power to amend the basic Act of 1852, and thus to amend its own constitution. A proposal at the time to adopt a written constitution found little support and was withdrawn. This book cannot be recommended as light reading; but for serious students of New Zealand's constitutional history, it is indispensable.

New Zealand was a pioneer in the building of a system of social security. In this, as in the development of political democracy, the country was favoured by exceptional circumstances; and before much had been done in that field by the other dominions the foundations had been laid for the extensive system which now exists. The need for such a system has generally been recognized; and each of the older countries of the Commonwealth, with the exception of South Africa, has now worked out its own distinctive scheme. In his volume on *Social Security in the Commonwealth* Mr. Mendelsohn presents a comparative study of these systems in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The book is a pioneer study, and the work has been done so thoroughly that it will almost certainly become the standard reference on the subject.

The core of the book consists of four long chapters explaining in minute detail the forms of payment, the covering legislation, and the administrative methods adopted in each of the four countries. These are preceded by a historical introduction dealing in general with the factory acts, poor law administration, public health measures, and the like in Great Britain. In all four countries the process has been, at least until very recent times, largely empirical. Labour parties in Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have long professed their adherence to socialist principles; but in practice all parties have generally been content to deal with practical problems as they arose without much thought of the underlying theory. The Beveridge plan is the only comprehensive blueprint that has had much influence, and even that has not been followed to the letter.

The empirical approach has been most evident in Canada; and indeed that remains the distinctive feature of the Canadian system as compared with those of the other countries. For reasons which Mr. Mendelsohn fully explains the start here was about a generation behind that in the other countries. But rapid progress has been made, and if the Canadian scheme still lacks a "coherent plan," or a general act covering the whole field, a good deal has been done to meet the essential need of "income security for the individual and the family." In Canada and Australia the existence of federal forms of government has created difficulties. Strangely enough, in view of the theories of federation in the two countries, these are greater in Canada than in Australia, where public opinion has sanctioned the assumption of very large powers in this field by the central government.

The later chapters are less interesting. The point by point comparison of the four systems is unduly repetitious; and the author, who has an unbounded enthusiasm for his subject, is inclined to indulge in elaborate discussions of minor topics that do not always appear especially relevant. The best of these chapters is an examination of the effects of all this on the working of democracy. The danger resulting from the growth of centralized bureaucracy is recognized; but the suggested solutions are a little vague; and the author perhaps assumes too much similarity in the conditions which determine social and political advance in the four communities. The argument is supported

throughout by charts and statistical tables which will make it invaluable to the specialist; but the book contains a great deal that should be of profound interest to a wider public.

Finally a word should be said about Professor Mansergh's inaugural lecture on *The Name and Nature of the Commonwealth*, a masterly analysis of recent developments in the forms and methods of co-operation and in the vocabulary through which those changes are reflected. All this was a consequence, unforeseen but inevitable, of the recognition of equality. It has of course not been accepted without opposition. To the traditionalists the changes in terminology have been only less repugnant than the more substantive changes which they represent. But their fears were groundless, as they have so often been in the past. There has been no loss of unity, and no impairment of the effectiveness of co-operation on practical issues. On the contrary, as Professor Mansergh points out, "this variety, by recognizing social and political realities," has tended to promote the only kind of unity that is possible or desirable. Only once, in the case of the Irish Free State, was the distinction between unity and uniformity disregarded; and the result was not fortunate. The lesson was learned, and in 1949 the Republic of India took its place among the member states, without criticism, and with evident advantage to all. In the one case the decision was made by a British government still thinking in terms of empire. In the other it was made by the prime ministers of a group of free and equal nations. That is in itself an indication of the change that has taken place. Without that change, and the greater flexibility which it has brought, it is doubtful whether the new Asian communities would have found membership in "the club" entirely to their liking; and to have secured their adhesion was for this generation an object worth attaining, even at the cost of dropping some old forms and some names hallowed by long tradition.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Social Sciences in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography. Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 64. New York. 1954. Pp. x, 181. \$1.75 (paper), \$2.25 (cloth).

The Teaching of the Social Sciences in the United States. Paris: UNESCO [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1954. Pp. 150. \$1.00.

THE purpose of the SSRC *Report* is the "exploration of how historians and other social scientists can better attain profitable intellectual co-operation through more effective knowledge and use of ideas and methods dominant in the various social sciences." It is true that the Introduction adds that "it is not a one way relationship—they [historians] can teach much as well," but the *Report* does not really deal with this aspect of the matter. It is "a discussion of the relevance for the historian of methods of enquiry developed in the other social disciplines; and a discussion of the nature of history itself as a social science" (reviewer's italics).

It would seem that the SSRC has missed a great opportunity. It is true that, formally, and for the greater part, the *Report* treats history with every courtesy. It admits that the conventional misapprehensions "malign the historian, as well as his fellow social scientists." It sees that, even on its own assumption that history is a social science, "history must be regarded as unique among social sciences in . . . that its focus of interest is explicitly the analysis of change over time," so that "since many social science methods are not explicitly designed to deal with temporal sequences and processes, the use of such methods for historical purposes presents major difficulties." It realizes that, while "to talk glibly of developing concepts and testing hypotheses is simple," "social science approaches to history can never be applied mechanically." There is no point, for example, in inviting the historian (occupied with change) to follow economists if these are devoting "the greater part of their ingenuity and energy to the elaboration of what are termed static models." It admits that, while the historian would be well advised to know what social scientists are doing in enquiries, or with data, close to his own, this is by no means inconsistent with his retaining "an attitude of qualified scepticism toward any particular methodological device which the other social sciences provide." It even catches a glimpse of the strange idea that what the historian may be trying to do is to be a historian: that he is not a kind of "failed" social scientist. Thus (p. 29) "in historical research the process of enquiry ordinarily begins not with testing hypotheses deduced from a general theory but with a problem of interpretation presented by a certain body of empirical material": and it is conceded that not all historians must "think alike or feel obliged to treat history as a social science. . . . Their disposition may be to regard history as a form of knowledge about the concrete, unique and individual." Had the *Report* explored what is involved in these admissions, it might have been richly fruitful. As it is, and these formal reservations once made, the *Report* goes on, in effect, to ignore their significance and simply to tell the historian what the social scientist *says* he is doing and suggest what the historian might be advised to borrow.

The keys to the matter are in the assumption that "that history can be regarded as a social science needs little argument," and in the (at this time of day) surprising reproduction (p. 86) of the old positivist notion that the historian's work falls into two distinct parts, the establishment of the "facts" and their explanation: the first process being descriptive and the second, scientific. It seems fair to say that, for the authors of the *Report*, Dilthey and Croce, Collingwood and Oakeshott, have written on air.

This is the more surprising because (p. 142) the reporters realize that few now believe that "facts speak for themselves" and because (p. 87) they suggest that they realize the importance of the "present consciousness" of the historian and of what he *brings* to the establishment of the facts. The statement that "recognition of a problem starts from *knowledge*, not from a random decision to study something. It may be the initial stage of an inductive inference from previous knowledge; or it may be a deductive inference from theory" points to Collingwood: and the view that the historian "does not ordinarily start with a collection of documents, but with an historical situation that presents a problem" reads like a paraphrase of Oakeshott. But here, as throughout, the *Report* assumes that any advance made by the historian is due to his having learned from social science, and this chapter vi, on "various suggestions for an historian's theory of historical knowledge," is curiously silent as to the historians' contribution to that theory. In this connection, the remark (p. 32) that "there are social scientists who have no sense of history" takes on a new significance. For while there are many good things about historical method and historical knowledge in chapters vi and vii of this *Report*, the authors seem to be entirely unaware that what they admire is not the fruit of history going to school to social science, but things which historians took for granted from Thucydides to Hume and which (in so far as they were ever lost sight of) we have recaptured by being again emancipated from that positivism which gave rise to social science.

Given this assumption that any historian who tries to be more than the merest "chronicler" is to be congratulated as striving to achieve maturity (i.e. to become a social scientist), it is not surprising that the chapters which seek to show what the historian may learn from individual social sciences turn out to be something less than helpful. Do we really have to go to anthropology to learn that "a human society, by minimal definition, requires organized relations, differentiated roles and patterns of social interaction, not simply an aggregation of people"? Did Belloc, Burdett, Mathiez, or Bullock, when they were writing their respective studies of Cromwell, Gladstone, Robespierre, and Hitler, really need to be told by anthropologists that "an individual who in ordinary times would be punished as a deviant, or dismissed as an eccentric, may in extraordinary times become the founder of a new religion?"—and did they have to wait for psychologists to tell us that "to-day it is generally agreed that leadership is a relation to which the leader, the follower and the requirements of the situation, including the traditions of the group, all contribute"? Do we have to wait for sociology in order to learn "that group relations affect ethical judgment and ways of thinking. What is an excusable error by a member of one's own political party . . . is a gross betrayal of trust in a member of the opposition?"—or did some of us find it, perchance, long, long ago in *Hudibras*? What (given the historian's special job) is he to learn from sociological theory if it is true

that "despite the many volumes dealing with the history of sociological theory . . . sociologists may discuss the logical criteria of sociological laws without citing a single instance which fully satisfies these criteria"?—or from economic theory if it be true that this "must necessarily be tautological, circular and assume what it proves . . . and that the *applicability* of the assumptions . . . is purely a question of fact, having nothing to do with the *form* of a proposition of pure theory"? One feels relatively at home with the political scientist who concludes that "the multiplicity of variables introduced into the analysis . . . militate against the development of a rigorous causal theory dealing with major political institutions," and grateful for being exempted from the need to pursue certain aspects of psychology since "the historian perhaps has little to learn here from what he may regard as the rediscovery of the obvious."

To say all this is not in any way to criticize social science. The quarrel, in so far as there is one, is not of the historian's making. It is not he who says, in effect: "I am in rather a muddle about the role of theory in my subject, but I am sure that you ought to make more use of it." By all means let the historian take account of, and be thankful for, all the grist which social scientists may bring to his mill. It is another matter to become involved in their methodological masochisms.

Part II of the *Report* is also, though not equally with part I, disappointing. Thus, chapter V ("Change and History") is not what one would expect, but a series of suggestions about those aspects of change which occur to social scientists and, when it turns to advise the historian, it varies exasperatingly between the elementary and the pretentious. Does it really advantage the historian at all to tell him that "it may be useful for him to consider the society that he is investigating as a structure of relationships and interactions, characterised by processes of change and shaped by the play of many interdependent variables of a physical, social, economic, political and intellectual nature"? And while "it may be profitable to distinguish between those factors of change that are inherent in a social body, like births and deaths, which may be called the *immanent factors* of change, and those outside it like the weather and topography, which may be called the *external factors*," what is really gained by formally separating things which no one has ever confused and giving them pompous names? It is true that the *Report* remarks that "classification of the different types of factors of change does not solve the problem of historical causation," but, in fact, it constantly repeats the besetting social science habit of mistaking mere classification for progress. Thus (pp. 134-5) it lists six categories of verification. They are, possibly, appropriate to an introductory course in logic; they are not, in any special degree, particular to the historian; and they end with the truism that "in actual research scientists combine, in one way or another, all of these methods . . . the scientist verifies his deductions in any way that he can." The immediately following pages ask "whether historical scholarship can demonstrate a significant degree of cumulative analysis" and enumerate aspects of the logic and methods of science which are particularly relevant to this analysis. Number 5 may stand as typical. It runs: "Theories are used or discarded depending on the consequences derived from them. This is the revisionary self-corrective process basic to cumulative analysis."

The historian will probably find chapter VII on historical synthesis, the most

directly concerned with his own work, since it suggests aspects of history which are still to be studied. Yet, even here, he may think that there is too much suggestion that the impulse to study these aspects comes from the non-historical sciences, and too little realization of the extent to which historians are agreed that every generation will restudy the past in terms of its own preoccupations.

One returns to the nub of the matter. Let the historian read the discussion (pp. 23-9) on the process of historical research. Let him note how much of this is true but not new, and let him consider whether what is new really describes what is done by a Maitland, a Tout, or a Namier. He may then, we think, turn to refresh himself with Marc Bloch's *The Historian's Craft*.

The UNESCO Report is a straightforward account of social science teaching in the United States and, as such, it is very useful. But the elevation of social science into a secular religion ("the great unanswered questions of the social sciences are the great unanswered questions of mankind," p. 14); the thoughtful pages (29 *seq.*) on the "ambiguous nature of the idea of social science as such"; and the exemplifications of this ambiguity (e.g., pp. 95-9) throw a curious light on the questions which the SSRC *Report* has begged.

H. N. FIELDHOUSE

McGill University

This Most Famous Stream: The Liberal Democratic Way of Life. By A. R. M. LOWER. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1954. pp. xii, 193. \$3.50.

"THIS MOST FAMOUS STREAM" is the liberal democratic way of life, and Professor Lower's little book seeks out its headwaters and explores a number of its tributaries. Dr. Lower discerns among the sources of liberalism the institutions of mediaeval England; Calvinism; the seventeenth-century and American revolutions; modern Protestantism, especially of the evangelical variety; and the thrusting, resourceful "self-made man" whose private vices have issued in some public benefits. He discusses the relationship of liberalism to Christianity, of the frontier to democracy, and of federalism to freedom. The essays are never dull, often entertaining, commanding attention if not always agreement. They do not comprise (nor are they intended as) a treatise in political theory or a work of serious historical investigation, but rather "a restatement of the faith upon which our modern world is founded." Restatement, more than re-examination. This is no time, the author seems to feel, for cringing introspection. Liberalism needs someone "to remove . . . the dust that has gathered on our historical heritage" (p. 52). For Dr. Lower this is no chore but a labour of love, executed with vigour and with verve.

Thus freshened and refurbished, liberalism remains an optimistic creed. "It is not to be thought of . . . that this most famous stream . . . should perish." Would Wordsworth's faith, one wonders, survive the present? Dr. Lower has seen the twentieth century do its worst, and *his* faith, undimmed and undiminished, is as courageous as it may be misguided. What assurance is there that whatever the iniquity, however long it lasts, "a swing back to faith in the individual is sure to recur" (p. 30)? We are asked to trust in "the genius of [our] . . . institutions" (p. 6). There may yet be hope for the hapless Bantu.

The modern liberal likewise shares his forbear's morbid mistrust of power. Acton's aphorism once more masquerades as truth (p. 184). We are told that "states whose internal life must proceed by debate are in no position to follow long-range Machiavellian policies towards their neighbours. Liberalism at home gives some assurance of peace abroad." (p. 187) Only, surely, in an improbable world of liberal democrats. In the real world it is more true to say that "Machiavellian" policies abroad give some assurance of liberalism at home. Where liberalism coexists with fanaticism, its very virtues may aid those bent on its destruction, just as defensive emulation of their vices may result in self-destruction. It is less than helpful to find this problem dismissed in the preface as "an unreal dilemma."

JAMES EAYRS

The University of Toronto

The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867-1887. By DAVID M. L. FARR. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 362, illus. \$5.50.

IN his well-documented book Dr. Farr discusses important aspects of the evolution of Canada toward constitutional equality with the United Kingdom. Having sketched the Imperial scene in 1867 and described the Colonial Office in the period under review, the author proceeds to trace British attitudes on Imperial guarantees of Canadian loans, the disallowance of provincial acts, appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Canadian fiscal freedom, and the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner in London. In a final chapter he sums up salient features of intra-imperial relations in the years between the passage of the British North America Act, 1867, and the convening of the first Colonial Conference. Three appendixes present material on the organization of the Colonial Office, the later history of appeals from Canada, and the later development of Canadian fiscal autonomy. The book has a good bibliography and an adequate index. The footnotes are, alas, at the end of each chapter.

Three of the "case studies" offered by Dr. Farr are of significance for general intra-imperial relations. They are therefore of interest to students, not only of the history of Canada, but of Commonwealth history as well. All studies are founded on a thorough examination of printed and manuscript source material in official and private collections and on wide reading in relevant books.

On the Canadian side, Edward Blake stands out as the most persistent champion of his country's claims. The Colonial Office is depicted as always friendly and sympathetic toward Canada, anxious to overcome the dilatory habits and conservative views of British law officers and of Board of Trade and Treasury officials. Sir Robert G. W. Herbert, permanent Colonial Under-secretary, 1871-92, and his kinsman, Lord Carnarvon (Secretary of State, 1866-6, 1874-8), were especially eager to grant Canadian requests and to reconcile conflicting British opinion. Among the host of other men whose views receive much attention we find, on the Canadian side, Galt, Macdonald, and Rose, and Britons, besides those connected with the Colonial Office and governors general of Canada, W. E. Gladstone and Lords Cairns and Salisbury.

Herbert lacked the independence of mind and the wide-ranging sympathy with the underprivileged which characterized his famous predecessor, Sir James Stephen, but otherwise the two men had much in common. Both appreciated the problems of overseas Britain, strove earnestly to further colonial well-being, and chafed under the restrictions imposed on colonial administration by the board of trade and the treasury. Dr. Farr's study reveals a remarkable continuity in Colonial Office point of view concerning the colonies. When in 1868 Sir T. F. Elliot referred to the "Dominion [of Canada] pretty nearly as an independent Country" (quoted p. 299) he simply repeated Stephen's statement of January, 1846, that Canada had "become, in everything but the name, a distinct State. . . ."

While Dr. Farr's "cases" amply demonstrate how little theory influenced colonial policy in action, the author finds it hard to free himself fully from the myth that the reverse was true. Despite trade laws, British colonies had enjoyed a large measure of fiscal freedom before Gladstone in February, 1846, conceded the basic principle. The later struggle by the British government at the behest of manufacturers to check protectionism in the colonies was merely an effort to close the stable door after the horse was gone. Dr. Farr is also bedevilled by terms such as "separatists," "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperial," often used by partisan British writers on imperial history. Both Gladstone and Salisbury believed that the self-governing colonies were destined for independence (who will now say that they were wrong?). Gladstone held that by granting them freedom they would long remain in the British fold. Yet he has been called a separatist while Salisbury has not. In this reviewer's judgment, the modern terms "anti-colonialism" and "anti-imperialism" better describe the attitude of many British liberals toward the colonies and empire than do "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperial."

On these and a few other points the reviewer does not share Dr. Farr's view. Yet he welcomes Dr. Farr's book both for its intrinsic value and because it reveals a growing tendency to investigate objectively and systematically the processes whereby during the last hundred years British nations have arisen beyond the seas.

PAUL KNAPLUND

The University of Wisconsin

The Parkman Reader: From the Works of Francis Parkman. Selected and edited with an introduction and notes by SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. Illustrated with maps. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1955. Pp. xviii, 533. \$6.75.

"THE purpose of this reader," writes Professor Morison in the preface, "is to present the public with selections from the works of Francis Parkman, who is universally admitted to be one of the greatest—if not the greatest—historians that the New World has produced." To accomplish this, whole chapters or groups of chapters have been selected from seven of the eight volumes of the series *France and England in North America*—there is no excerpt from Parkman's first published historical work, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac*. On the whole, the excerpts have been well chosen. They have been arranged in chronological sequence, beginning with a chapter on the Indian

tribes taken from the introduction to *The Jesuits in North America*, and continuing with chapters on the early explorers, the first attempts at colonization, the missionary activities of the Jesuits, the society of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century New France, western exploration, and, finally, the struggle between France and England in North America beginning with King William's War and ending with Wolfe's victory at Quebec. In addition, there is an introduction by the editor consisting of a twenty-four-page biographical sketch of Parkman, a table of statistics showing the sales of the Little Brown & Company editions of Parkman's works down to 1953, five excellent maps, and an index.

Most of Parkman's bibliographical footnotes have been deleted because, as the editor explains, they are of little interest to general readers for whom this volume is intended. Professor Morison then goes on to say that he has corrected, in footnotes, "statements by Parkman that have been proved to be inaccurate or misleading by research during the sixty-odd years since his death—and they are remarkably few. . . ." This last statement is itself rather misleading; the truth is, not that there are so few inaccuracies in Parkman's works, but that so little original research has been done in this field that relatively few of his inaccuracies have been brought to light. In some ways Parkman has had a rather disastrous effect on the study of Canadian history during the French régime; his seven volumes have been regarded as the definitive history of New France—certainly textbook writers would have been lost without them—and this has tended to stifle research in the field, at least amongst English-speaking historians. However, there are signs that this is not to continue indefinitely and the next few years may well see Parkman's works relegated to the same shelf as that containing the works of Prescott, Motley, and Bancroft, works which are of interest more to the student of historiography than the student of history.

W. J. ECCLES

The University of Manitoba

Rogers' Rangers: A History. By HAROLD MCGILL JACKSON. Ottawa. 1954. Pp. 214. \$3.00. Obtainable from the author, Box 59, Aylmer East, Quebec.

COLONEL JACKSON has apparently been torn between two desires: whether to write a history of the corps of Rangers which fought for the British in the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution, or to write a biography of Robert Rogers, organizer of the corps and its commander during the first and part of the second conflict. As a result, the book contains a full account of the Rangers during the period when Rogers was connected with them, and, in the intervals, a sketch of Rogers' life.

In the sections devoted to the Rangers, there are valuable pages on forest tactics and the role of irregular forces in supplying intelligence to the regular army, particularly in Amherst's Montreal campaign of 1759–60. But if a day-to-day summary of Ranger operations for much of the Seven Years' War is necessary, then a wider use of available sources is indicated. Too often the author has supplied little more than a third-person paraphrase of Rogers' *Journals* (London, 1765). Use is made of such sources as the *Johnson Papers* and the *New York Colonial Documents*, supplemented by Parkman; but material on *la petite guerre* from the other side of the hill in voluminous

printed sources such as the *Collections des manuscrits du maréchal de Lévis* (12 vols., Quebec, 1889-95) would have added another, more illuminating dimension (there is plenty of material in these volumes about Rogers and his Rangers which has not been exploited). The description of Ranger activities in the Revolution is perfunctory, possibly because Rogers' part in them was neither large nor creditable.

Unfortunately, this book as biography is not very informative either. For the most part, Colonel Jackson has accepted Rogers at his own estimation, although some embellishments have been added: not even the bold Rogers would have described himself as a "mental giant." Although material directly related to this partisan leader is scanty, an opportunity to examine him during one of his less shadowy moments (his remarkable conduct while commanding at Michilimackinac in 1766-7) is let slip in summary fashion.

There is no index.

S. F. WISE

The Royal Military College of Canada

Pioneer Inns and Taverns. I. Ontario, with Detailed Reference to Metropolitan Toronto and Yonge Street to Penetanguishene. By EDWIN C. GUILLET. With 235 illustrations. Toronto: The author. 1954. Pp. 240. \$10.00.

THIS is the first of three volumes projected by Mr. Guillet dealing with the pioneer inns and taverns of Ontario, Quebec, and New York State. Mr. Guillet is well and favourably known for his researches into pioneer life in Canada, as exemplified especially in his monumental *Early life in Upper Canada* (Toronto, 1933); and the present volume is an amplification of his researches into one phase of the subject dealt with in that work. To say that he has exhausted all the known materials available for the study of his subject is no more than a plain statement of fact. One hardly knows whether to admire more the industry which he has devoted to his researches or the skill with which he has presented its results. This is definitely a study which will never have to be done again.

In particular, I should like to draw attention to the numerous illustrations which the book contains. These must result from a search of the most exhaustive and indefatigable character. Most of them have never before been reproduced, and they form a record of notable value.

The book is well printed, and will be read with much interest both by the layman and by the student of Canadian history. It lacks an index, but this will no doubt be supplied when the series of three volumes is completed.

W. S. WALLACE

"Rise, Canadians!" By M. BELLASIS. Montreal: Palm Publishers. 1955. Pp. xvi, 271. \$4.25.

THIS book is a popularly written account of the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837 from the pen of an English novelist. The author appends a rather indiscriminate bibliography of some eighty-seven items, on which she presumably relied for background information. This book list contains many

standard works, but others are very marginal to the subject and many items essential to an understanding of the period are not included. Moreover, this list will bewilder the uninformed reader who tries to use it, since, as is the English fashion, every suggestion of pedantry has been avoided in its preparation.

It is apparent that the author has leaned heavily upon J. C. Dent's *Story of the Upper Canadian Rebellion* for her view of the period. Accordingly, we are given an horrendous tale of Family Compact misrule as the explanation of the Rebellion. The author was, however, wise enough not to follow Dent exactly in fashioning her portraits of Mackenzie and Rolph. Indeed, her account of the former, although not attempting to describe his political views, is the best thing in the book. Nevertheless, she has fallen into the common error of assuming that the Rebellion had to be, if responsible government was to follow.

The well-informed student of Canadian history will find nothing new in this book, not even the illuminating insights which the novelist can sometimes bring to history. The author is not sufficiently steeped in the period to provide these. The book contains a number of minor errors (she still has the *Caroline* going over the Falls), and the interpretations are old fashioned and over-simple. Still, the present reviewer has no disposition to dismiss the book in a mood of academic disdain. An attempt to write interestingly about an episode of Canadian history should be welcomed. The general reader will find here a lively account of Mackenzie and the Rebellion, which captures much of the flavour of the period, and which has no more misconceptions than have other and more pretentious works.

G. M. CRAIG

The University of Toronto

Ottawa. By BLODWEN DAVIES. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited. 1954. Pp. vi, 186. \$3.95.

Up and Down the Glens: The Story of Glengarry. By DOROTHY DUMBRILLE. Sketches by STUART MCCORMICK. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 139. \$3.25.

THESE two volumes can best be described as travel-history. Neither pretends to be a documented reference for the use of students or scholars, but they make pleasant reading for anyone.

Miss Davies' works are too well known and appreciated to require any lengthy introduction. This, her latest study of a Canadian city, bears the apt subtitle "Portrait of a Capital," for the first half of *Ottawa* comprises a history of the city's growth from a small but thriving lumber town to a large, if adolescent, national capital. The second part of the book is devoted to pen-portraits of some of the city's landmarks and institutions, such as its schools, the Mint, the Parliamentary Library, the Public Archives, the National Museum and Gallery. Each pen-portrait is a brief history in itself. Last but not least, Miss Davies describes "the Ottawa-to-be" when the plans of the Federal District Commission are completed. The book is well illustrated with photographs of scenes and pictures of historic and current interest. The index, however, is inadequate, and no bibliography or documentation of any kind has been included.

Dorothy Dumbrille (Mrs. J. T. Smith) frankly explains that *Up and Down the Glens* "is not, strictly, a history of the County of Glengarry, but rather a collection of sketches having to do with the Scottish settlers and their descendants." In point of fact much of the book is folk-lore and legend, bearing an obvious dissimilarity to acceptable history. Miss Dumbrille takes her readers on a tour of the county to meet the people and visit the landmarks of old Glengarry. Perhaps because the back-country is less known to the outsider the description seems less interesting after Miss Dumbrille leaves the familiar sites along the main highway. A surfeit of confusing genealogical details (especially regarding the ubiquitous clan Macdonald-Macdonell) makes the narrative drag occasionally in the later pages, and for some unaccountable reason Miss Dumbrille has confused the Nor'-Westers with the Astor fur traders in the Seven Oaks Massacre.

Nevertheless the writer's light touch and vivid descriptions carry the traveller onward at a good pace, while Mr. Stewart McCormick's delightful drawings of Glengarry scenes enhance the pages. *Up and Down the Glens* contains incidental bibliographic references but lacks an index, a serious handicap to anyone seeking genealogical information from the book.

Keeping in mind that both volumes are aimed at the general reading public, *Ottawa* and *Up and Down the Glens* fulfil their purpose well. *Up and Down the Glens* will appeal to a more limited audience, and suffers, as has been noted, from a certain lack of clarity and cohesion in some places. *Ottawa* should receive wide circulation because of its subject and the eminently readable style of Miss Davies.

JOHN S. MOIR

Queen's University

Behold the Shining Mountains: Being an Account of the Travels of Anthony Henday, 1754-55, the First White Man to Enter Alberta. By JAMES G. MACGREGOR. Edmonton: Applied Art Products, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 276, illus., maps. \$3.25 (paper), \$4.75 (cloth).

ANTHONY HENDAY, the first of the Hudson's Bay Company's regular inland wanderers among the Indians, is an important figure in western history, on whom a good book is overdue. In such a book serious students will want a handy correlation of the differences in the surviving recensions of his lost journal, and an attempt to reconstruct its original text; Mr. MacGregor gives neither. Likewise, serious students will certainly not want imaginative descriptions of Henday's sentiments, or of the supposed physical attractions of the squaw whom he described, without trace of erotic emotion, as "my bed-fellow"; of both Mr. MacGregor gives more than a little.

Yet scholars cannot justly express disappointment over this book. It is not written for their small band, but to interest all Mr. MacGregor's fellow Albertans on the celebration of their province's jubilee, and it must be judged accordingly. We felt it should serve its purpose well, and it has vastly more merit than popular works are commonly judged to require. With unrivalled local knowledge Mr. MacGregor has made the most thorough attempt yet to discover where Henday actually went. He can also be agreeably realistic; thus, he says that Henday "faced no great difficulties," which is true; and he recognizes Henday's earlier profession of smuggling as a

decidedly more dangerous calling than wandering westward with friendly Indians. It is good to see a provincial jubilee celebrated with so useful an attempt to awaken public interest in the province's history.

R. GLOVER

The University of Manitoba

In Search of the Magnetic North: a Soldier-Surveyor's Letters from the North-West, 1843-1844. By JOHN HENRY LEFROY. Edited by GEORGE F. G. STANLEY. Pioneer Books. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1955. Pp. xxx, 171, illus., maps. \$3.50.

CANADA has owed much to scientific explorers from the armed forces of Great Britain. Franklin and his fellows were all from the Royal Navy; Captain Palliser, of the Waterford Militia, was at least a quasi-soldier, and his companion, Lieutenant Blakiston, R.A., was a genuine soldier. We were therefore surprised to find Dr. Stanley describing another gunner, Lieutenant J. H. Lefroy, who wrote these letters, as "a soldier-scientist . . . a type of man more likely to be found in a modern army than one of an earlier era." Just because he was a service-scientist, Lefroy strikes us as conforming to one of the commoner types of nineteenth-century Canadian explorer.

That said, our criticism of Stanley ceases. He has given this volume a very competent introduction; and above all he has hunted down and secured for publication the letters it contains. In so doing he has set an example which other western historians should follow. The publications of Milton and Cheadle, of Messiter, their temporary and quarrelsome companion, and of Southesk have long been familiar, and regarded as valuable. But these were by no means the only British travellers who came to the prairies for sport and adventure in the nineteenth century; if the others published no books, they may at least be presumed to have written letters; and by publishing Lefroy's correspondence Stanley has shown how much might be gained from a search of other British attics for more dusty bundles of letters written long ago from Canada.

The value of an outsider's letters will be apparent to anyone who compares the present volume with *The Hargrave Correspondence* edited by G. de T. Glazebrook. The fur-trading authors of the latter generally wrote to friends who knew their situation too well to require description. Lefroy, on the other hand, wrote of scenes and circumstances that were equally novel to himself and his correspondents. He therefore gives, often vividly, broad descriptions that provide an admirable complement to the day-to-day details preserved in *The Hargrave Correspondence*; and he saw far more of what is now Canada than did most Canadians of his time.

He travelled by the Nor'-Westers' old route to Fort William, the almost derelict relic of former days where "the old mess House, in which so many hardy travellers used to tell of their exploits, is now a shed of canoes, half a ruin." Thence he went by way of Fort Garry (where "nothing" could "exceed the kindness and hospitality shewn to strangers") to York Factory and westward again by the Saskatchewan to Fort Chipewyan and beyond; finally he returned to Toronto. He had an eye for scenery and customs; he does not burden his readers with his magnetic observations, and almost his only defect is a propensity for attempting to write verse.

The temptation to quote Lefroy is strong. We liked his description of Toronto, "a wonderfully growing place [which] will probably hereafter be the leading commercial city of Western Canada, a sort of Fresh-water Boston"; and a comment on Canadian politics is striking. "A new and thriving country like this, teeming with discontent and vain regret amidst abundance, impresses upon me very strongly the truth that the least things in our daily course of life take often the deepest root." So much for all the mouthy outcry over clergy reserves and responsible government, in the eyes of a man who had met life's realities in places where a full belly was something to thank God for.

As a devout Christian, Lefroy was keenly interested in missions, but the regretful and scathing critic of missionaries. In the West he found three-cornered competition between Wesleyan, Anglican, and "Romanist"; the first were conspicuously ill-educated; the last two insisted on rebaptising other sects' converts; and wretched natives were taught Christianity as if it were an affair of mere magical formulae, being made to recite "the creed, sing hymns, read the Testament, etc. in English, *not one word of which any of them understand.*" Meanwhile the swarming half-breed offspring of nominally Christian fathers at the trading posts grew up in uninstructed heathenism, and rivalry between competing sects made it "impossible for the Whites to respect either party."

Our citations will show that Stanley has produced a very welcome volume; and the wizardry with which he identifies obsolete scientific instruments by their obscure trade names won this reviewer's delighted admiration.

R. GLOVER

The University of Manitoba

Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada. By J. R. MALLORY. Social Credit in Alberta, Its Background and Development, S. D. CLARK, Editor, 5. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 204. \$5.00.

SOCIAL CREDIT in Alberta, however it may be judged by later historians, has aided this generation of social scientists in Canada. And the Social Credit series, of which this volume is no. 5, has proved a useful peg on which to hang studies which, if primarily of various manifestations of western radicalism, have also contributed extensively to the study of national history and politics. Mr. Mallory's volume is a most useful and judicious combination of a searching examination of the federal power of disallowance with a detailed analysis of the relations of the Social Credit Government of Alberta with the federal Government. It will be consulted by those who wish to understand the victory and continued vigour of Social Credit in Alberta; it will also be added to the brief list of indispensable reference books on Canadian politics. The range of knowledge, the rigour of the analysis, ensure this, and a certain oracular compression of style will not prevent it.

Mr. Mallory opens his dual theme by a survey of the conventions governing the use of the federal power of disallowance from 1867 to 1936. The survey is uniform and judicious, although this reviewer questions whether the acceptance of popular sovereignty at the end of the last century was as important a factor in the diminishing use of disallowance as the author thinks. It is somewhat too academic a reason. The Liberal Government really

was inclined to believe in provincial rights, especially when there were Liberal governments in the provinces. But Mr. Mallory's concept of federal politics is realistic, and he quite properly views disallowance as one of the means by which the Canadian hinterlands were kept in subordination to policies determined by the needs of central Canada. It follows that the power has been used extensively only when the federal Government has been enforcing a major and positive policy, or when a provincial Government has deliberately challenged such a policy.

It is as such a challenge that Mr. Mallory sees much of the early legislation of the Social Credit Government. Indeed, the Social Credit movement in 1934-5 was fundamentally a means of making a more formidable challenge to federal policies than its predecessor, the United Farmers' Government, was prepared to offer. It is probable that this is the objective, historical judgment, but a less austere analyst might decide that Mr. Aberhart and many of his disciples were not unmoved by the hopes of easy monetary relief, which they inspired in their supporters. Here, however, was the grand strategy of the first years of Social Credit, and Mr. Mallory has traced it in a convincing fashion.

Mr. Mallory sees the constitution, not so much as a legal division of powers demarcated and shifted by judicial decision, but as a "field" of economic and political forces in which the courts themselves are contained. As a result, he naturally views the prompt disallowance of the challenging legislation of the Social Credit Government between 1937 and 1942 as an episode in Canadian constitutional development. The defiance of Social Credit was one factor in provoking that revival of federal powers which the late war necessitated and which was aided by the slow fading of *laissez-faire* principles from judicial thinking. The result Mr. Mallory sees as a new equilibrium between provincial and federal powers, and he argues cogently for that view. But would not the ghost of Aberhart ask what equilibrium there can be in a federal system in which the power of disallowance is actual and active, and the federal Government of necessity the agent in the last resort of the central provinces?

W. L. MORTON

The University of Manitoba

Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students. Edited by C. P. STACEY. Fourth edition, enlarged and revised. Ottawa: Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters; Queen's Printer. 1955. Pp. vi, 152. 50c.

THIS is the fourth edition, enlarged and revised, of a collection of articles by the Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian Army. All have appeared in the *Canadian Army Journal* but are here collected primarily for the benefit of junior officers making their first excursions into the fascinating field of military history. The first chapter deals with the development of the Canadian Army from the days of the French régime to the present day, and thereafter occur brief accounts of Sir William Phip's attack on Quebec, the conquest of Canada in the Seven Years' War, Brock's defence of Upper Canada in 1812, the Northwest Rebellion, Vimy Ridge, Amiens, Sicily, Normandy, and the Battle of the Scheldt. These accounts are illustrated by the

first-class sketch maps which we have come to expect as a matter of course from the Historical Section of the Canadian Army but for which we should never cease to be grateful. Colonel Stacey calls all this "a pamphlet" which no doubt it is, but there has seldom been a better half dollar's worth.

It is only recently that the influence of strategic requirements upon Canadian history has been fully appreciated by Canadian historians, and Colonel Stacey, who has devoted his life to the military history of this country, has almost certainly done more than any other writer to dignify and elevate the subject to a point which is consistent with our present national maturity. This of course was recognized by his appointment as Official Historian of the Canadian Army Overseas at the beginning of the last war. He has since developed the Historical Section of the General Staff along lines which have made it an indispensable function of the Army.

The accounts of the various campaigns are written simply and clearly with an eye to the didactic purpose for which they were intended. The author, in this regard, acknowledges the example of that famous staff college professor, Colonel Alfred H. Burne, and illustrates his accounts with frequent reference to the principles of war. Of particular value to students are the elucidations of the campaign of 1812 in Upper Canada and the strategy of the conquest of Canada in 1758-60. Not only the student, but also the veteran of our modern wars, will appreciate the manner in which Colonel Stacey has selected and maintained his aim in a field which too often becomes a mere catalogue of heroic incidents and in the limited experience of the participants themselves is little more than that.

SAM H. S. HUGHES

Welland, Ont.

The Two Jacks: The Amazing Adventures of Major Jack M. Veness and Major Jack L. Fairweather. By WILL R. BIRD. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1954. Pp. x, 209, illus. \$4.00.

JACK VENESS and Jack Fairweather landed in Normandy on D-Day as sub-alterns with The North Nova Scotia Highlanders, were captured when their positions were overrun the following day, escaped from the prison train taking them to Germany, and fought with the Maquis before being flown back to England from a secret air-field. Subsequently they returned to their regiment and finished the war as company commanders. But it is only their adventures during the summer of 1944 that are recounted by Dr. Will Bird, who also is writing the unit's regimental history. As well as being extremely readable, Dr. Bird's present volume is enhanced by 22 excellent photographs.

The brutality of the S.S. troops who captured the first Canadians is vividly portrayed, as are the long march to Rennes and the later train ride in closed box cars. Only after Fairweather and Veness got on the loose, however, did their story become really different.

Most of the Maquis encountered were from the lower strata of society. About half were aged twenty or less and there was a sprinkling of the gangster type. Naturally all craved excitement. Although the personal bravery of Capitaine Le Coz was always evident on his "expeditions," he was autocratic, vain, rash, and very callous towards those considered to be "collaborators."

There were few dull moments for Groupe Le Coz: either the Maquis were consuming vast quantities of vintage wines and the best of food, and retiring to rest on the finest bedding, all "liberated" from nearby chateaux, or they were on the run. Le Coz and his own officers kept mistresses with them throughout and there would seem to have been enough women for those interested. Truly it was a strange interlude for two New Brunswick boys who had been barely old enough to join the army in 1942.

J. MACKAY HITSMAN

Ottawa

Canada's Flying Heritage. By FRANK H. ELLIS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 388, illus. \$7.95.

THE publisher's note at the beginning of this volume informs us that the author "resolved to embark on a major project covering the whole of Canada's early flying history." That is an ambitious project, particularly for one who does not pretend to be an historian.

We must give Mr. Ellis credit for covering, in his own way, a very wide area. He begins by telling us how Thomas Selfridge was borne aloft over Lake Bras d'Or by the kite *Cygnets I* on December 6, 1907; he terminates his narrative with a reference to F/L Mel Lee's flight from Vancouver to Calgary in a Vampire jet aircraft on August 31, 1948. In between these limits he takes us through the early periods of experimentation and of exhibition and passenger flying, the development of military aviation in World War I, the attempts to span oceans and continents, the evolution of civil aviation, and the opening of Canada's more remote areas to transportation and communication by air.

In his final chapter the author states that he owes it to his readers to give them what he calls "the feel" of the early flying days in Canada. To some extent he succeeds in his purpose. One can hardly help being impressed by the spirit of the "Early Birds" who combined "an overwhelming urge to get up with an utter disregard of the manner in which one got down again." On the other hand one can scarcely suppress a chuckle over this paragraph quoted from the chapter in which Mr. Ellis deals with the air meets of 1910: "There were some interesting sidelights during the flights. Mr. Wilcox had arranged with Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Biggs, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Field Company, Canadian Engineers, for personnel of the Field Company to help in various ways, one of which was to simulate a bombing attack on an earthwork fort in front of the grandstand by exploding dynamite charges planted in the ground as an aircraft flew over the field and dropped sand bags on the fort. This shows the vision of these gentlemen who foresaw at that early date the military possibilities of the airplane in warfare." This little gem is matched by an item which the author quotes from the *Victoria Colonist* of May 31, 1911, with respect to an exhibition flight by Charles F. Walsh: "In travelling past the grandstand he took an apple from his pocket and threw it at the judge's box, striking the corner, which illustrates that the airplane might be destructively useful when employed for military purposes."

Undoubtedly Mr. Ellis has put into his book a copious store of information,

profusely illustrated with interesting photographs. Unfortunately one cannot be very enthusiastic about the method which the author has used in presenting his material. He has given us an accumulation of descriptive narratives about flying machines, the men who flew them, and the flights they made. After reading this book for two or three hours one has the impression that he has spent that amount of time in a museum looking at glass cases and reading the notices attached to the various exhibits. What we have here is a compilation rather than a synthesis.

One of the more serious defects in this book is the lack of definite reference to sources. We are told by the publisher that Mr. Ellis "began his research in 1941, writing over 6,000 letters to persons in Canada, the United States and other parts of the world." Furthermore, under the heading "Acknowledgments," we are given a formidable list of persons who helped the author in one way or another. But the fact remains that there are hardly any specific references. It is difficult to know how much of this information comes from hearsay, how much rests on recollection, and how much is based on solid documentation. To the historian, this is a real flaw. The book may be good reading, it may be good journalism, but it is not good history.

GEORGE BUXTON

The University of Ottawa

The Micmac Indians of Eastern Canada. By WILSON D. WALLIS and RUTH SAWTELL WALLIS. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press [Toronto: Thomas Allen Limited]. 1955. Pp. xvi, 515. \$8.00.

CONSIDERING how much has been published about the Indians of Canada, it is surprising how difficult it can be to find detailed information about a specific tribe. Early explorers and missionaries, who lived among the natives before their culture had broken down, were not methodical chroniclers of aboriginal life, and could not have foreseen that future generations would be interested in the Indians themselves. Their records emphasize the role of the Indian as an adjunct to the fur trade, as a guide or canoeman, or as the goal of missionary zeal.

This monograph contains practically everything that is known about the Micmac, the Indians who occupied Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and much of New Brunswick at the time of European contact. Cartier probably met the Micmac in 1534, but the earliest descriptions of their life are in the writings of Biard, Lescarbot, and LeClercq, and, of course, in the Jesuit *Relations*. The natives were expert hunters and fishermen, predators who followed their food resources to different areas at different seasons of the year. Their social structure was weak and they had few outstanding religious rituals or beliefs. In lecturing on the Indians of Canada, this reviewer has always found the Micmac a difficult subject on account of their lack of outstanding or distinctive cultural traits.

The book can be divided into two parts. The first is an attempt to give a full picture of Micmac life as it was at the time of European contact. Professor Wallis and his wife have quoted voluminously from all available writings, in the best traditions of ethno-history. Interwoven with this is the hitherto unpublished information obtained by Wallis himself during his

anthropological investigations of 1911 and 1912. This includes a large number of folktales, and a considerable amount of miscellaneous information which supplements the earlier sources. The arrangement is clear and the material brought together is so extensive that this volume can well be described as definitive on Micmac culture. But the Wallises would be the first to recognize that what they have described is no more than a mere shadow of Micmac life as it was. They trace clearly the way in which the Indians were caught between the conflicting French and English forces, and the more devastating effects of culture change; but the written records from which these historical facts can be gleaned give few details of Micmac beliefs, and oral traditions were of little value in 1910.

The second part of the volume—though the separation is not into two distinct sections—comprises data collected by the two Wallises some forty years later, in 1950 and 1953. There are other examples of tribes studied again after such a lapse of time, but not by the same investigator. Wallis could notice the changes in attitude, the lessened shyness of the women, a greater awareness of the world, and the introduction of the automobile and other mechanical devices. Knowledge of herbal remedies had remained unchanged, but the elements of material culture of native origin had almost disappeared. Elements from European sources had merged with those of Micmac origin to produce a distinctive culture, standing apart from that of the Canadian Maritime Provinces. It is truly Micmac, but far removed from the wandering hunters of the seventeenth century.

Perhaps the most important feature of this book is its portrayal of Micmac life at two periods: a reconstruction of what it must have been when the first Europeans landed, and what it is today. We, in Canada, are fortunate to have had this painstaking study by scholars from the United States; and fortunate, too, that their facts have been published in such an attractive volume.

T. F. McILWRAITH

The University of Toronto

Music in Canada. Edited by SIR ERNEST MACMILLAN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 232. \$5.00.

It is time indeed that a work should have appeared to survey the remarkable growth of music in Canada in recent years. This book has been issued in co-operation with the Canadian Music Council which was formed to champion the interests of music in this country. The work is organized as a symposium of eighteen writers dealing with subjects as varied as historical background, folk-song, composition, church music, popular music. The quality of the chapters ranges no less widely than their subject matter.

The book's virtues as well as its weakness derive in part from its semi-official origins. The stress is on inventory rather than on evaluation. The fact, too, that most of the writers are professional musicians has often imposed a certain etiquette that makes formal politeness triumph over frankness of judgment. Some of the chapters will be of very limited value to the future historian trying to ascertain the standards attained by music in our midst. Still there are some very useful and even some notable chapters, for example Marius Barbeau's poetic and scholarly contribution on folk-song, in which

amongst other things he tells of his expedition with Ernest MacMillan to the North Pacific Coast in the twenties in quest of Indian folk music. Dr. Arnold Walter's chapter on education in music brings to the subject a systematic train of reasoning. For his underlying thesis Dr. Walter takes issue with the point of view that every nation has or ought to have its own music. This, argues Walter, is "a typical nineteenth-century theory, an extension . . . of the tenets of nationalism. Music historians were so obsessed by it, that they went out of their way searching for local characteristics, . . . disregarding the fundamental truth that 90 per cent of all music performed and taught anywhere in the world is startlingly alike." Walter himself perhaps leans unduly in the opposite direction. Again in his own words: ". . . this Western music as we know it is a surprisingly independent phenomenon, a self-contained system almost like mathematics. If we compare the relative simplicity of that system with the myriad changes in spiritual outlook, in political life, in the social organization of the nations who created it, we must come to the conclusion that it is far less sociologically determined than we were led to believe."

In this passage Walter seems to be confusing the consumption of music with the creation of music. Our consumption of music is certainly less "sociologically determined" than it was fifty years ago. In our enjoyment of music we are now able to transcend our own times and enter into the spirit of remote periods which, except through the arts, would be largely closed to us. But that has nothing to do with the sort of music our composers write today—just as the Stratford Festival in no way invalidates the point of view that the plays of Shakespeare were very much the product of his time. As for the practical implications of Walter's thesis, here they are: "How can it be the business of a young nation . . . to begin at the beginning again and to develop, slowly and painfully, a musical culture all their own?"

Whether Canada will develop a distinctly national music or not is not likely to be decided by any amount of theorizing either for or against. More often than not such theorizing serves merely to vent the prejudices of the theorizers, while creative effort walks its own inscrutable ways. Still, it might not be amiss to mention that musical nationalism did make its appearance in Russia in the person of Glinka when that nation was just beginning to become literate musically.

WILLIAM KREHM

Toronto

A History of the Crusades. III. The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades.

By STEVEN RUNCIMAN. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. Pp. xii, 530. \$6.75.

WITH this final volume Steven Runciman brings his magisterial study of the Crusades to a triumphant conclusion. It is the best of his three volumes, incisive and dispassionate in narrative, trenchant in conclusions. Beginning with the Third Crusade, he unravels the tragic story of crime and folly which characterizes the later history of Outremer, concluding with chapters on commerce, the arts, and a "Summing Up." This last is likely to become a classical passage in the writing of history, so balanced and yet so vigorous is it in measured denunciation. "In the long sequence of interaction and fusion

between Orient and Occident out of which our civilisation has grown," he writes, "the Crusades were a tragic and destructive episode."

This volume, like its predecessors, is distinguished by its patient unravelling of political history rather than by analysis of problems or the probing of cause and effect. Yet most of the great questions concerning the Crusades are answered *in ambulando*, and answered with such fine judgment that preceding syntheses such as those of Grousset and Bréhier are now decisively superseded. In this connection, the exposition of character and of its influence in history is outstanding. Richard the Lion-hearted, Frederick II, Saint Louis, to name but the most familiar, are superbly delineated. Richard remains what he has been: a general rather than a politician. Some readers will feel that his mastery of battles is better attested than his brilliance of strategy. Frederick II is no less *stupor mundi* for being reduced by Runciman to a skilful, if short-sighted diplomat whose *avant garde* despotism was no solution for ultra-feudal Outremer, and whose recovery of Jerusalem meant little without Oultrejourdain. Full justice is done to the tragic failure of Louis IX and the blow this dealt to those who had blamed previous failures on the sins of the leaders. A further merit of the book is the excellent exposition, probably the best summary in English, of the dynastic and external relations of Moslems and Mongols. The classic problem of responsibility for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade is treated in a typical manner. Expounding the course of events, Runciman observes in a footnote (p. 112) that "while Philip of Swabia, Boniface and the Venetians all had separate reasons for the attack on Constantinople, it was the accident of Alexius's arrival [in Germany] which made the diversion practicable." Such, it would seem, is the rather frustrating "state of the problem."

In the brief chapters on commerce and the arts in Outremer, the relatively minor contributions of the Crusades are usefully summarized. The initiation of the crusading movement owed nothing to commerce, though it came to be dependent on it. But the Venetians and Genoese were more interested in Constantinople and Alexandria, and their support, however necessary, was as marked by conflict and intrigue as was the history of the Franks themselves. While the enemy thundered at the gates of Acre and the other coastal cities, the traders fought each other in harbour and market for economic privileges. On the arts, Runciman concludes: "The modest, sturdy work of the twelfth century Outremer was a prelude that led to nothing. Thirteenth-century Outremer was only a distant province of the Mediterranean Gothic world."

The text seems less letter perfect than that of previous volumes. Among the slips, we note, on page 42, October is given instead of April (1190) for Richard's departure from Messina. On page 128, for "affected" read "effective." The explanation in the footnote on page 137 has been incorporated in the text on the previous page. On page 238, read 1170 for 1270. While no attempt has been made by this reviewer to check the figures in detail, it seems that the size of the armies is generally far too high. However, the correction of the chronicle sources in this matter is a chancy and thankless task, perhaps best evaded. In conclusion, it should be said that, in general, the appearance of this book, as of the whole study, is as impressive as the content.

The University of Toronto

M. R. POWICKE

SHORTER NOTICES

Three Came With Gifts: The Story of the First Hospital, the First School and the First Cloister in Canada and Their Heroic Founders. By ANNA B. MONTREUIL. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1955. Pp. 60. \$3.50.

MME MONTREUIL retells simply and briefly the story of "the romantic period of the history of the first Ursulines and of the first Hospitalières of North America" (p. 60). The general reader may find himself slightly confused by a loosely chronological account which mingles references to Ursulines and Hospitalières, to Hôtel-Dieu, Ursuline Convent, and General Hospital, but he will be left with an impression of the devotion and courage of the founding members of the religious orders of New France. Of particular interest is a section of 24 pages of photographs of persons, scenes, and relics mentioned in the text.

D. M. HAYNE

The University of Toronto

La Voie de la sainteté d'après Marie de l'Incarnation, Fondatrice des Ursulines de Québec. By FERNAND JETTÉ. Publications de l'Institut de Missiologie, de l'Université d'Ottawa. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université. 1954. Pp. 226. \$2.00.

DOM ALBERT JAMET's monumental edition of the *Ecrits spirituels et historiques* of Marie de l'Incarnation has provided over the past quarter-century a fertile field for specialized studies of the Venerable foundress of the Ursulines of Quebec. The present volume gives a systematic account of her doctrine of the path to saintliness, drawn from the two autobiographical *Relations* of 1633 and 1654 and from about seventy letters of spiritual instruction, most of which were written to her son, Dom Claude Martin, or to her niece, Marie Buisson. A preliminary chapter defines the starting point of the "voie de l'esprit"; three chapters describe the three principal methods of progressing towards perfection: spiritual direction, prayer, and practice of the maxims of Jesus Christ; and a final chapter describes that mystical union with God which is the culminating point of the spiritual life.

There are copious quotations from Marie de l'Incarnation, whose lucidity is matched by the clarity of Father Jetté's analysis. One could wish for more critical comment, particularly in the area of Marie de l'Incarnation's debt to Saint François de Sales, St. Theresa of Avila, and St. John of the Cross, and in the relationship between the Ursuline's biography and her writings. Within the limits which the author has adopted, however, he has made a useful contribution to the growing bibliography of the "Theresa of New France."

D. M. HAYNE

The University of Toronto

World History from 1914 to 1950. By DAVID THOMSON. The Home University Library. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. x, 246. \$1.50.

MR. DAVID THOMSON's contribution to this series is a successful effort at writing "world history," a concept which he feels needs redefining. He centres his

attention on the how rather than on the what and why of the period and avoids making this brief survey a collection of separate histories of the six continents. How the world of 1914, that of "security and optimism," has become that of the cold war is shown in a general discussion in which he interrelates political, economic and cultural developments. One could wish, however, for a greater emphasis on the colonial revolutions. Similar shortcomings convince the reader that while the author has overcome the limitations of nationalism he is still bound by those of continentalism. The book tends to represent less a world view than a European view of the world. The most provocative section is that which deals with the fusion of nationalism and socialism. But the differences that existed between the various manifestations of this socialization of nationalism deserve more attention. Though many questions are left unanswered, the author's intelligent and suggestive generalizations and the union of learning with a happy command of language make this rewarding reading both for the professional historian and for the general reader.

EZIO CAPPADOCIA

The Royal Military College of Canada

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- ANDERSON, HOWARD A., ed., *Approaches to an Understanding of World Affairs*; with the advisory assistance of I. JAMES QUILLEN and ROBERT LAFOLLETTE (Twenty-Fifth Yearbook, National Council for the Social Studies; Washington, The Council, 1954, x, 478 pp., paper \$3.50, cloth \$4.00).
 ATAMIAN, SARKIS, *The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, xii, 479 pp., \$4.75).
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 BLOCH, MARC, *Esquisse d'une histoire monétaire de l'Europe* (Cahiers des Annales 9; publiés avec le concours du centre national de la Recherche Scientifique; Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1954, ii, 96 pp.).
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 BRICE, ANGEL FRANCISCO, *Bolívar, Libertador y Estadista* (Universidad del Zulia, Publicaciones de la Dirección de Cultura; Caracas, Talleres Civa, 1953, 367 pp.).
 BROCK, RAY, *Ghost on Horseback: The Incredible Ataturk* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce [Toronto, Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited], 1954, viii, 408 pp., \$5.50).
 CARR, EDWARD HALLETT, *A History of Soviet Russia: The Interregnum, 1923-1924* (London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd. [Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited], 1954, viii, 392 pp., \$5.75).
 CATTELL, DAVID T., *Communism and the Spanish Civil War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1955, xii, 290 pp., \$3.75).
 CHALFANT, ELLA, *A Goodly Heritage: Earliest Wills on an American Frontier* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955, xiv, 239 pp., \$3.00).
 COBBAN, ALFRED, *Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague* (London, Jonathan Cape [Toronto, Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited], 1954, 256 pp., \$4.25).
 COON, CARLETON S., *The Story of Man: From the First Human to Primitive Culture and Beyond*; line drawings by RICHARD ALBANY, photographs by REUBEN GOLDBERG (New York, Alfred A. Knopf [Toronto, McClelland & Stewart Limited], 1954, xxii, 426, xiv pp., \$7.50).
 CROZET, RENÉ, *La Vie artistique en France au XVII^e siècle (1598-1661): les artistes et la société* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, vi, 212 pp.).

GRADUATE THESES IN CANADIAN HISTORY AND RELATED SUBJECTS

The CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW presents herewith its twenty-eighth annual list of graduate theses which are in course of preparation or have recently been completed. Included in the list are titles not only in Canadian history but also in such related subjects as Canada's external relations, Canadian economics, law, and geography, and a selection of historical titles which bear indirectly rather than directly on Canadian history.

We wish to express our appreciation of the generous co-operation which we have received from a large number of universities throughout the Commonwealth, the United States, and Canada, in the compilation of this information. We shall be very grateful to have mistakes or omissions drawn to our attention.

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- SAMUEL H. BARNES, B.A. Tulane 1952; M.A. 1954. The political theory of organized labor in Canada. *Duke*.
- R. N. BEATTIE, B.A. British Columbia 1939; M.A. Toronto 1946. The Grand Trunk Railway to 1867. *Toronto*.
- J. M. BECK, B.A. Acadia 1934; M.A. Toronto 1947; Ph.D. 1954. The government of Nova Scotia. *Toronto*.
- RUBEN CARL BELLAN, B.A. Manitoba 1938; M.A. Toronto 1941. The development of Winnipeg as a metropolitan centre. *Columbia*.
- W. F. BOWKER, B.A. Alberta 1930; LL.B. 1932; LL.M. Minnesota 1953. The Supreme Court of Canada. *Yale*.
- CHANDLER BRAGDON, B.A. Cambridge 1921; M.A. 1934. Canadian reactions to the foreign policy of the United States in the period 1935-1941. *Rochester*.
- Sister M. TERESA AVILA BURKE, B.A. New Rochelle 1940; M.A. Columbia 1947. An historical analysis of the Canadian Cabinet. *Columbia*.
- J. K. CHAPMAN, B.A. New Brunswick 1950; M.A. 1952; Ph.D. London 1954. Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 1st Lord Stanmore, to 1875. *London*.
- MARTIN CLANCY. Rules of warfare observed by American military forces in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. *Georgetown*.
- P. G. CORNELL, B.A. Toronto 1940; M.A. 1948. The alignment of political parties in the united province of Canada. *Toronto*.
- HARRY SHERMAN CROWE, B.A. Manitoba 1947; M.A. Toronto 1948. The State and economic life in Canada. *Columbia*.
- R. C. DALTON, B.A. Bethel College 1949; M.A. Minnesota 1950. The political influence of the Orange Order in Canada. *Minnesota*.
- GRANT R. DAVY. Canadian policies in the United Nations. *Fletcher School*.
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- E. G. DRAKE, B.A. Saskatchewan 1950; M.A. 1951. Walter Scott's career as Premier of Saskatchewan, 1905-16. *Toronto*.

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- W. J. ECCLES, B.A. McGill 1949; M.A. 1951. Frontenac and New France, 1672-98. *McGill*.
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- ALLAN M. FRASER, M.A. Edinburgh 1928. History of Newfoundland from the suspension of Dominion status to unity with Canada. *Columbia*.
- D. G. L. FRASER, B.A. Acadia 1948; M.A. 1949. The Canadian background to the Statute of Westminster, 1897-1931. *Cambridge*.
- G. S. FRENCH, B.A. Toronto 1944; M.A. 1947. Methodism and politics in Canada in the nineteenth century. *Toronto*.
- LILLIAN FRANCIS GATES, B.A. British Columbia 1924; M.A. Clark 1926; M.A. Radcliffe 1930. The land policies of Upper Canada. *Radcliffe*.
- WILLIAM SPENSER HARDENBERGH, A.B. Illinois 1950; M.A. 1951; Ph.D. 1954. British government in British Columbia. *Illinois*.
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- HELEN G. LEWIS, A.B. Wilson 1940; A.M. Columbia 1942. Newfoundland, 1855-1933. *Columbia*.
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- JOSEPH E. MCGURN, A.B. Hobart 1950; M.A. 1951. Canadian opinion about United States foreign policy 1914-20. *Rochester*.
- K. A. MACKIRDY, B.A. British Columbia 1947; M.A. 1948. Regionalism: Canada and Australia. *Toronto*.
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- STANLEY N. MURRAY, B.S. State Teachers College, Minnesota 1949; M.S. Wisconsin 1953. Agricultural history of Red River Valley of the North. *Wisconsin*.
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- GRANT LOUIS REUBER, B.A. Western Ontario 1950; A.M. Harvard 1954. Changes in Anglo-Canadian trading patterns. *Harvard*.
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- CARMEN GIARD, B.A. Ottawa 1953; B.S.S. Laval 1954. Etude de la législation sociale de la Province de Québec 1900-21. *Laval*.
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- D. BERKELEY RHODES, B.A. Toronto 1948; M.A. 1955. The Toronto *Star* and the new radicalism, 1917-26. *Toronto*.
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- L. A. H. SMITH. Sir James Craig in Lower Canada: A period of re-examination of the 1791 constitutional experiment. *Oxford*.
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- C. F. J. WHEBELL, B.A. Western Ontario 1952. The industrial development of Haldimand County. *Western Ontario*.
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RECENT PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO CANADA

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARGARET JEAN HOUSTON

Notice in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: *B.R.H.*—*Bulletin des recherches historiques*; *C.H.R.*—*Canadian Historical Review*; *C.J.E.P.S.*—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; *R.H.A.F.*—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the Canadian Bibliographic Centre, Ottawa, and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the April issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

I. CANADA'S RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

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II. CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DOUGLAS, A. VIBERT. Report on UNESCO: What will Canada do? (*Queen's Quarterly*, LXII (1), spring, 1955, 89-99). An account of the Eighth General Assembly of UNESCO held in Montevideo.

FERGUSON, G. V. Canada's Four-Way Foreign Policy (*New Commonwealth*, XXIX (9), May 2, 1955, 423-5).

GLAZEBROOK, GEORGE PARKIN DE TWENEBROKES. Canada and the Rest of the World (*Current History*, XXIX (167), July, 1955, 13-18).

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HUDSON, G. F. How Unified is the Commonwealth? (*Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (4), July, 1955, 676-88). A discussion of the foreign policies of members of the Commonwealth.

HUTCHISON, BRUCE. The Struggle for the Border (*Maclean's*, LXVIII (5), March 5, 1955, 11-15, 55-8; LXVIII (6), March 19, 1955, 16-17, 88-91; LXVIII (7), April 2, 1955, 16-19, 89-93; LXVIII (8), April 16, 1955, 26-7, 57-60, 62-4; LXVIII (9), April 30, 1955, 24-5, 52-4, 56, 58; LXVIII (10), May 14, 1955, 28-9, 90-2, 94; LXVIII (11), May 28, 1955, 22-4, 26, 28).

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MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, Viscount. Nato and the Defense of the Free World (*Pacific Spectator*, IX (2), Spring, 1955, 168-77).

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

GILBERT NORMAN TUCKER

Last May, Canadian historical scholarship suffered an irreparable loss in the sudden death at Vancouver, B.C., of Dr. Gilbert Norman Tucker, Professor of Canadian History in the University of British Columbia. He was in his fifty-ninth year, having been born on November 11, 1896.

At the time of his death Dr. Tucker was working on a "critical study of the historians of French Canada." He had completed his note-taking and had just started the first draft of a volume which was destined to remain unpublished. He had already given evidence that his work and that of his research students was turning a new furrow in the field of the history of French Canada. He was, in fact, one of the few English-speaking Canadian historians who had delved into this field.

It was a matter of considerable interest to Gilbert Tucker that in his later life he returned to Vancouver, where both he and his wife, the former Frances Cowan, were born. Gilbert's father, the Reverend Norman Tucker, was the first rector of Christ Church, now Christ Church Cathedral, Vancouver. When Gilbert was about five years of age Canon Tucker became the general secretary of the Missionary Society of the Anglican Church, and the family moved to Toronto. Gilbert attended, in succession, St. Andrew's College, Ridley College, and the Central Collegiate Institute in London, Ontario.

In 1914 Gilbert Tucker entered the University of Toronto as a freshman, but in 1915 he enlisted in the C.E.F. He went to France as a lieutenant in the 18th Battalion and in 1917 was severely wounded in the fighting near Arras. His life was saved by a fellow-officer who carried him from the battlefield. This officer was George Spencer who later became Professor of Zoology of the University of British Columbia. Tucker was about eighteen months in hospital but finally made a good recovery.

After the First World War, Tucker resumed his undergraduate course at the University of Western Ontario where he specialized in history and obtained his B.A. in 1921 and his M.A. in 1922. In 1923 he entered the graduate school of the University of Wisconsin, where he remained for two years. In 1925 he was awarded an Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire travelling scholarship and was admitted as a graduate student to Christ's College, Cambridge. After a year at Cambridge he was appointed as an instructor in the Department of History at the University of Minnesota where he remained till 1929. He then returned to Cambridge where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1930. His thesis on *The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845-1851* was published in 1936 by the Yale University Press. After attending the University of London, where he continued his researches as a post-doctoral student, Tucker in 1931 returned to Canada and taught for one year at the University of Western Ontario. He then, in 1932, accepted an appointment at Yale where he remained as an Assistant Professor until 1940.

Research training is only part of the necessary equipment for a history professor. Much of his best work must be done in the class-room, in tutorial

groups, and in seminars. In the class-room Tucker shone. Few have ever prepared their lectures so thoroughly and few have equalled him as a class-room teacher. To employ a rather hackneyed phrase, he held his classes spellbound. He had few, if any, class-room tricks. What he did was to throw himself completely into the task before him and the class responded.

By nature Gilbert Tucker was shy and retiring. It was not that he lacked friends, he had plenty, but he was not a showman. He possessed two outstanding characteristics, his ready wit and his joy of living. One of his graduate students, who knew him as few did, recently remarked that it did not matter what he was doing, teaching, doing research, or attending social functions, Tucker always got full enjoyment out of the situation. He was never bored. He gave what he had and he enjoyed giving it. He liked people but his natural shyness often held him back. Many admired him greatly, but few got to know him well. One talent of his was obvious: his terrific, and almost terrifying ability to concentrate. But if he could concentrate, he also could relax and enjoy a cup of coffee and a chat.

Tucker was exceedingly humble, in fact it may be said he had the true humility of greatness. He shunned the limelight, but when he did give an opinion it was always based on mature thought. No doubt he made mistakes but they were rarely due to hasty conclusions. Anything he produced was most carefully prepared, but his delivery made it seem spontaneous.

In 1940 Gilbert Tucker became interested in Canadian naval policy and started to do research work in this almost untouched field. It was this interest which led to his appointment in 1941 as official historian of the Department of Naval Service. He spent eight years in Ottawa and with the assistance of a carefully selected and capable staff of young historians he wrote *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History*, in two volumes, published in 1952 "under the authority of the Minister of National Defence."

By the time these two volumes appeared Gilbert Tucker had been for several years Professor of Canadian History at the University of British Columbia. The Tuckers found the Vancouver and University atmosphere most congenial, and the years 1948-55 witnessed Gilbert's crowning achievements: the much delayed publication of the naval history, and the launching of his research into the history of French Canada. Assisted by generous grants from the Carnegie Corporation, the University of British Columbia, stimulated by Gilbert Tucker, now is recognized as possessing the best collection west of Montreal of source material on the history and literature of French Canada.

And now, suddenly and almost without warning, Gilbert Tucker has left us. His work will go on, but we cannot replace him. [WALTER N. SAGE]

CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION MEETING

The thirty-fourth annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association was held at the University of Toronto, Toronto, June 1-4, 1955. The career of Sir Wilfrid Laurier was the theme of the first general session. H. Blair Neatby's paper dealt with Laurier as a moderate imperialist and J. A. Colvin analysed his attitude towards imperial preference. On the following morning there was a session devoted to European history. R. M. Saunders spoke on "The Function of History, a *philosophe* View," Ezio Cappelletti on "Guglielmo Ferrero and the Writing of History," and R. A. Spencer on "Farewell to German History? Revisionism versus Traditionalism." The next session was

concerned with the Atlantic provinces. G. F. G. Stanley read, and translated, the Reverend René Baudry's paper on the problems involved in searching for materials on the history of the Acadians, and G. O. Rothney's subject was "Newfoundland 1755-1855-1955." As usual, there was a joint session with the Canadian Political Science Association, at which the presidential addresses were delivered. J. A. Corry spoke on "The Prospects for the Rule of Law" and J. J. Talman on "The Impact of the Railway on a Pioneer Community." The next session was a symposium on political parties in the mid-nineteenth century. Great Britain, the United States, and Canada were dealt with, respectively, by J. B. Conacher, W. E. Binkley, and A. R. M. Lower. A joint session was held with the Ontario Historical Society, at which Leslie R. Gray, the president of the Ontario Historical Society, delivered a paper on "The Moravian Missionaries, their Indians and Government" and John S. Moir on "The Clergy Reserves Settlement, 1840-1855."

In addition to the papers there were several *divertissements* arranged for the entertainment of those attending the meeting. These included tours of the University of Toronto Press, of the Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives, and of the Sigmund Samuel Gallery of Canadiana. Mr. Samuel addressed his guests briefly on this last occasion. Finally, on June 4, some ninety members of the Association went on an all-day bus tour of the Niagara Peninsula, which was provided through the courtesy of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. The Programme Committee was under the chairmanship of Professor J. B. Conacher.

Further progress was reported in the historical booklet series, under the editorship of Colonel C. P. Stacey. The fifth title in the series is *Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, 1724-1808: Revised Version* by Professor A. L. Burt, which was recently published.

The new officers of the Association for 1955-6 are: President, Dr. G. F. G. Stanley; Vice-President, Professor D. G. Creighton; Editor of the Canadian Historical Association *Report*, Professor P. G. Cornell; Councillors, Pierre Brunet, D. G. G. Kerr, D. C. Masters, K. W. McNaught, Mason Wade.

PERSONAL ITEMS

At Laval University Professor Marcel Trudel, secretary of the Faculty of Letters, has become director of the Institute of History and Geography, replacing Abbé Arthur Maheux, who has been named professor emeritus.

At the University of Toronto Professor D. G. Creighton has been appointed chairman of the Department of History. Professor J. M. S. Careless will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1955-6. H. I. Nelson and R. A. Spencer have been promoted to the rank of assistant professor. E. E. Rose has been appointed as lecturer and A. Feuerwerker as special lecturer.

At the University of Manitoba Professor Richard Glover has been granted leave of absence during 1955-6. Mr. W. J. Eccles will be *locum tenens*.

At the University of British Columbia Dr. Margaret A. Ormsby has been promoted to the rank of professor. Mr. H. Blair Neatby has been appointed as instructor.

Dr. James A. Gibson, Professor of History and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science, has been named Acting President of Carleton College, following the recent death of Dr. M. M. MacOdum, President and Vice-Chancellor.

At United College, Winnipeg, Dr. J. H. Stewart Reid, chairman of the Department of History, has returned after a year's leave of absence in Europe on a Canadian Government fellowship. Dr. Norman P. Zacour, who has replaced Dr. Reid, has been appointed instructor in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Editors have received the following letter from H. S. Ferns and Bernard Ostry, authors of "Mackenzie King and the First World War," *CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, XXXVI, 2 (June, 1955), 93-112:

"May we call attention to and apologize for an error contained in our article. On page 110 we report Sir Wilfrid Laurier as having written to N. W. Rowell on June 2, 1917, as follows: "If at the present time anybody can restrain and face the extremists, I think I am the man. Were I to flinch at all in the position I have always taken, my usefulness would be gone, and my self-respect would be gone with it." While Sir Wilfrid expressed similar sentiments to these to Mr. Rowell, he did not actually use these words. They were used in a letter to Senator A. C. Hardy dated May 23, 1917."

The following letter has also been received from Professor A. R. M. Lower: "Since I am mentioned by the authors, I may perhaps be allowed a word of comment on Messrs. Ferns and Ostry's "Mackenzie King and the First World War." I refer particularly to the discussion of the Canadian Association for International Conciliation on pp. 102 ff. It so happens that, as a very young candidate, I was President of the Toronto Branch of this Association. It is possible that we were all misled by the wily Mr. King as to its nature, but I do not think probable. Just prior to the outbreak of World War I, a rather hazy pacifism was running a strong tide in the English-speaking world. Those were the days of Norman Angell's *Great Illusion*. I remember Angell speaking at the University of Toronto a year or two before war broke out:— his influence went far, and made many generous-minded people feel that any effort was worth while which might decrease the likelihood of war.

"I doubt very much if Mr. King—of whom I was never a major admirer—was different from the rest of us. I doubt if it is good history to see in his attempts to interest people in *International Conciliation* anything subterranean or Machiavellian. I doubt if it maintains good historical perspective to make so much of what, after all, was no great matter. Finally, I doubt whether obvious bias and a constant spray of weak acid solution, unpleasantly scented, upon the subject of the biography can constitute good biography."

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Professor R. A. Spencer has replaced Professor J. M. S. Careless on the Editorial Committee.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR., is a member of the Department of History of Michigan State University.

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C. P. STACEY is Director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa. He is author of numerous works on Canadian military history.

F. H. UNDERHILL is Professor of History at the University of Toronto.

